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Preface
Critical Shifts
Over the past 40 years, powerful demographic and societal shifts have irrevocably changed the 
American workforce.  Today, women make up nearly half of all U.S. workers.  This change has had 
a dramatic impact on the way families manage their responsibilities at home and at work.  Our 
population has aged significantly — many older Americans are working well past the traditional age 
of retirement.  Transformative civil rights laws empower people with disabilities, allowing them to 
be productive workers.  But the way our workplaces are set up to get work done has failed to keep 
pace with these changes.  The result is a profound “mismatch” between the needs of the modern 
workforce and the structure of the modern workplace.1   
This mismatch between the needs of workers and out-of-date workplace policies plays out every day 
in the lives of working Americans across the country as they struggle to meet the demands of both 
work and family.  And as President Obama recently explained, the consequences of this mismatch 
reach far beyond the needs of certain families or certain industries.
“Workplace flexibility isn’t just a women’s issue.  It’s an issue 
that affects the well-being of our families and the success 
of our businesses.  It affects the strength of our economy —
whether we’ll create the workplaces and jobs of the future we 
need to compete in today’s global economy.”2
This policy platform is the fruit of a collaboration between two organizations:  Workplace Flexibility 
2010 at Georgetown Law (WF2010) and Berkeley Law School’s Center on Health, Economic & Family 
Security (Berkeley CHEFS). Six years ago, Workplace Flexibility 2010 was founded on the simple 
premise that our tremendous societal sea change has been met with an inadequate response from 
both business and government, and that workplace flexibility is critical to the needs of modern 
workers.  Berkeley CHEFS was founded in 2008, in part on the recognition that the mismatch 
between the needs of the modern workforce and the current organization of workplaces has caused 
increasing economic insecurity for families. WF2010 and Berkeley CHEFS share the mission of 
working to develop robust policy solutions to these linked problems of the mismatch between the 
needs of workers and the structure of workplaces, the need for flexibility, and rising individual and 
family economic insecurity.
The “great transformation” of the American workforce isn’t affecting only one type of family or one 
type of industry.3  It’s an American story about a constellation of cultural shifts and demographic 
changes that challenges us to reconsider the touchstones of our daily lives — how we live; how we 
support our families; how we meet our responsibilities as parents, children, and workers; how we run 
our businesses; and how we remain a healthy and globally competitive society.
One of America’s great strengths has been to treat societal change as an opportunity to be seized 
rather than as a problem that merely needs to be fixed.  Confronting the “mismatch” should be no 
different.  
Workplace Flexibility 2010:  Building a National Response 
Despite a growing consensus that workplace flexibility issues are of national concern,4 neither 
federal policy nor private sector practice has fully adapted to, or adequately accounted for, this new 
reality.  Instead, working families largely have been left to muddle through these issues on their own, 
resulting in a high degree of demand for various types of flexibility, but little consistency in the supply.
Workplace Flexibility 2010 was established to figure out how to move the ball forward on flexibility 
using public policy levers.5 We view workplace flexibility — including Flexible Work Arrangements, Time 
Off, and Career Flexibility6 — as a necessary response to the modern work-life dilemma.  It is a set of 
tools that acknowledges the diverse needs of the workforce and diverse demands of the workplace. 
Our goal was to make workplace flexibility a compelling national issue in Washington, and to come up 
with common-sense public policy solutions that would help make workplace flexibility the standard in 
the American workplace. Our unique challenge has been to figure out what role government can play 
on issues that cut to the heart of how employers do business — how they manage their workforce, 
how they structure compensation and benefits, and how they achieve their bottom-line goals.  
In addressing each aspect of flexibility, we started by getting a handle on the current landscape — the 
existing relevant law and policy, and the data available on each issue — and then forcing ourselves to 
look beyond what was in front of us, to imagine new possibilities for restructuring the workplace.  
For the first several years of our project, we maintained a posture of “disciplined neutrality” — keeping 
an open mind on the role of public policy and the types of policy mechanisms that could be used 
to increase access to flexibility.  We were truly looking to get beyond partisan politics and open the 
door to a reasonable and productive policy conversation on flexibility.  Many people from across the 
political spectrum have engaged on our proposals, offered alternatives, and helped us hone our best 
thinking on all three aspects of flexibility.7  We succeeded in creating space for open and constructive 
conversation with leaders from across the political spectrum.
That effort has led to real progress.  Based on these years of work, Workplace Flexibility 2010 was 
able to publish a policy platform on Flexible Work Arrangements in 2009.8  This report included 
a “consensus statement” from our National Advisory Commission on Workplace Flexibility (NAC), 
a diverse group of experts on various aspects of flexibility, which included representatives of 
employers, labor, and researchers.  The platform and consensus statement helped set the stage 
for the 2010 White House Forum on Workplace Flexibility, which featured numerous companies that 
have made flexible work arrangements the norm rather than the exception in their workplaces.9
That same “consensus-based” process, however, including an intense series of conversations with 
our National Advisory Commission, did not result in a similar agreement on time off.  Everyone 
acknowledged there was a problem:  People need paid time off for their own health and family 
caregiving and lots of people, across incomes and industries, don’t get it. 
But we simply couldn’t come up with an alignment of interests between employers and employees 
about the role of government and public policy in this equation.  Workers’ need for time-off policies 
is deep, but the concerns of employers are deep as well:  How would public policy intersect with how 
they do business?  And how would a new law intersect with current law?   
Instead of coming to consensus, we left our Advisory Commission process with a long list of 
“homework” on time-off policy — tough questions that needed more research, thinking and debate.  
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The task was a bit daunting.  But we also left with a flicker of an idea:  There was strong interest 
from employer and employee representatives in addressing the issue of how to provide income 
replacement for periods of extended time off from work for health and caregiving reasons.   
So, in 2009, the question for Workplace Flexibility 2010 was:  How?  How do we get more people, 
across incomes and industries, access to paid time off for health and caregiving reasons?  And 
how can we do it in a way that addresses the needs of working families — as well as the needs of 
employers?
Berkeley CHEFS:  Bridging the Gap Between Academic Ideas and Practical 
Proposals
While Workplace Flexibility 2010 was tackling the difficult question of how to develop modern 
day flexibility policies, Berkeley CHEFS was launching its effort to address issues surrounding the 
increasing economic insecurity of workers and families in the United States.  
One of our central goals at Berkeley CHEFS is to ensure that rigorous academic thinking is applied 
to practical policy solutions.  The reason we chose to focus on workers’ need for paid time off for 
health and caregiving was not only because it is a necessary benefit to increase security for today’s 
workers, but also because, collectively, we have spent significant time and energy over the years 
thinking hard about the problem.  More than 20 years ago, Professor Steve Sugarman developed 
an academic proposal aimed at requiring workers to save in order to be economically prepared for 
a potential future need to be temporarily away from work.10  More recently, Professor Gillian Lester 
made an important contribution to the work addressing this policy problem with her article defending 
the need for paid leave in our country,11 and Ann O’Leary published an article providing an historical 
perspective, examining why family leave laws in the United States don’t provide adequate protections 
for low-income workers.12 
It was the thinking and research behind these articles that formed the initial basis for our research 
on this project.  
Combining Efforts to Construct a Plan
In this last stage of Workplace Flexibility 2010’s process, and at the beginning of Berkeley CHEFS’ 
work, we engaged in a wonderful collaboration aimed at finding the best way to address the thorniest 
questions about time-off policies.   
This report presents our answers. We looked to best practices, explored private sector insurance 
markets, and ultimately landed on a policy solution whose structure, because of its similarity to 
Social Security, would be familiar to every American.  We also ran up against some challenges we 
believe deserve further research.  These include how to ease the “transition costs” for employers as 
we shift the workplace to account for the “new normal” and ensure that employees feel like they can 
take paid time off without risking their job, particularly during a time of recession.
Right now, individuals are struggling with these issues. They are working and have families.  They are 
aging, but still need to work to support themselves and may need more time off to address their own 
ailing health. They have disabilities and health conditions, but could maintain employment if they had 
temporary disability policies to support them.  Women — working or not — continue to carry the bulk 
of the burden for caregiving (both for children and for their aging relatives who are living longer than 
ever) and suffer the consequences of any attendant lost family income.  
Individual employers are all over the map in their ability to provide this type of time off, depending on 
whether they believe it fits their business model and bottom line.  And the government is only now 
realizing that workplace flexibility issues have an impact on the nation’s “bottom line” — the American 
economy. 
In that context, we believe the scope of our proposal matches the depth of the problem.  Our 
proposal acknowledges the elephant in the room:  The world has changed.  American families 
need help.  The modern work-family dilemma means people need new kinds of support to take 
care of themselves and their families.  We need sustainable business, economic, and workforce 
development models that allow us to reap the benefits of every American’s participation in the 
workforce without burning out the most valuable commodity we have: the American people. 
So as we move through the economic recession and rebuild our economy, we need to adopt policies 
that move beyond societal expectations established for a workforce of the last century.  We need 
policies for today’s workers, to ensure they keep working.  Indeed, workplace flexibility represents, 
at its core, an opportunity to sustain our economy, maintain competitiveness, and, at the same time, 
support our families’ financial and emotional health.  The time has come to seize this opportunity 
and put workplace flexibility and paid time off at the top of the list for our 21st century economy and 
American way of life.
Workplace Flexibility 2010
Georgetown Law
Berkeley CHEFS
UC Berkeley School of Law
8 9
1 Kathleen Christensen & Barbara Schneider, Evidence of the Worker and Workplace Mismatch, in Workplace Flexibility: Realigning 
20th-Century Jobs for a 21st-Century Workforce 2 (Kathleen Christensen & Barbara Schneider eds., 2010).
2 Traci McMillan, Obama Says Flexibility Not Just a Women’s Issue, Bloomberg, Oct. 5, 2010. See also  Barack Obama, President 
of the United States, Remarks of the President, White House Forum on Workplace Flexibility (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/forum-workplace-flexibility-closing-session (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).  
3 Maria Shriver, A Woman’s Nation, in The Shriver Report: A Woman’s Nation Changes Everything 7 (Heather Boushey & Ann O’Leary 
eds., 2009).
4 See White House Forum on Flexibility, Break out Session: Participant Comments (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/01/a-conversation-workplace-flexibility (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (including Ron Glover of IBM, 
describing the idea of enabling business to be flexible as “really core”; Avis Jones-DeWeever, National Council of Negro Women, 
emphasizing the difficulties low-wage workers encounter when attempting flexible work; Nancy LeaMond, AARP, conveying 
older workers’ intent to maintain employment at older ages than previous generations; and Sheila Casey, The Hill, explaining 
how important flexibility is to members of the military or loved ones when the member is at home, especially given the reality of 
multiple deployments).
5 See Chai R. Feldblum, Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Workplace Flexibility: The State of Play, in Work-Life Policies (Ann 
C. Crouter and Alan Booth eds., 2009).
6 See Workplace Flexibility 2010, Policy Components, available at http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/index.php/policy_
components/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
7 This feedback process was formalized through our Legal Working Group and National Advisory Commission on Workplace 
Flexibility, but also included numerous meetings with work-family and business advocates, academic researchers, and business 
representatives.
8 Workplace Flexibility 2010, Public Policy Platform on Flexible Work Arrangements (2010), available at http://workplaceflexibility2010.
org/images/uploads/reports/report_1.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
9 White House Forum on Workplace Flexibility (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/01/a-
conversation-workplace-flexibility (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
10 Stephen D. Sugarman, Short Term Paid Leave: A New Approach to Social Insurance and Employee Benefits, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 
465 (1987).
11 Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 Harv. Women’s L.J. 1 (2005).
12 Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 (2007).
Executive Summary
In this report, Workplace Flexibility 2010 at Georgetown Law and the Berkeley Center on Health, 
Economic & Family Security at UC Berkeley School of Law propose a new “Family Security Insurance” 
(FSI) that would reform our current social insurance system to provide for income replacement when 
people take time off from work for health and caregiving reasons. This report details the benefits 
provided under FSI, who would be eligible, how it would be administered, and — importantly — how to 
pay for it. 
The recommendations cover income replacement for the following three significant life events:
k  One’s own serious illness or temporary disability that renders a worker temporarily unable to 
perform his or her job; 
k Arrival of a newborn, newly adopted child or newly placed foster child who needs care and 
time to bond with parents; and
k The serious illness of a family member who is in need of care. 
Our report is based on an extensive review of research documenting the demographic and societal 
shifts over the past 40 years, the current variability in access to paid time off, the legal landscape, 
and the public policy arguments in support of income replacement when workers are away from work 
for health and caregiving reasons. We make the case that workplace flexibility, and specifically paid 
time off from work for health and caregiving reasons, is no longer an issue for some families or some 
industries, but rather a national priority with major social and economic implications.  FSI is designed 
to support people who are working, and to help keep them working. 
FSI would be a national social insurance program paid for not by the government, but by spreading 
the cost among workers and their employers to create a fair, predictable foundation of support.  It 
would not be a cash assistance or welfare program that would add to the national deficit.
Key Elements of Family Security Insurance (FSI)
The following summary describes the key elements of the FSI program and how it would work for 
employers and employees.
                 
Eligibility for income replacement benefits under FSI
FSI would consist of three components: Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI), Parental Care for a 
New Child Insurance (PCNC), and Caregiving Insurance.  Workers would qualify based on the reason 
needed for time off from work:
TDI: Those eligible must have a “temporary disability,” defined as a “serious health condition” 
[as that term is used in the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)], which causes an individual 
to be unable to perform the usual functions of his or her job, including disability resulting from 
pregnancy or childbirth. 
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PCNC: An individual would be eligible for PCNC benefits if he or she is the parent of a 
newborn, newly adopted or newly placed foster child and is providing care to that child.  
 Caregiving Insurance: A worker would be eligible if he or she is “needed to care for” a “family 
  member” with a “serious health condition.”  The terms “needed to care for” and “serious 
 health condition” would track the definitions used in the FMLA.  The term “family member”  
 would be defined broadly to include, among others, grandparents, domestic partners, and 
 siblings, as well as spouses, parents, and children.  
All participants, regardless of the reason for time off from work, would need to meet a threshold 
level of attachment to the labor force:  They must have worked at least 950 hours in the previous 
year. This threshold will help meet one of the key objectives of FSI: encouraging continued labor 
force attachment of individuals who need to interrupt work temporarily to meet health or caregiving 
demands.  A worker’s eligibility would not depend on the size of his or her employer or on having 
worked for one particular employer.  Self-employed individuals also would be covered.
The amount of the benefit  
We sought to make the wage replacement rate for each aspect of the program high enough so 
people could depend on the program to provide substantial financial security when they have a 
health or caregiving need requiring time off work.  We also tailored the benefit — both the wage 
replacement rate and the length of the time off — to the different needs of, and policy challenges 
posed by,  each of the three components.  
TDI: An eligible recipient’s wages would be replaced at 80% of the worker’s average weekly 
wage, up to a maximum amount of 150% of the national average weekly wage.  Benefits 
would be available for up to 26 weeks per year, although the actual duration of benefits 
received would depend on a medical provider’s recommendation for the specific illness or 
injury. 
PCNC: An eligible recipient’s wages would be replaced at 90% of the worker’s average 
weekly wage, up to a maximum amount of 150% of the national average weekly wage. Each 
parent would be eligible for 12 weeks of PCNC benefits within the first year of a child’s birth, 
adoption or foster placement.  The benefits would accrue to each individual and would not be 
transferable between parents.  
Caregiving Insurance:  An eligible recipient’s wages would be replaced at 80% of the worker’s 
average weekly wage, up to a maximum amount of 150% of the national average weekly 
wage. There would be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum 
amount an individual could receive over the course of his or her working lifetime, and that 
12 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum an individual could receive in any one year. 
Within those limits, actual benefit durations would depend on how long a worker had to be 
away from work to provide care.  
*Note: Because 90% of $1500 is $1350, which is higher than the allowed maximum benefit ($1254), the professional worker would receive the 
maximum benefit of 150% of the national average weekly wage ($1254) instead of 90% of his or her salary ($1350).
Worker’s Average 
Weekly Wage
Worker
Minimum Wage Worker
Unionized Worker
Professional Worker
Maximum Benefit  
Allowed
[National  Average 
Weekly Wage ($836) 
Multiplied by 
150 Percent]
$1254
$1264
$1254
$232
$800
$1200
$261
$900
$1254*
$290
$1000
$1500
Worker’s TDI and 
Caregiving Insurance 
Weekly Benefit 
(80% of Workers Avg. 
Weekly Wage up to 
Max of National Avg. 
Weekly Wage)
Worker’s PCNC Weekly 
Benefit 
(90% of Workers Avg. 
Weekly Wage up to 
Max of National Avg. 
Weekly Wage)
Hypothetical FSI Worker Benefits
Like regular wages, the benefits would be subject to federal income and payroll tax.   Benefits would 
be available for five consecutive business days of time off or more, but not for shorter periods of time 
off.
In the case of TDI and Caregiving Insurance, a five-business-day waiting period would effectively 
serve as a “co-pay” into the system.  This means recipients might need to use other forms of 
paid time off, such as sick days or their own savings, before drawing on FSI benefits. This would 
discourage using the system unnecessarily.  There would be no waiting period for PCNC benefits.
Paying for FSI
FSI would be financed by an equal-contribution employer and employee payroll tax, with no cap on 
the amount of earnings subject to taxation for a given year.  The tax would cover the cost of benefits 
as well as administration of the program. The payroll tax spreads the cost of the program across a 
large risk pool, protecting against deficit spending and ensuring that the program is budget neutral 
over the short and long term.
Protecting against overuse, fraud, and abuse
Each aspect of the program — TDI, PCNC, and Caregiving Insurance — includes checks and balances 
to protect against overuse, fraud, and abuse.  We recommend specific eligibility and benefit rules to 
control cost and prevent fraud and abuse.
To control against overuse, for example, we limit the ability to receive benefits under TDI and 
Caregiving Insurance to those who take time off from work because, respectively, they have a 
“serious health condition” or are “needed to care for” an individual with a “serious health condition” 
as defined by the FMLA.  This program will not be available for routine illnesses.  In addition, a 
worker taking TDI has to be unable to work due to the serious health condition.  In other words, 
it is not enough to be sick; the illness must render the worker temporarily incapable of working. 
Recipients of TDI and Caregiving Insurance must also satisfy a five-day waiting period before 
receiving any benefits.  Together, these rules help ensure that the program is used only for serious 
illnesses and injuries.
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Another way in which the program controls against overuse is by limiting the Caregiving Insurance 
benefit to a total maximum benefit duration of 26 weeks across an individual’s working life.
In addition, we include a number of mechanisms to control against fraud and abuse.  For example, 
under TDI, medical certification is required to confirm the presence of a serious health condition.  For 
Caregiving Insurance, a benefit recipient must provide documentation that he or she is needed to 
provide care and what type of care will be provided.  Medical providers must certify the need for care. 
For PCNC, each parent must attest that he or she is providing care to the child.
Rationale for a social insurance model  
After exploring several other policy models — such as tax incentives, employer mandates, and 
personal savings accounts — we became convinced that social insurance was the best policy model 
for providing income replacement for health and careving needs.  Historical, fairness, and economic 
arguments all support a social insurance model.  
Historically, our country has decided to insure its citizens against a number of unexpected 
disruptions and significant life events. Social Security provides protection for retirement, death of a 
loved one, and permanent disability.  Unemployment Insurance protects against the risk of losing a 
job without cause. Worker’s Compensation insures employees against workplace injuries.  Further, 
five states and one territory use Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) to protect their workers against 
illness and injury outside the workplace, and two states have added family and medical caregiving 
protection to that coverage.  
National social insurance that provides income replacement during periods of time off for health and 
caregiving purposes fits well within this system of supports. After all, few events are more disruptive 
to a person’s life than the birth or adoption of a child, or the need to care for oneself or a loved one 
with a serious health condition.  
From a fairness perspective, national social insurance based on workforce attachment is the only 
option that can guarantee a universal baseline of income replacement.  Because access is based 
on workforce attachment, there are no disparities based upon income, gender, occupation, industry, 
and/or union membership. A laborer in Massachusetts, for example, has the same basic access to 
paid time off as an attorney in Arizona.  Though some beneficiaries will have access to additional 
paid time off, such as benefits funded by employers for recruitment and retention purposes, 
everyone will start from a common baseline.
Finally, national social insurance makes good economic sense.  The rise of the two-earner family, 
coupled with an aging population, has created a permanent demographic shift in the American 
workforce.  More people need to take time off to care for themselves or a loved one, but few are 
able to afford the time away from work.  This is exactly the kind of problem that social insurance was 
designed to protect against.
In addition, employers — especially small employers — benefit from a social insurance model because 
it allows them to provide their employees with paid time off at an affordable price.  This is true 
because a national social insurance program has the practical advantage of risk-pooling across firms 
instead of pricing time-off benefits for each individual employer.
The administration of FSI  
FSI would be administered by either a single federal agency or a federal-state partnership. 
Regardless of which agency administers FSI, a functioning system will require its own set of 
administrative processes.   In the report, we outline how the administration of FSI would work, 
including the application process, distribution of benefits, and review process.
Other key aspects of the report
We explored additional policy levers that would be necessary to make FSI work better for employers 
and employees.  First, employers should be supported during periods of time that employees are 
off from work and receiving FSI benefits.  Employers need to get their work done, and there are 
numerous business practices that can help employers manage periods of time off effectively.
We also believe job protection for employees is a necessary prerequisite for any insurance system 
or wage replacement program.  Employees are afraid to take time off from work for fear of being 
fired or being replaced, particularly in this economy. To ensure people take the time they need — 
and to ensure we get at the societal “payoffs” of the system — we recommend that the FMLA’s job 
protection requirement be extended to cover smaller employers (those with 15 or more employees 
rather than the current threshold of 50 or more employees).
Finally, we provide a series of “next steps” that would further our understanding of how to build 
effective public policy solutions in this arena.  
Reasons to adopt FSI despite concerns about the federal deficit  
and the recession  
The key goals of FSI are to keep people working, healthy, and productive. Nothing could be more 
relevant as America seeks to move through this recession and maintain a balanced budget.  In fact, 
we view the goals of FSI as a necessary part of broader economic and budget conversations.
Many factors — family income security, child development, productivity, labor force attachment, and 
better health outcomes —combine to make this issue a national priority. This is particularly true 
during volatile economic times when many families simply can’t afford to take unpaid time off even 
for the most pressing and important health and family events.  
Current access to paid time off for health and caregiving comes nowhere near to meeting the 
demand.  The current system runs on the luck of the draw — where some companies offer some 
forms of paid time off, but others either cannot afford it or presume these issues are not part of 
their bottom-line strategy.  Families hope for the best and muddle through, but sometimes with dire 
consequences for their job tenure and long-term financial security.  Depending on the type of work 
you do and what industry you’re in, there is huge variation in access to paid time off from work.   
Even more important than the short-term view is the long-term payoff.  Over time, the costs of failing 
to deal with this issue will add up.  In contrast, long-term benefits of addressing this issue include 
healthier children, parents, and elders; an informal caregiving network that complements the 
American healthcare system; gender equity and equal opportunity; possible savings on other public 
benefits programs; sustained labor force attachment by workers who have caregiving obligations; 
and family economic security.  
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Of course, spending any amount of money or political capital on this issue will never be “worth it” 
unless policymakers make this issue a priority.  To date, the “big ticket” conversations on the deficit 
and economic recovery generally haven’t included workplace flexibility — or specifically, paid time off 
for health and caregiving reasons — as a key variable, even though women’s workforce participation 
and keeping people working are critical elements to our overall economic competitiveness.  That’s 
exactly why we believe FSI should be front and center in discussions about the deficit and economic 
growth.
 
The issue is no longer an individual one.  Instead, it has major social and economic implications that 
merit a national response. 
 
Introduction
The Challenge
Over the course of our lives and careers, almost all of us will need time off from work to care for our 
children, our own health needs, or those of a family member.  This has always been true, but the 
problem, magnified by demographic shifts, is now a nearly universal challenge.
Yet our national policy on paid time off from work for health and caregiving reasons has not caught 
up with today’s reality.  As a result, individuals, families, and employers are largely left to muddle 
through on their own, with only a patchwork of supports that falls far short of the demand. This 
inaction has consequences not only for individuals and families, but also for business and the overall 
economy.  
This report offers one solution to the problem of how we support ourselves, our families, our 
businesses, and our economy through some of life’s most complex and challenging moments.  It 
offers a blueprint for a national social insurance program — which we call “Family Security Insurance” 
(FSI) — to provide income replacement for workers when they are away from work due to the birth or 
adoption of a child, their own serious illness, or to care for a family member with a serious illness.1  
This report documents our proposal in detail and shares the depth of rigorous research that supports 
our conclusions. 
Over the last two years, Workplace Flexibility 2010 at Georgetown Law and the Berkeley Center on 
Health, Economic & Family Security at UC Berkeley School of Law have collaborated to create this 
proposal.  We followed a careful and lengthy process to reach the conclusions laid out in this report. 
We looked at the reasons people need paid time off from work for health and caregiving and what 
happens if they don’t get it. We scrutinized how things work right now in the private sector and 
under current law to understand who has access to paid time off and who doesn’t.  We carefully 
constructed our policy response to meet the needs of individuals across income, gender, age, 
occupation, and industry, while also addressing employer concerns and remaining conscious of 
financial costs to individuals, employers, and the government.  
Because we looked at these issues through a research lens, we can say with confidence that each 
of the elements we propose as part of FSI is firmly grounded on a foundation from the fields of law, 
economics and social science.  Our proposal recognizes that the 21st century requires a different 
set of policies than the 20th century.  In the 21st century, we need policies designating a national 
priority to support people who are working— and to help keep them working.  We also need policies 
that spread the costs of paid time off from work for health and caregiving among employers and 
employees to create a fair and predictable baseline of support.  
Below, we outline the rationale for our program design— through our key research findings and our 
goals and objectives. 
Qualifying Event 
Duration
Wage Replacement 
Rate & Maximum 
Benefit Amount
Waiting period
Method of financing
Job protection
Anti-retaliation provision
Payroll tax earnings cap
Administrative vehicle
Proportion of payroll 
tax contributions
Allowable increments 
of benefits
Taxation
Workforce Attachment 
Requirements
Covered Employers
• Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI): applicant’s serious health condition (includes pregnancy). 
• Parental Care for a New Child Insurance (PCNC): birth or placement of a new child.
• Caregiving Insurance (CI): serious health condition of a family member, broadly defined. 
• TDI: depends on length of an individual’s serious health condition;  
    maximum annual duration of 26 weeks; no total maximum duration.
• PCNC: 12 weeks per parent, must be taken within 12 months of child’s birth or  
    placement; no total maximum duration.
• CI:  depends on length of caregiving need; maximum annual duration of 12 weeks,  
    total maximum duration of 26 weeks.
• TDI and CI: 80% of worker’s average week wage up to maximum of 150% the  
    national average weekly wage.  
• PCNC: 90% of worker’s average week wage up to maximum of 150% the  
    national average weekly wage.
• TDI: 5 workdays per year, per serious health condition.
• PCNC: None.
• CI: 5 workdays per year, per serious health condition of the person being cared for.
Payroll tax, contributions made on a pre-tax basis.
No.  Recommends an expansion of the FMLA to cover employers with 15+ employees.
Yes.
None.
Either a single federal agency or a federal-state partnership.
Employees: 50%; Employers: 50%; Self-employed: 100%.
5 days or more.
Benefits are treated as taxable wages for income and payroll tax purposes.
Minimum of 950 hours worked over a base period, which is defined as the last 4 or 5 
quarters preceding an application for benefits. Hours can be served at multiple employers. 
Self-employed individuals’ eligibility is determined based on earnings.
All.
ELIGIBILITY
BENEFITS
FINANCING
JOB PROTECTION or ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISIONS 
ADMINISTRATION
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Couples Spend More Time Working
52.5
63.12000
1970
combined average hours per week
Source: Jacobs and Gerson, The Time Divide 
(Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 44, Table 2.1
More Parents Are in the Labor Force
40%
66%2008
1975
% of families with children under 18yrs 
in which all parents work
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release, 
Table 4: “Families with Own Children, 2007-2008 Annual Averages”; 
National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Ed., “Indicator 
18: Parents’ Employment, 1975 to 1993.”
More Older Adults Are in the Labor Force
46%
24%
29%
14%
53%
34%
40%
Men Women
24%
ages 62-64 ages 65-69ages 65-69ages 62-64
Source: Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related Statistics, 
“Older Americans Update 2006: Key Indicators of Well-Being,” Table 11.
1985 2005
The Research Findings
Three key research findings shape the principles behind our recommendations and ultimately guide 
our thinking on why a social insurance model is the appropriate policy vehicle.  
Finding #1:  The world of work and family has changed.
Profound demographic and societal shifts over the last 40 years have resulted in an increased and 
acute need for various types of workplace flexibility, including paid time off for health and caregiving 
reasons. For example: 
k In most families, the family-based caregiving safety net in the form of a “stay-at-home spouse” 
no longer exists. Women are now nearly half of all U.S. workers and are integral to the national 
economy as primary or co-breadwinners in over two-thirds of households.2    
k We are living longer, working longer, and providing more care to aging relatives.3 In fact, 
caregiving demands are hitting a critical mass.  Fifty-nine percent of the 44.4 million 
caregivers providing care to older individuals are employed, simultaneously juggling work and 
caregiving responsibilities.4   
k Health technology has advanced in ways we could never have imagined 50 years ago.  Health 
conditions that previously would have resulted in death or an inability to work now often can 
be treated through medication, short-term therapies, and surgery, allowing individuals to get 
back to work within a matter of weeks.
k People with serious illnesses and temporary disabilities now are able to stay in the workforce 
and are expected to support themselves through work. In fact, with the passage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, these individuals are empowered to work and contribute to 
the economy.5
k The above changes have led to increased levels of reported work-family conflict.6  Americans 
want more workplace flexibility.  Seventy six percent of likely voters say they favor extending 
the current law to provide paid leave.7 Both men and women experience this tug, and the 
need for flexibility and paid time off goes beyond one type of family or one type of industry.8
Finding #2:  We haven’t caught up to the changes in how we work and live.
Despite the on-the-ground reality facing most Americans, neither the private sector nor public policy 
has met the demand for paid time off for health and caregiving reasons.  
k Working families need paid time off for parental care for a new child, temporary disability, 
and caregiving reasons, but current access is extremely variable and depends on employer, 
occupation, income, industry, gender, union membership, and number of hours worked.9  
What’s more, there is huge variation in how employers provide paid time-off benefits, 
including formal insurance, self-insured benefits, informal policies, and PTO (paid time off) 
banks.10 
k Disparity continues to exist between women and men regarding who takes time off for 
caregiving reasons and for bonding with a new child, driven in part by the fact that men 
continue to earn more than their wives.11
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k The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides critical 
protections, but has two key failings:  Its protections reach 
only about half the workforce, and because the leave is 
unpaid, many simply cannot afford to take it.12
k No federal programs exist to provide paid time off for health and caregiving reasons, and 
there are only a few state programs that provide income replacement for these reasons.13 
k Many, many working Americans lack access to paid time off all together — most frequently 
those who are low-wage and part-time workers.14
Finding #3:  Income replacement for health and caregiving reasons is good for 
public health, family economic security, and business productivity.
Beyond the sheer need for more work-family support, there are many reasons why income 
replacement for personal and family health events is good — even critical — for society.  In Chapters 
2 through 4 of this report, we detail the reasons: better outcomes for children, greater gender equity, 
more secure family incomes, and positive business outcomes.  Here we provide a few highlights:
Improved Health and Well-Being for Children and Their Caregivers:15 Income replacement for new 
parents has tremendous benefits for the health and well-being of children and their caregivers. 
Parental leave of 12 weeks or more is correlated with many positive health outcomes for children. 
Further, parental workplace flexibility during the first year of a child’s life, including a significant 
amount of time off and/or flexibility in scheduling, can have positive developmental and cognitive 
effects for children. 
Parents also benefit from time off to care for newborn, newly adopted, or newly placed foster 
children. For women, returning early to work, particularly if earlier than preferred, is associated with 
greater amounts of stress and higher rates of depression. Fathers and non-biological parents (e.g., 
adoptive or foster parents) also benefit from having time to bond with their children.  Although men in 
the United States rarely take much time off following the birth or adoption of a new child, those who 
do are more involved in the care of their children later, resulting in stronger long-term, father-child 
relationships. Time off for foster or adoptive parents is also important because these parents may 
not have had the same amount of time to prepare psychologically and emotionally for the arrival of 
the child and are often not present at the birth of the child.
By contrast, returning to work very soon after birth, (i.e., six weeks or less) is associated with a 
variety of negative outcomes for both parents and children. These include higher rates of infant 
mortality, lower rates of breastfeeding, lower rates of immunizations and well-baby care, and a higher 
incidence of maternal physical and mental health concerns. 
Greater Income Security:  FSI provides greater income security for workers and their families who 
need time off for a health or caregiving reason.  The case for increased income security is especially 
strong for those events that are unplanned, such as one’s own serious illness or the need to provide 
care for a suddenly seriously ill family member.  It is well documented that working caregivers often 
suffer significant financial hardship.16  
 
Better Business Outcomes:  Employers stand to gain from the provision of wage replacement 
for their temporarily disabled workers or for those needing time off to provide care.  A worker’s 
faster and more complete recovery, associated with paid time off, reduces the cost of foregone 
productivity.17  Employers may also benefit from reduced health care costs since employees will have 
time off to recover from an illness or injury instead of developing a chronic problem.   Providing 
workers with wage replacement during time off for caregiving is also advantageous to business. 
Recent research shows that people who receive wage replacement while taking care-related time off 
are more likely to return to their job following the event and to be more productive overall.18  
Improved Gender Equity:  Women have historically been, and continue to be, primary caregivers in 
their families, despite the fact that most are now employed outside the home.19  Women are nearly 
always the ones who leave the labor force if it is deemed necessary or more cost effective for one 
parent to do so.20  Data from other countries that have adopted social insurance programs for paid 
family leave suggest that providing women with the means to take temporary time off keeps them 
working and also increases their lifetime wages.21   Many men would also like to be more involved 
in caregiving; this is particularly the case among younger generations of workers, who highly value 
a balance between work and family life.22   Recent experiments in OECD countries, such as Sweden 
and Finland, have demonstrated that when governments put policies in place to encourage men to 
take leave, they do it.23 
Our Goals and Objectives
Based on the above research findings, we set out goals and objectives that our ideal program had to 
meet. Our proposal had to:  
k Focus on the primary sources of workplace/workforce conflict regarding the need for time 
off: personal illness, care for an ill family member, and time off to care for a newborn or newly 
placed adopted or foster child.  
k Provide universal access to paid time off for medical and caregiving reasons.  Universal 
access means equal access across gender, income, life stage, and industry/occupation. 
k Seek to support people who are working and keep them working.  Labor force attachment 
drives many aspects of our program design.
k Ensure efficient delivery of the benefit so that people would get the income replacement 
simply and when they needed it, not weeks or months later.
k Be budget neutral, spreading the costs among employers and employees rather than 
increasing the federal deficit.
k Account for employer interests in predictability and administrative ease.
We believe FSI meets all these goals.
A Call for Action
In this report, we make the case for why we need a national social insurance system to support 
workers who must be away from work because of their own illnesses, to care for a new child, or to 
care for an ill family member.  We argue that FSI is in the best interest of families, businesses, and 
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our national economy, and we provide detailed recommendations regarding how FSI would work in 
practice.  Government inaction is no longer acceptable.  The time to act is now.
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Chapter 1
Universal Recommendations
Some of our recommendations apply to all three types of paid time off: Temporary Disability 
Insurance, Parental Care for a New Child Insurance, and Caregiving Insurance.  Other 
recommendations differ, depending on the underlying reason for the time off.
All recommendations build on a number of existing laws and programs:
k The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which provides unpaid, job-protected time off for 
one’s own serious health condition, to care for a new child, or to care for a seriously ill family 
member; 1
k Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs in California, Hawaii, New York, New Jersey, 
Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico, which provide wage replacement for time off from work due 
to an individual’s temporary illness or injury that renders the person unable to work; and
k Paid Family Leave (PFL) programs in California and New Jersey, which provide wage 
replacement benefits for time off from work to bond with and care for a new child, or to care 
for a family member.
These laws are explained in detail below.2
We start by laying out the recommendations that are universal across all three categories of time off.  
These include the following:
Eligibility.
k A worker’s eligibility for FSI benefits should be tied to a critical level of labor force 
attachment.  We recommend a minimum of 950 hours worked over a one-year period. 
k A worker’s eligibility should not depend on the size of his or her employer or on working, or 
having worked, for one particular employer.
k Self-employed individuals should be covered by FSI, but eligibility for the self-employed 
should be based on earnings, not hours (as it is for traditional employees).
Benefits.
k FSI benefits should be based on a percentage of the worker’s average wages over a one-year 
period. The wage replacement rate will differ depending on the reason for the time off: 80% 
for temporary disability and caregiving, and 90% for parental care of a new child. 
k There should be a maximum benefit amount that is the same for all three categories of time 
off. We recommend a maximum weekly benefit amount that replaces wages up to 150% of 
the national average weekly wage.
k FSI benefits should be subject to federal income and payroll tax, but contributions to the 
program should be made on a pre-tax basis. 
k FSI benefits should only be available for time off that lasts five consecutive business days or 
longer.
k No individual should be discharged or discriminated against because he or she has filed a 
claim for FSI benefits.
Financing.
k FSI should be financed by an equal-contribution employer and employee payroll tax, with no 
cap on the amount of wages subject to taxation for a given year. The tax should be sufficient 
to cover the cost of benefits as well as administration of the program.
k Contributions to the program should not be experience-rated. 
Below we describe our rationale for each of our universal recommendations:
Eligibility.
A worker’s eligibility for FSI benefits should be tied to a critical level of labor force attachment.  We 
recommend a minimum of 950 hours worked over a one-year period.
A significant rationale for this proposal is to support the continued labor force attachment of 
individuals who need to interrupt work temporarily to meet health or caregiving demands. Requiring 
a specified number of hours worked as a condition of eligibility is the best way to ensure the 
program achieves this objective.  Requiring little or no prior workforce participation would mean the 
benefit could be used as a form of cash assistance for non-workers. Setting the requirement too 
high, however, could exclude workers whose labor market participation is less than full time but 
nevertheless significant.
We propose a reasonable minimum workforce attachment requirement of 950 work hours during 
a one-year period. The one-year period would generally be calculated by taking the first four of the 
five most recent quarters preceding an individual’s application for benefits.  However, if an applicant 
would be deemed ineligible using the traditional base period, an alternative base period should be 
used instead — that is, using the last four completed quarters.3  
A requirement of 950 hours would allow individuals who work part time to qualify for the program.  
An employee who works an average of 20 hours per week during the year would qualify for the 
program even if that person took up to 41/2 ½ weeks off work for vacation, sick days, or other reasons 
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(including being between jobs).  This hours threshold is significantly lower than requirements of 
the FMLA and recent congressional proposals for paid family and medical leave insurance.4  We 
recommend this lower threshold precisely to address the exclusion of part-time workers we have 
seen with FMLA coverage.5  We are motivated in part by the fact that in the current economic climate, 
many who work part time do so involuntarily because full-time positions are not available.6 
While our recommended hours requirement is lower than the FMLA, we recognize it is higher than 
most Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) parental leave programs 
and some state TDI or PFL programs.7  The reason we recommend a higher threshold is because 
this program is explicitly aimed at supporting and incentivizing strong labor force attachment.  
With regard to parental care and caregiving leave, research suggests higher levels of workforce 
attachment prior to leave have a direct correlation to higher levels of attachment by mothers 
after returning from the leave.8  We believe a moderately high threshold is also appropriate for 
the TDI portion of the program to reduce the likelihood of moral hazard and to reinforce the idea 
that the program is designed to give benefit entitlements only to those who have a demonstrated 
commitment to the workforce.9
We believe an hours requirement is more appropriate than an earnings test.  Hours worked is a more 
direct measure of workforce attachment than earnings and avoids the skewing of eligibility towards 
high earners.  Many OECD countries condition eligibility for parental leave social insurance programs 
on a minimum level of hours worked rather than earnings.10  Furthermore, the historical use of 
earnings as a proxy for attachment — the criterion used by most state Unemployment Insurance (UI), 
TDI, and PFL programs — has led to arbitrary exclusions of low-wage and part-time workers, which we 
seek to avoid.11  The UI programs in Washington and Oregon provide good models for establishing a 
mechanism to track hours data for salaried and hourly employees.12  
A worker’s eligibility should not depend on the size of his or her employer or on working, or having 
worked, for one particular employer.
All workers who pay into the system should have access to benefits, regardless of whether such 
individuals work for a small or large employer.  This is consistent with most social insurance 
programs in the United States, including Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, Workers’ 
Compensation, and state TDI and PFL programs.13 The OECD countries we studied also allow 
individuals at both small and large employers to qualify for parental leave benefits.14   Extending 
coverage to all workers, regardless of business size, is also particularly important for low-wage 
workers, who are more likely to work for small employers and less likely to receive time-off benefits.15  
Low-wage workers are also more likely to report needing leave from work to care for a family member 
or to recover from their own serious illness or health condition.16 
We also believe there should be no requirement that the hours worked be for the same employer.  
While job protection must be tied to a particular employer because it requires employers to restore 
a job, there is no similar need in a national wage replacement insurance system.  None of the social 
insurance programs we studied in the United States requires that the hours worked or earnings 
must be tied to a particular employer to trigger eligibility for benefits, including UI and state TDI/PFL 
programs.17   It is unfair to disqualify workers who have paid into the program at a previous place of 
employment simply because they have changed jobs.  It is equally unfair to disqualify workers who 
have paid into the program simply because they work part time, but simultaneously, at two or three 
different jobs.
We recognize that employers, particularly small businesses, might be rightfully concerned about 
how to cope with an increased number of employees who take time off.  To account for these 
concerns, this proposal incorporates eligibility and benefits rules that 
create clear expectations about how the program will be used by 
employees, and includes safeguards against fraud and abuse. 
Self-employed individuals should be covered by FSI, but eligibility for the self-employed should be 
based on earnings, not hours (as it is for traditional employees).
We believe that self-employed individuals should be covered by FSI and required to contribute 
both the employer and employee portions of the payroll tax. Self-employed individuals are also 
required to maintain coverage under similar social insurance programs such as Social Security 
and Medicare.18  Self-employed workers represent 7 percent of the workforce; these individuals are 
often entrepreneurial risk-takers who are particularly subject to the uncertainties of the market, and 
therefore arguably even more in need of protection.19  We considered recommending such coverage 
on a voluntary basis, but we were concerned that optional coverage for the self-employed could 
lead to adverse selection and place the fiscal stability of the program at risk.  In other words, we 
were worried that if participation were optional, only individuals with serious health conditions or 
significant caregiving responsibilities would opt in to the program, thus driving up the costs.  
We believe that eligibility for self-employed individuals should be based on earnings, not hours, 
because, unlike for other workers, there is no feasible mechanism to verify self-employed hours data. 
Social Security and California’s TDI/PFL program both present models for determining an appropriate 
earnings test for self-employed individuals. 20
Benefits.
As explained in subsequent chapters, we recommend that an individual receive 80% wage 
replacement (up to a cap) for time off for Temporary Disability and Caregiving, and 90% wage 
replacement (up to the same cap) for Parental Care for a New Child.  The following recommendations 
regarding benefits, however, are universal across all three programs and thus are discussed here.
FSI benefits should be based on a percentage of the worker’s average weekly wage over a one-year 
period.
We believe the program should provide a level of benefits that represents a realistic assessment 
of workers’ past average weekly wages.  Thus, we recommend that the benefit amount be based 
on a worker’s average wages across a base period, which should be the last four or five quarters 
immediately preceding an application.21 
There should be a maximum benefit amount that is the same for all three categories of time off. We 
recommend a maximum weekly benefit amount that replaces wages up to 150% of the national 
average weekly wage.
A national social insurance program should include a maximum benefit amount.  All individuals 
should receive a basic wage replacement benefit through FSI and the maximum benefit must be 
higher than the average weekly wage to ensure families across the income spectrum — in particular, 
middle-class families — can effectively take advantage of the benefit.  Individuals whose incomes fall 
above the maximum at which wages are replaced and wish to maintain a significantly higher wage 
replacement during their time off should be encouraged to save private funds for that goal. 
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We recommend a maximum weekly benefit amount that replaces wages up to 150% of the 
national average weekly wage.  In today’s dollars, the maximum weekly wage at which a worker 
would receive wage replacement corresponding to their income level is approximately $1,254 per 
week.22  Setting the maximum benefit at this level ensures that a substantial majority of American 
households — more than 75 percent — will receive benefits that correspond to their income levels.23 
There is precedent in analogous social insurance programs for setting maximum benefits at a 
moderately high level.  California’s TDI and PFL program sets maximum benefits at 150% of the 
state average weekly wage, and some state workers’ compensation programs are set at 150% of 
their state average weekly wages as well.24 In addition, the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation program, which provides wage replacement to longshore and harbor workers who 
have work-related injuries or disabilities, sets maximum benefits at 200% the national average 
weekly wage.25 
Our primary reason for setting the maximum benefit at a moderately high level is to enable primary 
household earners, who are disproportionately men, to take parental or caregiving leave.  Our review 
of statistics from paid parental leave programs in countries with low maximum benefit amounts and 
wage replacement rates showed very low take-up rates among men; high benefit amounts were 
associated with increased male take-up.26  Additionally, usage data from California and New Jersey’s 
PFL programs show that California’s PFL program, which has maximum benefits similar to our 
proposal, has much higher take-up rates of PFL among men than New Jersey’s PFL program, which 
has a low maximum benefit amount.27  In short, we believe that an effective national social insurance 
program for addressing temporary disabilities, care for a new child, and caregiving should provide 
benefits that allow each working family member to affordably take time off work when needed.
To account for changes in wages and cost of living over time, the maximum benefits should be 
indexed to the national average weekly wage.  Several state-level social insurance programs index 
benefits to their state’s average weekly wage.28   For national programs like our proposal, national 
average weekly wage data is appropriate because workers in every state will be contributing the 
same percentage of their wages to fund the program.29 Social Security also uses national average 
weekly wage data as part of its benefit formula.30 
FSI benefits should be subject to federal income and payroll tax, but contributions to the program 
should be made on a pre-tax basis. 
We arrived at our recommendation on taxation after researching how similar short -term wage 
replacement benefits (workers’ compensation, state TDI/PFL, and unemployment compensation) 
are currently treated under federal income and payroll tax rules.31  Our research found different 
tax rules for each type of benefit; in particular, there are complicated rules on taxation of state TDI 
benefits that depend on how a program is funded.32  We also looked at how other countries treat 
similar benefits for tax purposes.  Many of them treat parental leave and maternity leave benefits as 
taxable income, particularly if the benefits are offered as wage replacement and not flat-rate public 
assistance benefits.33
There are several reasons we chose to treat FSI benefits as taxable wages for income and payroll tax 
purposes:
First, because FSI is explicitly linked to paid employment and the benefits are based on one’s wages, 
we believe it is appropriate to treat the benefits as taxable wages. Treating the benefits as wages 
for payroll tax purposes means that a person receiving FSI benefits will still be contributing to Social 
Security and Medicare while away from work.  We believe it is important that an FSI recipient’s future 
Social Security benefits not be affected by taking the benefit.  Nonetheless, the payroll tax used to 
fund FSI should be deducted from an employee’s pre-tax earnings to avoid double taxation when 
that employee receives benefits.  Further, we recommend that benefits be treated as earned income 
for purposes of qualifying for the EITC.  Because income is required to be eligible for the EITC, it is 
important that the benefit be treated as earned income in order to assist low-income workers who 
might otherwise fall out of EITC eligibility. 
Second, we wanted to ensure equity between FSI benefits and similar benefits that are currently 
available through other social insurance programs.  We were particularly concerned with achieving 
equity between workers’ compensation benefits and our proposed temporary disability benefits.  
Workers’ compensation benefits are not subject to taxation; income is usually replaced at 66%.  
Temporary disability benefits under FSI are offered at 80% wage replacement.  By taxing the 
temporary disability benefits proposed under our program we would achieve rough equivalence in 
effective wage replacement rates with workers’ compensation.34
Finally, we sought to simplify tax rules so that someone receiving benefits under our program could 
expect nearly the same tax treatment as if they were receiving regular wages.
FSI benefits should only be available for time off that lasts five consecutive business days or longer.
FSI is a wage replacement system for individuals who need to take extended periods of time off — 
i.e., more than one week — from work.  It is designed to supplement, but not supplant, other sources 
of wage replacement available for shorter periods of time off, such as paid sick days, paid vacation 
days, and PTO banks.  As such, we recommend that FSI benefits be available only for periods of time 
off that last one business week (five days) or longer.  Such a requirement makes the benefits easier 
to administer, provides scheduling predictability to employers, and provides flexibility to employees 
who need wage replacement for varying needs and for varying periods of time.
Some individuals, however, will need episodic periods of time off for the same underlying reason. For 
example, a woman with breast cancer may need to undergo a number of surgeries — a few months 
apart from each other — if she undergoes a mastectomy and reconstruction.  As such, we believe 
that benefits for the same underlying reason should be available for non-continuous periods of time 
off —so long as the periods of time off each last at least one week.
 
That said, we recognize there are individuals who may need to take episodic periods of time off, 
for the same underlying reason, in increments shorter than one week.  For example, the woman 
with breast cancer may need to attend weekly chemotherapy or radiation appointments.  Other 
individuals who have taken an extended period of time off may want to “phase back in” to work by 
working a part-time or reduced-hours schedule.  Using the same example, a woman who took four 
weeks off from work for a mastectomy may want to phase back into work by working three or four 
days per week for a few weeks prior to returning to work full time.  Or a new mother may want to work 
a reduced-hours schedule for a few months prior to returning to a full-time schedule. 
 
As noted above, we believe that individuals who need wage replacement for these shorter periods of 
time should be able to receive wage replacement from other sources, such as paid sick days or PTO 
banks.  Unfortunately, however, as discussed below, some individuals — especially low-wage workers 
— do not have access to any paid time off.  Many others have access to some paid time off, but not 
a sufficient amount to address their needs.  As a result, and as explained further in Chapter 7, we 
believe additional research needs to be done regarding whether and how a national social insurance 
program such as FSI can feasibly provide benefits for episodic periods of time off, or reduced-hours 
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schedules, in durations of less than one week.  
No individual should be discharged or discriminated against because he or she has filed a claim for 
FSI benefits.
A number of state workers’ compensation laws provide that an individual should not be discharged 
or discriminated against for filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.35  New York TDI, which 
is operated out of the state workers’ compensation agency, follows the New York non-discrimination 
provision.36 We believe the same should apply to FSI claimants — namely, an individual should not be 
discharged or discriminated against because he or she has filed a claim for FSI benefits.
Financing.
FSI should be financed by an equal contribution employer and employee payroll tax, with no cap on 
the amount of earnings subject to taxation for a given year.  The tax should be sufficient to cover 
the cost of benefits as well as administration of the program.
Both employers and employees benefit from FSI.  As such, 
employers and employees should share the costs through a joint 
payroll tax. 
Employers — especially small employers — benefit because FSI allows them to provide their 
employees with paid time off at an affordable price.  This is true because a national social insurance 
program has the practical advantage of risk pooling across firms instead of pricing time-off benefits 
for each individual employer.  In addition, low-wage and middle-income workers will find it easier to 
maintain their attachment to the workplace, helping with retention and reducing turnover costs for 
employers. 
Employees also benefit from the establishment of a social insurance program for caregiving, 
temporary disability, and parental care for a new child.  Obviously, not all employees will use each of 
the available benefits.  But almost everyone will use at least some FSI benefit over the course of his 
or her lifetime.  Also, all employees will gain peace of mind from knowing these life-altering events 
are covered and that they will have economic security for themselves and their families. 
Both employers and employees benefit because of the positive societal effects described in 
subsequent chapters — including increased labor force participation, the potential for lower health 
care costs, and better physical and emotional health outcomes for children, leading to future 
economic growth and productivity.  
The new payroll tax would have no limit on the amount of earnings subject to taxation (like Medicare). 
This model helps ensure the solvency of the new program and maintains progressivity in its financing. 
As we noted above, we do recommend a maximum benefit amount.  However, the maximum benefit 
amount we impose is intentionally high, so most workers, including most middle-income workers, 
receive benefits commensurate with their income levels.38  
We also recommend the payroll tax cover the cost of benefits as well as administration of the 
program, so the program does not need to rely on general revenue financing. Several other social 
insurance programs we studied finance the administrative costs through a payroll tax.39
As discussed in Chapter 7, we specifically chose not to cost out the FSI program at this time because 
we wanted to focus solely on the substantive policy issues and spark debate.  That said, we did study 
the costs of similar programs, particularly the five state TDI programs and the two PFL programs 
(California and New Jersey).40  Each of these programs is financed either through employee-only 
payroll taxes or joint employee-employer payroll taxes.  The tax rates and the amount of earnings 
subject to taxation vary, but are generally quite low.  For example, as of 2010, non-self-employed 
workers covered by California’s TDI/PFL program pay a 1.1 percent tax on the first $93,916 of their 
earnings to finance the program.41  This means that the maximum worker contribution per year is 
currently $1,026.42   In New Jersey, both employers and employees contribute to the state’s TDI 
program, but only employees contribute to the state’s PFL program.  As of 2010, the basic TDI tax 
rate for New Jersey employers is .5% on the first $29,700 of employee wages; employees pay .5 
percent to finance the TDI program and .12 percent to finance the PFL program.43  Thus, assuming 
an employer is paying the basic tax rate of .5 percent, an employer’s maximum yearly contribution 
per worker for the TDI plan is $148.50. An employee’s maximum yearly contribution for both the TDI 
and PFL programs is $184.14 ($148.50 for TDI and $35.64 for PFL).
Contributions to the program should not be experience-rated because employers have no control 
over the triggering events.
In general, social insurance programs that experience-rate employer contributions have features 
giving employers some control over the cost of their premiums through their own behavior, and 
penalize those who have higher usage rates.  
For instance, workers’ compensation is experience-rated on the assumption that employers can take 
measures to provide safer workplaces, which will reduce their premiums through fewer work-related 
injuries and illnesses. Unemployment Insurance is experience-rated to discourage frequent layoffs 
and fairly allocate the costs imposed on society at large by unemployment.44
But employers do not have any control over whether their employees will need time off or will utilize 
benefits for temporary disability, parental care, or caregiving.  Hence, employers should not be 
penalized for their employees’ use of benefits.  Furthermore, if employers were experience-rated 
based on how often employees utilized time-off programs, they might actively discourage leave-
taking, or discriminate against those employees perceived to be at “high risk” of leave-taking, such 
as women of childbearing age or employees with disabilities or young children.  
The universal rules described above apply regardless of the reason for claiming FSI benefits.  In 
Chapters 2 through 4 we describe the eligibility and benefit rules that vary depending on the reason 
for time off:  temporary disability, parental care for a child, or caregiving.
Here we provide one final point of clarification.  As we explain in Chapter 6, we believe access to job 
protection while receiving FSI benefits is critical.  (Indeed, in that chapter, we recommend the FMLA’s 
job protection requirement be extended to cover smaller employers.)  FSI benefits, however, do not 
in and of themselves provide a worker with an independent right to take a leave of absence from 
his or her current job. That right must be granted by the employer, either voluntarily or as a result of 
their obligations under the FMLA and any other relevant federal or state laws governing time off from 
work.45 
m
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rate base allowance (residence-based benefits for which every resident of Sweden qualifies). However, individuals may receive 
additional, separate benefits that correspond to their income levels, and these additional benefits are subject to taxes like other 
ordinary income. Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Social insurance in Sweden (2009), available at http://www.regeringen.
se/content/1/c6/13/75/63/d1783aed.pdf 
34 We recognize that low earners who may not owe any income tax would receive a more valuable benefit under our temporary 
disability program than under a state workers’ compensation program.
35 See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 132a (West 2009) (California); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-39.1 (West 2010) (New Jersey); N.Y. Workers’ 
Comp. Law § 120 (West 2010) (New York).
36 See N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd., Form DB-271S (8-09), Statement of Rights - Disability Benefits Law (2009), available at www.wcb.state.
ny.us. See also N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 120 (McKinney 2010).
37 See also Appendix F: Other Policy Models for Achieving Wage Replacement for Temporary Disability, Parental Care, and Caregiving 
(describing the economic advantages of the social insurance model, and the disadvantages of models that do not pool risk 
broadly across firms).
38 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (noting that under our proposal more than 75 percent of American workers 
would receive benefits that match their contributions to the program).
39 See e.g. Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (2010); Employment Training and Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uitaxtopic.asp (federal FUTA tax goes to reimbursing states for the costs of 
administration); 42 U.S.C. § 401(g)(1)(A)(2006) (requiring FICA payroll tax to cover administrative costs). 
40 See generally Appendix B (Financing).
41 Cal. Unempl. Ins. Code § 985 (West 2009); Self-employed workers pay a 2.2% tax on the same maximum earnings cap.  
California Employment Dev. Dep’t, “FAQs for Elective Coverage,”  http://www.edd.ca.gov/disability/FAQs_for_Elective_Coverage.
htm.; See also U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Comparison of State Unemployment Laws: Temporary Disability Insurance 8-3  (2009),  available at /
www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2009/disability.pdf. (last visited Dec. 11, 2009) (discussing California 
SDI financing). See also Appendix B (Financing).  
42 California EDD, Disability Insurance and Paid Family Leave Statistics (2010) http://www.edd.ca.gov/About_EDD/Quick_
Statistics.htm#DIStatistics.
43 On November 18, 2010, the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development announced the tax rate for the 
Family Leave Insurance program will be cut in half for FY2011, from .12 percent to only .06 percent.  Thus, the maximum 
employee contribution for New Jersey’s Family Leave Insurance program will only be $17.76 per worker. See Bureau of National 
Affairs, New Jersey Labor Department to Cut  2011 Family Leave Insurance Tax Rate, Nov. 18, 2010. An employer’s rate 
in New Jersey may decrease to .1 percent or increase to 1.1 percent on the basis of the employer’s reserve ratio, length of 
employment, and the status of the fund as a whole. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-7(e); See also New Jersey Department of Labor and 
Workforce Development, Employer Handbook: New Jersey’s Unemployment & Disability Insurance Programs, at 32-33, available at http://
lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/forms_pdfs/ui/b426.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (describing experience rating in NJ TDI system); 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Laws: Temporary Disability Insurance  (2009), at 8-3, available at http://www.
workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2009/disability.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (summarizing New Jersey 
TDI financing); See also Appendix B (Financing).
44 26 U.S.C. § 3303(a) (2010). The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) encourages the practice of experience rating by 
offering additional credits against the federal UI tax to employers with low state experience ratings.  As with the other credit 
provisions of the FUTA, if a state fails to experience-rate its system, its companies lose the potential offsets.
45 Under the FMLA, employers with 50 or more employees are required to provide job-protected leave for eligible employees 
for up to 12 weeks per year.  In this report, we recommend an expansion of the FMLA to cover all employers with 15 or more 
employees, recognizing there are many questions that would first need to be addressed regarding how to make the FMLA work 
for small employers.  We also recommend that further research be conducted to examine the access to benefits issue that may 
be created due to the discrepancy in job protection offered under the FMLA, even if it is expanded at some point to lower the 
employer threshold and the benefits available under FSI.
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Chapter 2
Temporary Disability Insurance
The first component of FSI provides wage replacement for time off taken because of a non work-
related temporary disability.  
In the United States, we have some social insurance programs that provide wage replacement when 
a worker is out of work due to a permanent disability or a work-related disability or injury.  However, 
no form of national public insurance exists to support workers who need temporary time off from 
work to recover from non-work-related illnesses or injuries of moderate duration, or to give birth and 
recover from childbirth.  
State-level workers’ compensation programs cover workers who become temporarily or permanently 
disabled through a work-related illness or injury.1  The Social Security Disability Insurance program 
covers people who become permanently disabled.2  Additionally, there is current legislative interest 
focused around national guaranteed paid sick days to cover mild, short-term illnesses or injuries, 
such as brief ailments that require a week or less away from work.3  
In this chapter we discuss the policy arguments in favor of providing wage replacement during time 
off from work because of a temporary disability, and current access to wage replacement during 
periods of temporary disability — both those related to illness or injury not suffered on the job, as well 
as those related to pregnancy, childbirth, and recovery from childbirth.  We then describe our policy 
recommendations to address this need.
A. Temporary Disability Related to Illness or Injury 
1. Policy Arguments
Most individuals will face a temporary disability, illness, or injury in their lifetime — whether it is 
a condition requiring intensive recovery, like a heart attack or an injury from a car accident, or a 
chronic illness that may need recurring treatment, like multiple sclerosis or rheumatoid arthritis.  
These illnesses or injuries are usually out of the control of individuals, most of whom want and need 
to work, and who want to return to their job following time away from work. 
Such individuals need time off to receive medical treatment and recover.   Unless they are fortunate 
enough to have significant savings, they will need some form of wage replacement during their 
time off—to pay for their groceries, their health care, their rent or mortgage, their utilities, and other 
regular expenses.
Without paid time off, individuals who are ill or injured may return to work before being fully 
recovered, thus making them susceptible to a relapse or recurrence, and potentially placing 
additional burdens on our health care system. When a job requires physical stamina or ability, 
individuals who return to work too early may put themselves or others in jeopardy.
Employers stand to gain from the provision of wage replacement for their temporarily disabled 
workers.  Faster and more complete recovery associated with paid time off reduces the cost of 
foregone productivity.4  Employers may also benefit from reduced health care costs since employees 
will have time off to recover from an illness or injury instead of developing a long-term chronic 
problem.  Many employers have recognized the cost-effectiveness of providing paid, temporary 
disability benefits to their professional employees.5   While most employers do not currently provide 
such benefits to their low-wage workers, research shows providing them with workplace flexibility, 
including paid time off, is equally cost effective, both in terms of increased productivity and 
decreased turnover.6
 
2. Current Access to Wage Replacement
There is neither a national system nor a nationally encouraged state system for wage replacement 
during periods of non-work-related, temporary disability.  This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that workers in this country have no access to wage replacement when they are ill or injured.  Indeed, 
employers have developed various types of paid time-off policies as part of employee compensation 
packages.  And five states and one territory have Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs, 
funded by employer and/or employee payroll taxes.7
To fully understand the current landscape regarding access to wage replacement during time away 
from work because of temporary disability, we must look at the full range of private and public 
benefits currently offered in the United States.8 
a. Voluntary Employer Practices
Employer-provided wage replacement for periods of illness or injury is usually provided through a 
combination of paid sick days and, for longer periods of disability, short-term disability insurance 
plans.  Paid sick days generally provide 100 percent wage replacement, whereas short-term disability 
plans generally replace between one-half and two-thirds of a worker’s pre-disability gross weekly 
wages.9  In general, paid sick days provide wage replacement for short periods of time off (less than 
one week), whereas short-term disability benefits provide wage replacement for illnesses or injuries 
that last longer than one week.  Workers who have access only to paid sick days, however, will often 
use those days for longer-term illnesses, to the extent they can.  Short-term disability payments and 
paid sick days are both subject to taxation to the extent the employer pays for them.10  
Paid sick days are available to an employee to use immediately upon accrual.  After one year on the 
job, full-time, private-sector workers who receive paid sick days receive, on average, seven paid sick 
days per year.11  Part-time workers who receive paid sick leave, as well as workers in firms with fewer 
than 100 employees, receive, on average, six paid sick days per year.12
Under most short-term disability plans, there is a waiting period of at least one week during which the 
disabled employee receives no wage replacement benefits under the plan (although they may use 
their accrued paid sick days, if they have any, to replace wages during this time).13  This waiting period 
functions similarly to a “co-pay” and helps control plan costs and simplify administration.14 
The typical short term disability plan pays benefits for up to 26 weeks after the waiting period has 
been satisfied.15   In practice, however, many illnesses and injuries that workers experience do not 
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require them to be out of work for a full 26 weeks.16   For example, a worker recovering from surgery 
might only be out of work for four weeks, and therefore would only receive four weeks of short term 
disability benefits.  Companies often use case-management tools and procedures, such as the 
Official Disability Guidelines and the Medical Disability Advisor, to determine the number of weeks a 
particular disability will render an employee unable to work.17
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) 2010 National Compensation Survey, 39 percent 
of private-sector workers had access to employer-provided short term disability insurance policies.18  
Of those workers who had access to such plans, 97 percent of the workers participated in them.19 
The data from 2010 indicate that 80 percent of employees participated in plans funded entirely by 
their employers, while 20 percent of employers required employees to contribute to their short-term 
disability plans.20 
The following factors affect whether an individual has access to paid short-term disability benefits or 
paid sick days: 
The employee’s income is the greatest predictor. The greater a worker’s wages, the more likely the 
worker will have access to these benefits.  For example, in 2010, only 18 percent of low-wage private 
sector workers had access to short-term disability benefits, compared to 59 percent of high-wage 
workers.21  Similarly, only 32 percent of low-wage workers in the private sector had access to some 
form of paid sick-days benefit, while 84 percent of high-wage private sector workers had access to 
such benefits.22 
Whether the worker works full time or part time is also significant.  For full-time private sector 
workers, 47 percent had access to short-term disability insurance, compared to just 15 percent 
of part-time private sector workers.23  Seventy-four percent of full-time private sector workers had 
access to some form of paid sick-days benefit, as compared to just 26 percent of part-time private 
sector workers.24 
Size of employer also has an impact. For employees working in establishments with fewer than 
100 employees, just 27 percent had access to short-term disability benefits.  Forty-six percent of 
employees working in establishments with 100-499 employees, and 63 percent of employees 
working for employees with more than 500 employees, had access to short-term disability benefits.25  
As for paid sick days, 53 percent of employees working in establishments with fewer than 100 
employees had access to some paid sick days.  Sixty-seven percent of employees working in 
establishments with 100-499 employees had access to this benefit, as did 81 percent of employees 
working for employers with more than 500 employees.26 
Both type of work and union membership make a difference. Sixty percent of management, 
business, and financial workers had access to short-term disability benefits, compared with just 
30 percent of workers in sales and related occupations, and only 23 percent of service workers.27  
Sixty-four percent of union workers had access to short-term disability benefits, compared with 36 
percent of non-union workers.28  As for paid sick days, 91 percent of management, business, and 
financial workers had access to some paid sick days, compared to just 55 percent in sales and 
related occupations, and only 42 percent of service workers.  Seventy-one percent of union workers, 
compared with 61 percent of nonunion workers, had access to paid sick days.29 
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It should be noted that, according to BLS, 16 percent of short-term disability plans provided by 
employers are legally required under state laws discussed below.30  While the BLS data provide 
breakdowns of access to short-term disability plans by geographic area,31 it does not provide a 
comparable breakdown by state.  Thus, it is unclear whether the already-limited access that low-
income workers have to such plans is due to the fact that an employer has voluntarily provided such 
access or merely because the employer is required to provide such access by state law.  The same 
is true for part-time workers, employees working for small employers, employees working in non-
unionized shops, and employees working in industries that provide short-term disability benefits to a 
low percentage of workers.
Finally, the fact that a worker does not have access to paid sick days or short-term disability 
insurance does not necessarily mean the worker will go without any wage replacement during 
periods of time off because of illness or injury.  
For example, after one year on the job, private-sector workers receiving paid vacation receive, on 
average, nine vacation days.  In other words, more private sector workers have access to paid 
vacation time (77 percent) than have access to paid sick days (62 percent) or short term disability 
plans (39 percent).32  And many workers now receive a generic bank of Paid Time Off (PTO) instead of 
sick days and vacation days.33  Employers that provide PTO generally provide between 15 and 25 PTO 
days per year.34  If an employee has unused vacation or PTO time that can be taken during an illness 
or injury, the employee will presumably use those paid days off during periods of temporary disability.
The data on access to vacation leave and PTO is not, however, particularly helpful in determining how 
much access actually exists for any specific employee’s illness or injury.  First, we have no way of 
knowing whether those days are still available at the time an unexpected illness or injury occurs, or 
whether those days were already used for other purposes. Indeed, the amount of time set aside by 
employers for PTO or vacation is usually designed for what an average employee might need for sick 
leave, vacation, and personal days — and not what an employee who has suffered a more serious 
illness or injury might require.35  In addition, the requirements for using vacation leave may preclude 
its use for an unexpected illness or injury, because employees generally are required to provide 
advance notice of their need for that type of time off.36 
In sum:
 k Many more workers have access to paid sick days than they do to short-term disability 
benefits. The number of paid sick days a worker receives, however, will often be insufficient 
when a worker suffers an illness or injury that lasts more than one or two weeks.  
 k There are substantial disparities in access to both paid sick days and short-term disability 
benefits.  Access is strongly skewed toward higher-income, professional, full-time, and/or 
unionized workers.  Lower-income workers, part-time workers, and workers in the service 
and retail industries have particularly low access to these benefits, especially to short-term 
disability benefits.
 k Some employees also have access to paid vacation leave and PTO days, which may 
sometimes be used for temporary illness or injury.  Again, however, access skews toward 
higher-income, professional, and full-time workers.  In addition, access to paid vacation leave 
and PTO days does not guarantee this paid time off will be available when a worker needs it 
because of temporary illness or injury.
Employees qualify for benefits if they work for a covered employer and meet a set of eligibility 
requirements, including satisfying a waiting period (generally 5-7 days). 41  While standards vary from 
state to state, most workers are covered, including both full- and part-time employees.42 
Benefit recipients are entitled to a weekly benefit based on their past wages, usually up to a specified 
cap.43  The benefit duration usually allows up to 26 weeks of benefits per year, but Rhode Island 
and California are more generous, offering up to 30 weeks or 52 weeks per year, respectively.44  As 
with private, short-term disability benefits, however, TDI benefits are only provided for the actual 
number of weeks that a worker is unable to work because of a disability. For example, the average 
claim under California’s State Disability Insurance program lasted only 15.23 weeks in FY 2009, even 
though the total allowable annual duration is 52 weeks.45  
The following chart provides the weekly wage replacement rate, the current maximum benefit 
amount, and benefit duration for each state program.46 
b. State and Local Laws 
 
A handful of state and local laws require the provision of wage replacement when a worker takes 
time off from work because of a non-work-related illness or injury.  Currently, only two cities — 
Washington, D.C., and San Francisco — require that employers provide a certain number of paid sick 
days to their employees.37  The number of days required depends on the size of the employer and 
whether the employee works full time or part time.
Five states and one territory — California, Hawaii, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, and Puerto 
Rico — have statewide TDI programs.  These programs provide temporary disability insurance 
benefits to private and public sector employees who are unable to work because of their own non-
work-related illnesses or injuries that last longer than five to seven days.38 As discussed in Chapter 1, 
some state TDI programs are funded exclusively by employee payroll tax contributions, while others 
are jointly financed between employers and employees.39  Programs that are based on a social 
insurance model, such as California and New Jersey’s TDI programs, generally allow employers to opt 
out of the state-run program if an employer offers an approved, voluntary plan.40  
“I was the victim of domestic violence.  I had been  
severely beaten and was unable to work for over six 
months.  Without [California’s Short Term Disability (SDI) 
Program], I don’t know how I would have taken care of 
my 11-year-old son or kept a roof over our heads.  [SDI] 
allowed us to barely survive until I was able to return to 
work.  [SDI] allowed me to provide for both of my sons 
without facing eviction or hunger.” 
 
Testimonial from California employee, Labor Project for Working Families
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B. Temporary Disability Related to Pregnancy, Childbirth, and  
    Recovery from Childbirth
1. Policy Arguments
Women who are unable to work due to pregnancy-related complications, giving birth, and/or 
recovering from childbirth are often treated as having a pregnancy-related disability.47 Time off for 
these pregnancy-related reasons serves several critical purposes, including better outcomes for both 
mothers and infants. 
Approximately 13 percent of women will have a complication from pregnancy requiring them to be 
hospitalized before delivery, likely requiring at least some time off from work.48  These complications 
may range from gestational diabetes to pre-eclampsia49 to pre-term labor.  Pregnant women with 
medical complications often have to go on partial or full bed rest prior to childbirth; 20 percent of 
pregnant women spend a minimum of one week on bed rest during the course of their pregnancy.50  
Even women with uncomplicated pregnancies experience health benefits when taking time off prior 
to labor and delivery. 51  This time off is known as “antenatal leave,” and it is taken by nearly 30 
percent of employed women in the United States.52 In the postnatal period, the minimum period 
of physical recovery from a normal pregnancy and delivery is six weeks (eight weeks for Cesarean 
deliveries).53  Of course, the required length of pregnancy disability leave will vary depending on 
specific maternal health needs.54  
Finally, providing wage replacement for pregnancy-related disabilities may lessen reliance on public 
assistance benefits, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).55  The Department of 
Labor found that 9 percent of women on unpaid FMLA leave used public assistance to supplement 
family income while out on maternity leave, including 20 percent of women from low-income 
families.56  
2. Current Access to Wage Replacement 
a. Voluntary Employer Practices
If women receive wage replacement for pregnancy-related reasons, they receive it through a 
dedicated “paid maternity leave” plan and/or from other sources of employer-provided paid time off, 
such as vacation and sick days. Of those employers who provide dedicated, paid maternity leave 
plans, most offer them as part of their short-term disability plans, although some offer self-insured, 
paid, maternity leave benefits.57  As noted above, certain classes of workers — including part-time 
and low-wage workers and those who work for small employers — have limited access to short term 
disability plans, paid vacation days, and paid sick days.
Based on the Medical Disability Advisor recommendation,58 the majority of private, short-term 
disability plans provide six weeks of wage replacement for a normal delivery. 59 If there are 
complications from the pregnancy or childbirth, or if the woman has a Cesarean section, a doctor will 
certify a longer period of recovery, and wage replacement will be provided for that period.60 
Employers who do not provide wage replacement through a short-term disability plan will sometimes 
provide specific maternity-leave benefits paid through their general assets.  For example, according 
to a study conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) of its members, 14 
percent of respondents stated that they offered paid maternity leave other than what was covered 
by their short-term disability plans.61  Other employers, who do not specifically provide paid maternity-
leave benefits, allow their workers to use their paid sick days and other sources of paid time off 
(vacation leave, holidays, PTO days, etc.) for pregnancy and recovery from childbirth.62  
According to data from the 2004 U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), which surveyed employed women who delivered their first child between 2001 and 2003, 
nearly 50 percent used some form of paid leave for pregnancy-related reasons or recovery from 
childbirth.63  Many of these women combined several types of paid leave to fund their time off.  
Nearly 39 percent of the women surveyed used maternity leave, 9.1 percent used vacation leave, 8.7 
percent used sick leave, 8.5 percent used disability leave, and 2.8 percent used other paid leave.64   
b. State Laws
All state TDI programs are required to provide wage replacement for pregnancy-related disabilities 
as a result of the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 65  As a result, women who reside in 
California, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico and who take time off due 
to pregnancy-related complications, childbirth, and/or recovery from childbirth, may receive TDI 
benefits for the amount of time they are unable to work due to their pregnancy disability.   Eligibility 
requirements, weekly wage replacement rates, the maximum benefit amount, and benefit duration 
are the same as those for non-pregnancy-related disabilities.
C. Recommendations 
Given the significant disparities in access to wage replacement during periods of temporary disability 
(including pregnancy-related disability), as well as the pressing need for income during such periods, 
we recommend that FSI provide a minimum level of wage replacement for individuals who take time 
off from work because of a serious health condition that lasts longer than one week, or because of a 
pregnancy-related disability.  
Weekly Wage 
Replacement Rate
Maximum Benefit 
Amount (per week)
Maximum
Benefit Duration
55%
58%
66%
50%
65%
4.26% of total high  
base period quarter 
wages (translating into  
a weekly wage  
replacement rate of 
~51%) 
$987
$510
$561
$170
$113
$700
52 weeks
30 weeks
26 weeks
26 weeks
26 weeks
30 weeks
California
Hawaii
New Jersey
New York
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
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Our specific recommendations are as follows:
Eligibility.
k “Temporary disability” should be defined as a “serious health condition” (as that term is used 
in the FMLA) that causes an individual to be unable to perform the usual functions of his or 
her job, including disability resulting from pregnancy or childbirth.  
k Benefits should not be available to those who are receiving workers’ compensation benefits 
for their condition. 
Benefits.
     k   An eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced at 80 percent of the worker’s average
            weekly wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage.  
     k   Benefits should be available for up to 26 weeks per year.  The actual duration of benefits
            should depend on the specific illness or injury.
     k   There should be a five-day waiting period, per qualifying serious health condition, before 
            benefits can be collected.  If an individual needs to take time off for the same qualifying  
 condition at a later point in the same year, a waiting period should not apply.
     k   The time off from work may be taken only while the recipient is suffering from a serious 
 health condition.
Below we describe our rationale for each recommendation:
Eligibility.
“Temporary disability” should be defined as a “serious health condition” (as that term is used in 
the FMLA) that causes an individual to be unable to perform the usual functions of his or her job, 
including disability resulting from pregnancy or childbirth.   
In deriving a definition of “temporary disability” we looked to the FMLA and several state TDI 
programs.66   We settled on using the FMLA definition because we believe a different definition of 
“temporary disability” would create confusion between the FMLA and a national program of wage 
replacement for the same type of time off from work.  Specifically, we wanted to avoid confusion 
regarding whether a person who is entitled to FMLA job protection is also entitled to FSI TDI benefits, 
and vice-versa.
We recognize that some members of the business community argue the FMLA’s definition of “serious 
health condition” is overly broad and difficult to administer.67  However, as discussed above, under 
our proposal, wage replacement is only available to recipients who take at least five days off work.  
We believe this requirement will help minimize disputes over whether a particular illness or injury 
satisfies the FMLA’s definition of “serious health condition” and thus warrants FSI wage replacement 
benefits.
Benefits should not be available to those who are receiving workers’ compensation benefits for 
their condition.
Our proposal is intended to fill the gap in wage replacement benefits for workers who experience 
illnesses or injuries not already handled through the workers’ compensation system. Because 
workers’ compensation laws in all 50 states provide wage replacement for individuals who suffer 
work-related disabilities (both temporary and permanent), benefits under our TDI proposal would 
not be available to those currently receiving workers’ compensation benefits. This recommendation 
reflects similar policies in the New York, New Jersey, California, Rhode Island, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico 
state TDI programs.68
Benefits.
An eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced at 80 percent of the worker’s average weekly 
wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage.  
Our recommended wage replacement rate of 80 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage for 
temporary disability benefits is based on three principles.  First, we believe that wage replacement 
levels for a temporary disability program must be sufficiently high to provide financial support to 
promote individual health and well-being.  The program must provide enough income to allow 
workers to recover from their illness or injury while they are unable to work and not to return to work 
prematurely. 
In determining a proposed benefit amount under this TDI component, we looked first at the five 
states and one territory that currently have temporary disability insurance laws.  As noted above, the 
weekly wage replacement rate in these programs ranges from lows of 50 percent in New York and 
55 percent in California to highs of 65 percent in Puerto Rico and 66 percent in New Jersey.69  The 
maximum benefits amounts also vary, from lows of $113/week in Puerto Rico and $170/week in 
New York, to highs of $700/week in Rhode Island and $987/week in California.70  We also looked at 
private-sector, short-term disability insurance plans, which generally provide a more generous 60-70 
percent wage replacement rate without any maximum cap.71
Second, the wage replacement levels should not be so high that recipients take more time off than 
is necessary to recover, or are discouraged from taking the steps necessary to recover and return to 
work as quickly as possible.  To the extent that moral hazard exists, or is perceived to exist in a TDI 
“I am currently having complications with my pregnancy. 
I have been put off work two months early on bed rest. If 
the SDI programs weren’t there for me now, and for my 
maternity leave afterward, my family would not be able to 
make ends meet. My husband also works. However, his 
income alone is not enough to pay all the bills. The two-
income family has become necessary these days.”
 
Testimonial from California employee, Labor Project for Working Families
44 45
1 Ishita Sengupta, Virginia Reno, & John F. Burton, Jr., Workers’ Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs 1, National Academy 
of Social Insurance (2007), available at http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/NASI_Workers_Comp_2005_Full_
Report.pdf. See also Appendix B:  Key Characteristics of Social Insurance Programs (Eligibility: Qualifying Events).
2 U.S. Social Security Administration, ”Disability Planner: What We Mean By Disability,” http://www.socialsecurity.gov/dibplan/
dqualify4.htm. See also Appendix B (Eligibility: Qualifying Events).
3 Healthy Families Act, S. 1152, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009); Healthy Families Act, H.R. 2460, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009).
4 Vicky Lovell, No Time to Be Sick: Why Everyone Suffers When Workers Don’t have Paid Sick Leave 1 (Institute for Women’s Policy Research 
2004), http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/B242.pdf.
5 See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 2752, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the United States, 
March 2010,” 237 (Table 17) available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2010/ebbl0046.pdf  [hereinafter BLS, Employee 
Benefits 2010] (showing that 51 percent of management, professional and related employees in the private sector have access 
to short-term disability insurance policies).
6 Corporate Voices for Working Families, Innovative Workplace Flexibility Options for Hourly Workers (2009), available at http://www.
cvworkingfamilies.org/system/files/CVWFflexreport-FINAL.pdf.
7 See generally Appendix A: Current Social Insurance Programs; Appendix B.
8 Of course, if the United States had a universal legal requirement for paid time off during periods of temporary disability, and 
such a legal requirement was effectively enforced, it would be much easier to determine who had access to wage replacement 
for these reasons – because it would simply be all workers covered by such a requirement.  In the absence of such a 
requirement, however, we are dependent on the data that have been collected on private-employer practice, some of which is 
spotty or unclear.  
9 Employee Benefit Research Inst., Fundamentals of Employee Benefit Programs,  346-47 (6th ed. 2009), available at http://www.
ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/2009/33_Disablty-Ins_OTHER-BENS_Funds-2009_EBRI.pdf [hereinafter 
Fundamentals of Employee Benefit Programs].
10 I.R.S. Publication 15-A, Employers Supplemental Tax Guide 15-19 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15a.pdf.
11 See BLS, Employee Benefits 2010, supra note 5, at 309 (Table 35).  After five years on the job, private sector workers receive an 
average of eight days per year. Id.
12 Id.
13 Fundamentals of Employee Benefit Programs, supra note 9, at 346.
14 Id.
15 Note, however, that the maximum period of benefits under a specific short-term disability plan may range from as little as 
A waiting period is also appropriate because, as a practical matter, the temporary disability 
component of this program should supplement, not supplant, shorter-term, voluntary employer 
policies such as paid sick days or “paid time off” banks.  Thus, those workers who have access 
to such employer benefits will ordinarily receive wage replacement during their one-week waiting 
period.75
The time off from work may be taken only while the recipient is suffering from a serious health 
condition.
Benefits should only be available for time off taken from work while the recipient is experiencing a 
serious health condition.  As discussed in Chapter 5 below, a health care provider must certify that a 
claimant has an illness or injury that renders the individual unable to work.
program, having less than full wage replacement can counter that problem, or perceptions of that 
problem. 
Finally, benefits programs for both work- and non-work-related injuries and illnesses should be 
generally equivalent from the perspective of the employee.  All 50 states’ workers’ compensation 
programs provide wage replacement for individuals who cannot work because of a work-related 
illness or injury.  The wage replacement rate in most states is approximately 66 percent of average 
weekly earnings, up to a cap usually set at 100 percent of the state average weekly wage, with 
maximum benefits even higher in some states.72  As discussed above, workers’ compensation 
benefits are not taxable. Because we propose taxation of all of the benefits proposed, the effective 
wage replacement rates between our proposed TDI benefits (80 percent, subject to taxation) and 
state workers’ compensation benefits (66 percent, not subject to taxation) are largely equivalent.
Benefits should be available for up to 26 weeks per year.  The actual duration of benefits should 
depend on the specific illness or injury.
This recommendation is based on a review of existing state TDI programs and private-sector, short-
term disability programs. As set forth in the chart above, benefit durations in most of the state TDI 
programs run up to 26 weeks, although Rhode Island provides up to 30 weeks and California up to 
52 weeks.  Private sector plans generally provide benefits for up to 26 weeks.73
Women who are unable to work because they are recovering from childbirth, as well as women who 
are unable to work because they are experiencing medical complications during their pregnancy, 
(i.e., “pregnancy-related disabilities”) should receive temporary disability benefits for the time they 
are unable to work.  Benefits should be commensurate with the time needed for physical recovery.  
For example, birth mothers who have medical complications during childbirth will need more time off 
than those who have a normal delivery.  As discussed in Chapter 3 below, under our proposal, women 
using TDI for pregnancy disability will be able to transition seamlessly from TDI to Parental Care for 
a New Child Insurance. Both California and New Jersey also allow women to transition directly from 
temporary disability to paid baby-bonding leave benefits after they are no longer disabled because of 
pregnancy.74
There should be a five-day waiting period, per qualifying serious health condition, before benefits 
can be collected.   If an individual needs to take time off for the same qualifying condition at a later 
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Chapter 3
Parental Care for a New Child Insurance
The second component of FSI provides wage replacement for “parental care for a new child” (PCNC).  
We define time off for PCNC as time off from work that parents — both women and men — take after 
a child’s birth, adoption, or foster placement to care for and bond with their child.  
In this chapter we discuss the policy arguments in favor of providing wage replacement for parental 
care, and current access to wage replacement during periods of time off for parental care.  We then 
describe our policy recommendations to address this need.
A. Policy Arguments
Both parents and their children benefit when parents have time off 
to care for and bond with their newborn, newly adopted, or newly 
placed foster child. 
A child’s overall physical, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes are better when his or her parents have 
sufficient time off work after birth, adoption, or foster placement.1  Parental bonding, which takes 
place immediately following birth, adoption, or foster placement, is critical for a child’s physical and 
emotional well-being.2  It is during this time that primary attachment relationships form and children 
develop a sense of safety, stability, and trust.3 Children adopted after infancy particularly have 
attachment needs that require a period of adjustment.4  
Public health research shows that parental leave of 12 weeks or more is correlated with many 
positive health outcomes for children.5  Further, parental workplace flexibility during the first year of a 
child’s life, including a significant amount of time off and/or flexibility in scheduling, can have positive 
developmental effects for children.6
By contrast, returning to work very soon after birth, (i.e., six weeks or less) can be associated 
with a variety of negative outcomes for both parents and children compared to families in which 
working parents take more time off (i.e. 12 weeks or more) before returning to work. These negative 
outcomes include higher rates of infant mortality, lower rates of breastfeeding, lower rates of 
immunizations and well-baby care, a higher incidence of maternal physical and mental health 
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concerns,7 and increases in externalizing behavior problems in young children (such as ADHD, 
behavioral problems, or aggression).8 
Significantly, while public-health research supports a reasonable period of time off to bond with a 
new child (i.e., 12 weeks or more), research also suggests that parents — specifically, mothers — 
who return to work within the first year of a child’s life do not negatively affect children’s physical or 
emotional development. 9  In fact, limited research suggests that mothers who spend some time at 
work during their child’s early life might create a slightly higher-quality home environment than those 
who do not work at all, an effect attributed to the various economic and social benefits of working.10
Parents also benefit from time off to care for newborn or newly placed adopted or foster children.  
Unfortunately, most research focuses on the benefits to biological mothers, not fathers or non-
biological parents.  We discuss here what we currently know about the health and economic benefits 
to parents who have time off work to care for children, but we believe more research needs to be 
done in this area.  
For women, returning early to work, particularly if earlier than preferred, is associated with greater 
amounts of stress and higher rates of depression.11  By contrast, taking 12 weeks of leave is 
associated with a significant decline in depressive symptoms among mothers.12 Women who return to 
work after fewer than six weeks of leave are also four times more likely than women who take more 
than 12 weeks of leave to fail to establish consistent breastfeeding patterns, and are more likely to 
breastfeed for shorter periods of time.13  Some of the positive health benefits of breastfeeding for 
childbearing mothers include fewer incidences of postpartum depression, decreased postpartum 
bleeding, earlier return to pre-pregnancy weight, and protection against breast and ovarian cancer. 14
With regard to economic security, it is well documented that significant family care obligations, which 
tend to fall more heavily on women, often lead to reduced labor force attachment among women, 
which in turn leads to lower lifetime income potential.15  Evidence suggests paid parental leave is an 
important way to help women meet these family-care obligations, while also helping women remain 
attached to the workforce.  Specifically, women who receive paid time off to care for and bond with 
their new children are more likely to return to work after taking leave, have a higher lifetime income, 
and have stronger labor force participation compared with women with no access to parental leave.16  
This strengthening of workforce attachment associated with paid parental leave is not as strong for 
unpaid parental leave.17  
“I am not unemployed, and I am not a stay-at-home dad. 
I’ve got a ‘real’ job; I just haven’t gone to the office since 
last December. In total, I’ve spent 18 of the past 36 months 
on paternity leave here in Sweden, my adopted country, ‘off’ 
work to care for my two kids. And, yes, I still get paid.”
 
Nathan Hegedus, “Snack Bags and a Regular Paycheck: The Happy Life of a Swedish 
Dad,” Slate Magazine,  August 31, 2010
Fathers and non-biological parents (e.g., adoptive or foster parents) also benefit from having time to 
bond with their children.  Although men in the United States rarely take much time off following the 
birth or adoption of a new child, evidence shows that those who take time off work of at least two 
weeks or more are more involved in the care of their children later, resulting in stronger, long-term 
father-child relationships.18  Time off for foster or adoptive parents is also important because these 
parents may not have had the same amount of time to prepare psychologically and emotionally for 
the arrival of the child, and are often not present at the birth of the child.19
Finally, paid time off from work to care for newborn or newly placed children can also help families 
manage the significant logistical and financial challenges to finding suitable childcare arrangements, 
especially for infants.  First, there are often very long waiting lists for infant childcare.20  Paid time off 
for parents while they are out of work waiting for a suitable childcare arrangement may help relieve 
significant stress. In addition, infant childcare is generally the most expensive type of childcare and 
is often unaffordable for low- and middle-class families.21  If parents receive paid time off during the 
first several months of a child’s life, they may offset some of the high costs of infant childcare, and 
parents will be able to return to work under less financial strain.  
In sum, while more research should be done on the positive health and economic effects associated 
with paid time off for parental care of a new child, the current body of literature suggests that paid 
time off for a moderate duration — that is, between 12 and 26 weeks — is beneficial for children and 
their families.  
As with Temporary Disability Insurance and Caregiving Insurance, there are several reasons why 
Parental Care for a New Child Insurance would also be beneficial for businesses.  First, those 
employers who offer paid parental care benefits experience increased morale and decreased stress 
among their employees.22  Employee satisfaction, in turn, is associated with increased revenue 
growth and greater customer satisfaction.23  Second, paid parental-care benefits are associated with 
increased employee retention, particularly among female workers.24  This reduced turnover helps 
businesses avoid the significant costs of replacing a lost worker.25  In addition to being more likely 
to return to the workforce in general, evidence shows women receiving paid parental leave are also 
more likely to return to the employer they worked at before taking time off, optimizes the human 
capital investment a particular employer has made.26  
Finally, taking a longer-term view, caring for children in their critical, early years represents a frontline 
investment in human capital, playing a key role in the development of the cognitive and social 
capacities that are crucial for later productive contributions in the workforce. 
B. Current Access to Wage Replacement
1. Voluntary Employer Practices
As noted in the previous chapter, women who receive maternity leave through employer-provided, 
short-term disability plans receive wage replacement based on their inability to work during that 
time period. Women also use that paid time off, however, to care for and bond with their newborn 
children. 
Women also use other forms of employer-provided, paid maternity leave, paid vacation, and paid sick 
days to bond with their newborns — either in conjunction with short- term disability plans (if they have 
access to such a plan) or as their sole source(s) of wage replacement.27  
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However, for biological fathers and non-biological parents (e.g., adoptive parents, foster parents, 
and/or same-sex partners), generally neither employer-provided, paid sick days nor short-term 
disability benefits can be used as sources of wage replacement for time off to care for and bond with 
their new children.  This is because fathers and non-birth mothers are not temporarily disabled by the 
arrival of a new child. 
Some employers provide wage replacement for parental care through paid paternity leave, paid 
parental leave, paid family leave, and/or paid adoption leave policies.  Definitions of these policies 
vary from employer to employer.  
The data is very limited on workers’ access to these various types of wage replacement.  In general, 
however, access to parental care is much less than that provided to birth mothers for pregnancy 
disability, leaving fathers and non-biological parents with less time to care for and bond with their 
new children.
There is only one nationally representative survey on employee access to parental care:  the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’ National Compensation Survey.  The survey defines “paid family leave” as 
including paid leave to care for a newborn or newly adopted child.28  That survey found that in 2010, 
only 10 percent of private sector employees had access to paid family leave.  
Not surprisingly, even among the small number of employees who had access to paid family leave, 
access varied depending on income, type of job, full-time versus part-time status, and industry.29 
While only 3 percent of workers in the lowest 10th percentile of wages had access to paid family 
leave, and only 4 percent of workers in the lowest 25th percentile of wages had such access, 18 
percent in the highest 10th percentile of wages had access to paid family leave.30  Eighteen percent 
of workers with management and professional positions had access to paid family leave, but only 6 
percent of workers in the service industry and 7 percent in sales and related industries did.31  Twelve 
percent of full-time workers had access, but only 5 percent of part-time workers did.  Interestingly, 
union membership did not appear to have an impact:  10 percent of both union and non-union 
members had access to paid family leave.32
There is also limited data from surveys of employers.  While such surveys give us information 
regarding the percentage of employers who are providing parental-care benefits, they offer little 
information regarding employee access to these benefits, because employers may provide the 
benefits to some employees, but not others.  Even with these limitations, the data still provide insight 
into employer practices regarding voluntary paid parental leave benefits. 
For example, the Families and Work Institute’s 2008 National Survey of Employers found that 52 
percent of surveyed employers provided at least some wage replacement for maternity leave, and 16 
percent provided at least some wage replacement for paternity leave.33  The survey did not, however, 
ask whether paid maternity and paternity leave was provided to all employees, or only to those in 
certain positions (e.g., management or professional) or those who worked full time. 
Further, in a 2009 survey of members of the Society for Human Resource Management, 25 percent 
of the roughly 500 human resource professionals who responded to the survey indicated that their 
workplace provided paid family leave, 15 percent indicated that their workplace provided paid 
paternity leave, 15 percent indicated that their workplace provided paid adoption leave, and 14 
percent indicated that their workplace provided paid maternity leave (other than what is covered by 
short-term disability).34   Again, however, the study did not provide any information regarding which 
workers received these benefits. 
 
Finally, employees who do not have access to any of the forms of wage replacement described 
above, but who do have access to vacation days or to some other source of paid time off (such as 
PTO), can presumably use those paid days off to care for and bond with their new child.  However, 
as noted above, employer-provided vacation days average nine days per year, while employers that 
provide PTO generally provide 15-25 days per year.  Neither of these types of paid time off provide 
a significant amount of wage replacement for parental care for a new child, particularly because 
employees must use their PTO days when they are sick or when a family member (including their new 
child) is sick, as well as for holidays, vacations, and other time-off needs.
  2.  State Laws
Two of the states with TDI programs — California and New Jersey — have expanded their TDI 
programs to include a Paid Family Leave (PFL) component.35  The coverage and qualification 
standards are identical to those used in the states’ TDI systems, except that applicants do not have 
to prove that they have a disability.  Rather, applicants must show that they qualify either for parental 
leave (recent birth or adoption of a new child) or that they are needed to care for a covered family 
member.36   For purposes of this section, we focus on the provisions regarding parental care for a 
new child. 
Like TDI, benefits under these two PFL programs are correlated to the employee’s income and 
delivered through a state plan or a state-approved private plan.  Benefit duration is capped at six 
weeks in both programs.37
In New Jersey, employers using a private plan must ensure the plan provides benefits equal to the 
state plan.38  In California, employers who wish to use a private plan must demonstrate that the 
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private coverage exceeds the state plan in at least one respect.39  
The state PFL programs in California and New Jersey are funded exclusively through employee 
contributions; employers have the option of paying the employees’ premiums or “topping up” state 
PFL benefits through their own benefit plans.40  Whereas California’s PFL financing scheme mirrors 
its TDI program (100% employee financed), New Jersey’s PFL program departs from the financing 
scheme for its TDI program, which requires at least 50 percent contributions from employers.41 
In addition, two states — Hawaii and Wisconsin — have laws that require that if an employer provides 
paid sick days to its employees, the employer must provide its employees the option of using a 
certain percentage of their paid sick days for time off for the birth or adoption of a child.42 
C. Recommendations
Given the lack of access by most workers to wage replacement during periods of time off for parental 
care, the pressing need for income during such periods, and the current inequity in male and female 
take-up, we recommend that FSI provide a robust level of wage replacement to individuals who take 
time off from work to care for and bond with a newborn or newly placed adopted or foster child.   A 
national insurance program would provide wage replacement for all individuals who take time off for 
parental care and would provide a strong signal that both women and men need, and are expected 
to take, time off after the birth, adoption, or foster placement of a child.
Our specific recommendations are as follows:
Eligibility.
k   An individual should be entitled to PCNC benefits if he or she is the parent of a newborn, 
newly adopted or newly placed foster child (or is acting in loco parentis to a newborn or 
newly placed child) and is providing care to that child. Each parent must attest that he 
or she is providing care for the child during any time period in which PCNC benefits are 
received by that parent.
Benefits.
k   For time off taken from work for PCNC purposes, an eligible recipient’s wages should be 
replaced at 90 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage, up to a maximum of 150 
percent the national average weekly wage.  
k   Each parent should be eligible for 12 weeks of PCNC benefits.  The benefits are an 
individual entitlement to each parent and not transferable between parents.  In 
households with two parents, the benefits can be taken simultaneously or consecutively.  
k   There should be no waiting period for PCNC benefits. 
k   The 12 weeks of PCNC benefits need to be taken for periods of at least five days or 
more within the first year of a child’s birth or adoption, but they need not be taken 
consecutively.  
Below we describe our rationales for each recommendation.
Eligibility.
An individual should be entitled to PCNC benefits if he or she is the parent of a newborn,  newly 
adopted or newly placed foster child (or is acting in loco parentis to a newborn or newly placed 
child) and is providing care to that child. Each parent must attest that he or she is providing care for 
the child during any time period in which PCNC benefits are received by that parent.
All parents, including those acting in loco parentis, should have access to PCNC benefits as long as 
they are providing care to their child.43  Requiring an attestation that parents are providing care to 
their child while receiving wage replacement benefits is standard in state PFL programs and in the 
programs in OECD countries that we researched.44  This requirement ensures that the program is 
being used for its intended purpose.
Benefits.
For time off taken from work for PCNC purposes, an eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced 
at 90 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent the national 
average weekly wage.  
The PCNC benefit must be sufficiently robust so that a single parent or both parents in a two-parent 
family have a strong incentive to take the benefit and to use the time to bond with a newborn or 
new adoptive or foster child.45  The percentage at which an individual’s wage is replaced must be 
sufficiently high so that both a primary and a secondary breadwinner can take time off without 
leaving the family financially constrained.  In addition, a high-wage replacement rate appropriately 
signals that society views the time off as worthy of support because of the long-term benefits that 
children, families, and society experience.
A national program of robust wage replacement would encourage more men to take extended time 
away from work to care for and bond with a new child. Evidence from paid parental schemes in other 
countries shows that greater take-up by fathers of parental leave is directly associated with robust 
benefit levels and extended leave duration.46  Increased take-up by fathers of parental care for a 
new child would create new cultural expectations and norms around caregiving. It would also provide 
significant benefits to the children receiving care from their fathers.
“What would happen if we passed policies that gave strong 
incentives for men to take parental leave? Don’t laugh, the 
Swedes have tried it. And now you see hunky blond Swedish 
men pushing strollers down the streets while Mom is at 
work. It’s an intriguing idea and it could decrease gender 
discrimination.”
Dwyer Gunn, “Freakonomics:  Betsey Stevenson Answers Your Questions,” New 
York Times, October 13, 2010, 2:30 PM, at http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.
com/2010/10/13/betsey-stevenson-answers-your-questions/
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A wage replacement level of 90 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage subject to the universal 
maximum benefit across all programs — 150 percent of the national average weekly wage — would be 
sufficiently high so that both primary and secondary breadwinners in middle-income families could 
take time off during this period, without leaving the family financially constrained. This high wage 
replacement rate and high maximum weekly benefit is also essential for single parents who do not 
have a partner to contribute to the household’s income.
  
Each parent should be eligible for 12 weeks of PCNC benefits.  The benefits are an individual 
entitlement to each parent and not transferable between parents.  In households with two parents, 
the benefits can be taken simultaneously or consecutively.  
The duration of benefits should be long enough to support parental and child health and economic 
security, but not so long that the program discourages workforce attachment after taking time off 
from work.  Research suggests that paid parental leaves of moderate duration (around six months, 
or 26 weeks) are correlated with the best outcomes in both areas.47  Our proposal would provide 
benefits for a combined leave period of 24 weeks of leave for children with two parents, if parents 
decide to take time off consecutively.  Because every family’s situation is different, however, we 
also believe parents should be able to take PCNC benefits simultaneously, as long as they are both 
providing care to the child.  
As a result, under our proposal, mothers who have an uncomplicated childbirth would be entitled to 
18 weeks of benefits in total: six weeks of TDI benefits (at 80% wage replacement with a one-week 
waiting period) to recover from pregnancy, and an additional 12 weeks of PCNC benefits (at 90% 
wage replacement with no waiting period) to care for and bond with the new child.  This aligns with 
the recommendations discussed above, both with respect to maternal and child health and female 
labor force attachment.  Of course, this assumes that the birth mother is able to take 18 weeks of 
leave from work.  If a woman is able to take only 12 weeks of leave or fewer, she might choose to file 
a claim for PCNC benefits alone rather than for TDI benefits, because the PCNC wage replacement 
level is higher and there is no waiting period. 
We believe the benefits should be non-transferable between parents in two-parent families, just 
as the FMLA is an individual entitlement.  Evidence suggests that children do best when both 
parents take a leave of absence from work after birth or adoption.48  Also, making the time off 
non-transferable promotes gender equity. Parental leave programs in other countries that allow 
transferable entitlements between parents have very little take-up by fathers in heterosexual 
households, resulting in a caregiving burden that disproportionately falls on women.49
There should be no waiting period for PCNC benefits.  
Having no waiting period for PCNC benefits helps provide families with immediate income support.  
The lack of a waiting period also encourages leave-taking by avoiding a wage gap after the birth or 
adoption of a child.  Also, PCNC recipients should not be penalized if they do not apply for benefits 
in advance of childbirth or the date of adoption, because individuals cannot predict the exact time a 
child might be born or placed with a family. 
In addition, if a recipient has not applied in advance for benefits, the program should provide 
retroactive benefits from the date of childbirth or adoption as long as a claimant attests that he or 
she has not worked since the birth or adoption of the child.
The 12 weeks of PCNC benefits need to be taken for periods of at least five days at a time or more 
within the first year of a child’s birth, but they need not be taken consecutively. 
The public health literature shows the most critical time for parents to have some time off to be 
with new children is within the first year of a child’s life.50  While most parents will likely take most of 
the time off in consecutive segments, we believe the program should allow flexibility within the first 
year of a child’s life for some segmented periods of leave.  We believe this segmentation will allow 
two-parent households to better manage shared-caregiving responsibilities and will help parents 
transition back into the workforce earlier by allowing them to return to work, but with the option to 
receive benefits for additional segments of time off when they may need it (such as when a child care 
arrangement does not work out).  New Jersey’s PFL program has a similar rule for time off taken to 
care for a new child.51
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Chapter 4
Caregiving Insurance
The third component of FSI provides wage replacement for time off from work to care for a family 
member with a serious health condition.  
In this chapter we discuss the policy arguments in favor of providing wage replacement for 
caregiving, and current access to wage replacement during periods of time off for caregiving.  We 
then describe our policy recommendations to address this need.
A. Policy Arguments  
Caregiving covers a wide variety of situations in which an individual provides care to a family 
member, broadly defined, with an illness or disability.  Most people who temporarily leave the 
workforce to provide care to someone do so in order to care for their children, their elderly parents, 
or their spouse or partner.  But there are times when workers need to provide care to someone 
else — for example, a sibling, a grandparent or grandchild, or another person who is like a family 
member.1  The type of care provided may vary greatly — from physical care to psychological support to 
logistical help.  While caregiving primarily involves helping family members recover from a moderate-
duration illness or injury, caregivers also provide occasional care for those with long-term diseases or 
disabilities; support elders when they must be moved to a more intensive care setting; or stay with a 
person who is dying.  Nearly everyone will substantially benefit from being able to take paid time off 
during their working lives to address these situations.  
Working caregivers are a rapidly growing segment of the population.  An aging population, the 
deinstitutionalization of elder care, and the rise of dual-earner families are all trends that have 
contributed to this growth.2  In any given 12-month period, about one-third of households have 
someone (most often woman) who is providing care to someone else, typically an older relative.3  
Of these caregivers, nearly 60 percent are employed, the majority of them full time.4  Nearly half of 
working individuals have provided elder care in the past five years, many of whom are part of the 
“sandwich generation,” providing elder care while simultaneously taking care of minor children at 
home.5
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Two-thirds of caregivers who are employed report significant effects 
on their job — either going in late, leaving early, or taking time off.6  
One in five report taking leaves of absence from work, and almost 
one in 10 gives up working all together.7  On average, caregivers devote more 
than 20 hours per week to providing care, and 13 percent of caregivers spend more than 40 hours 
per week providing care.8  While both men and women are providing care for seriously ill family 
members, one study found that women were twice as likely to take unpaid leave to provide elder 
care and twice as likely to report that they considered quitting their jobs as a result of elder care 
responsibilities.9 The fact that women disproportionately provide care — and, as suggested by this 
study, are more likely to take leave and potentially quit their jobs when caregiving conflicts with work — 
gives us concern that caregiving responsibilities have negative effects on women’s labor market 
attachment and outcomes.   
Balancing work with the need to care for others takes a toll on the well-being of workers.10  Those who 
provide caregiving to others have higher rates of absenteeism, worse health outcomes, and higher 
rates of stress than other workers.11  Research shows that having workplace flexibility, including paid 
time off to provide caregiving, would help alleviate these outcomes.12
The care provided by family members also has significant positive health benefits for care recipients.  
Sick children who stay home generally need their parents to administer medicines, take them to 
the doctor, and monitor their health in case their conditions worsen.13  And hospitalized children are 
able to go home more quickly and suffer fewer complications when a parent is present during the 
hospital stay than when a parent is absent.14 The American Academy of Pediatrics credits “family-
centered care” — care that includes the presence and participation of family members — for various 
improvements in health outcomes and more efficient allocation of medical resources.15   In addition, 
although moderate illnesses or injuries generally cause family stress, there is less familial stress 
when family members can stay home to care for individuals who are in need.16
Working caregivers often suffer financial hardship as well.  In one study, women who cared for their 
parents cut back their work hours by an average of 41 percent, resulting in significant wage loss.17 
Caregivers who reduce their work hours also may experience reduced Social Security benefits due to 
lower earnings, more limited access and contributions to employer-sponsored pensions and 401(k) 
plans due to working part time, and reduced personal savings due to less time in the workforce. 18
Providing workers with wage replacement during time off for caregiving is advantageous to 
businesses as well. Recent research shows that people who receive wage replacement while 
taking care-related time off are more likely to return to their job following the event and to be more 
productive overall.19  
Businesses benefit from reduced turnover (saving on the high costs of recruiting and training new 
workers) and lower rates of absenteeism (and thus superior ability to engage in medium-term 
scheduling and planning).  In addition, workers who are unable to take leave when they need it may 
be preoccupied with their family member’s care needs and thus less productive than they would 
otherwise be.20
Finally, caring for people at home is significantly less expensive than other, formal forms of care, 
such as skilled nursing facilities.21   Elderly, disabled and medically frail individuals are less likely 
to spend time in a nursing home, hospital or assisted living facility if they have family members to 
care for them.22  Although temporary time off cannot replace the role of full-time caregiving, it often 
is sufficient for less serious needs, can lower health care costs, and can reduce reliance on public 
assistance.23
B. Current Access to Wage Replacement
In the United States, there are only two sources of direct wage replacement when a worker needs to 
take time off for caregiving: wage replacement provided voluntarily by an employer or, for residents 
of California and New Jersey, wage replacement provided through the state Paid Family Leave 
(PFL) programs.  There is currently almost no private insurance market for individuals to protect 
themselves against the risk that they may need to take a leave of absence, and forgo wages, to 
provide care for a family member.  In some instances, however, family members may be able to get 
paid for the family care they provide through the ill family member’s long-term care insurance or 
through a Medicaid-funded, in-home support services program, but as we detail below these policies 
are a poor substitute for direct wage replacement insurance for workers needing to take leave to 
provide care.
 1. Volunteer Employer Practices
First, an employer might provide wage replacement for caregiving, either by offering a specific type of 
paid time off for caregiving or by allowing employees to use other types of time off for caregiving.
Employer policies that give wage replacement to employees specifically for time off for caregiving are 
rare.  As noted in Chapter 3, the nationally representative BLS Compensation Study found that only 
10 percent of employees in the private sector have access to formal paid family leave — a term that 
BLS defines as including leave to care for and bond with a newborn or adopted child, care for a sick 
child, and care for a sick relative.24  While we have no confirmation, we assume that this data point 
would drop if it excluded leave to care for and bond with a new child and instead was limited to the 
population that has access to paid leave to care for a sick child or other family member.
Of course, as with time off for parental care for a new child, this statistic does not reflect the full 
scope of employee access.  Rather than instituting formal paid family leave policies, many employers 
allow employees to use paid time off (PTO) and/or vacation days to cover these types of situations.25  
Some employers also voluntarily allow employees to use accumulated sick leave to take care of a 
sick family member, although many do not.  As discussed below, some states have recently enacted 
laws requiring employers to allow their employees to use a certain percentage of their paid sick days 
to care for an ill family member.26
“The medical infrastructure for elder care in America is 
good, very good. But the cultural infrastructure is all but 
nonexistent. How can it be that so many people like me are 
so completely unprepared for what is, after all, one of life’s 
near certainties?”  
 
Jonathan Rauch, “Letting Go of My Father,” The Atlantic, April 2010
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Again, however, there are significant disparities in access to such paid time off depending on the 
employee’s income, job position, industry, and full-or part-time status.  Moreover, even workers who 
have access to generous vacation time, sick leave, and/or PTO policies may find they do not have 
sufficient paid time off to provide the caregiving their family members need.
The BLS study was the only study we could find regarding employee access to formal paid time off 
policies for caregiving purposes.  Self-reported data from employers, however, corroborate the fact 
that access to these formal policies is low. The Society for Human Resource Management’s study 
of its members found that only 25 percent of the employers surveyed provide paid family leave.27  
According to a study on working couples caring for children and aging parents, only 15 percent of 
companies with more than 500 employees provided “elder care leave.”28  And again, just because 
an employer provides caregiving benefits to some employees does not mean that all individuals who 
work for that employer have access to such benefits.
 2. State Laws
The two states with paid family leave insurance programs—New Jersey and California—provide 
wage replacement to employees who take time off for caregiving purposes. These programs define 
caregiving quite broadly—providing wage replacement to individuals who take time off from work 
to provide physical and emotional support to their family members with serious health conditions, 
including time to care for a dying relative and time to provide logistical support, such as helping 
someone move to a nursing home.29  The wage replacement benefits provided for caregiving are 
equivalent to those for parental leave to bond with a new child.30
In addition, eight states have “kin care” laws that require that if an employer provides paid sick days 
to its employees, the employer must provide its employees the option of using a certain percentage 
of their paid sick days to care for ill family members. 31
 3. Private Insurance Policies
Unlike time off for a temporary disability —which individuals can insure against through short-term 
disability insurance (most often offered through an employer) — there is no real private market for 
caregiving insurance.  Indeed, we were only able to find private insurance policies for caregiving in 
New Jersey, a state that already possesses a public, paid, family leave insurance program.  New 
Jersey law allows companies to opt-out of the public TDI and PFL programs and either self-insure or 
purchase private insurance (subject to the standards set for private plans by the state.)  A handful 
of private insurers that already provide TDI insurance to companies have applied to provide PFL 
as well.32  The presence of these policies proves that a private market may develop once a state or 
national program is put in place. However, the impact of these existing private insurance policies 
should not be overstated as they remain a very small part of the overall market (both private and 
public) for caregiving insurance and are not available to the vast majority of the country.
While individuals cannot purchase insurance to protect against lost wages during leaves of absence 
to provide family care, it may be that the person for whom they are caring can pay them for their 
services.
Under some long-term care insurance plans, reimbursement to pay a family member who is providing 
care is allowed.33  In addition, all but six states allow Medicaid reimbursement for in-home health 
support that is provided by a family member.34  Finally, a new social insurance program for long-term 
care, the Community Living Assistance Services and Support (CLASS) program, was recently enacted 
as part of the federal health care reform law.35  Starting in January 2011 this program will be funded 
by payroll tax contributions from all workers, except those who choose to opt out of the program.36  
While it is too early to know if funds received through the CLASS program will be able to be used to 
support a family member who is providing caregiving services, it is another future potential source of 
payment to family caregivers.
There are two limitations with long-term care insurance as a form of paid time off for family 
caregivers. First, the funds received through the policies are not “wage replacement” per se because 
pay is based on a set amount allowed under the insurance policy, not on the family caregiver’s wages 
at their place of employment.  Second, these policies are directed at individuals with long-term 
disabilities or seriously ill elders and, as a result, the care needed is often extensive and may not 
easily accommodate short-term exit from and reentry into the labor market.
C. Recommendations
Given the minimal availability of wage replacement during periods of time off for caregiving, 
the pressing need for income during such periods, and the current inequity in male and female 
caregiving, we recommend that FSI provide meaningful wage replacement to all individuals who take 
time off from work to provide caregiving to their family members.  The program would also provide 
meaningful wage replacement for all individuals who take time off for caregiving and would provide 
a strong signal that both women and men need, and have the necessary support to take, time off to 
care for a family member.
Our specific recommendations are as follows:
Eligibility.
k An employee is eligible for caregiving benefits if he or she is “needed to care for” a “family 
member” with a “serious health condition.”  
“My mother had Stage IV breast cancer and Paid Family Leave 
(PFL) allowed me to take time off work to travel to Texas and 
take care of her during her final months. There is absolutely 
no way I could have managed to keep my apartment (and life) 
here in California while taking unpaid leave from work. The 
application process was relatively easy, the benefits arrived 
quickly, and the people I talked to when I needed help were 
courteous and helpful. The huge relief all this provided while 
dealing with the extremely stressful situation of caring for 
and saying goodbye to my mother cannot be fully explained in 
words. I am very grateful that I live in one of the few states that 
offer this benefit.” 
Melissa Stern, paidfamilyleave.org
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k The terms “needed to care for” and “serious health condition” should track the definitions in 
the FMLA. 
k The term “family member” should be defined broadly and should track the definition used 
by the federal government to allow its employees to use their own sick leave to care for a 
family member. 
k An eligible recipient must attest that he or she is acting as a caregiver for a family member 
during any time period in which benefits are received.
 
Benefits.
k An eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced at 80 percent of the worker’s average 
weekly wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage.  
k There should be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum 
amount an individual can receive over the course of his/her working lifetime, and that 12 
weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum an individual can receive in any one year. 
Within those limits, actual benefit durations should depend on how long a worker must be 
out of work to provide care.  
k There should be a five-day waiting period for each of the care recipient’s qualifying serious 
health conditions before benefits can be claimed. 
Below we describe our rationale for each section:
Eligibility.
An employee is eligible for caregiving benefits if he or she is “needed to care for” a “family member” 
with a “serious health condition.”  The terms “needed to care for” and “serious health condition” 
should track the definitions in the FMLA. 
The terms “needed to care for” and “serious health condition” have been part of federal law for a 
number of years under the FMLA.37 We believe the definitions of those terms are substantively in line 
with the purposes of our proposal and will provide consistency for the administrative agency when 
determining eligibility for FSI Caregiving benefits.38
The FMLA regulations provide that a person is “needed to care” for a covered family member with a 
serious health condition if he or she is needed to provide physical and/or psychological care, such 
as assisting with the basic health care needs of a family member, providing emotional support to 
a dying family member, or helping an elderly relative transition to an assisted living facility.39  As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the administrative agency implementing FSI should require certification from 
a health care provider documenting the need for care.
The term “family member” should be defined broadly and should track the definition used by the 
federal government to allow its employees to use their own sick leave to care for a family member.
 
We believe that eligibility to take leave for caregiving purposes must be broad enough to recognize 
the full range of caregiving relationships in our society — e.g., grandparents who are the primary 
caregivers for their grandchildren; siblings; or non-relatives who are like a family member.  Data on 
caregiving in the United States shows that non-immediate family members make significant sacrifices 
to care for extended family and friends — whether it be a grandparent, an uncle, or a close friend who 
is like a family member.  One study found that more than 14 percent of caregivers are caring for a 
non-relative.40  Another study found that more than 40 percent of caregivers for Alzheimer’s patients 
are not covered under the FMLA’s narrow definition of family, and yet another found that nearly 20 
percent of primary caregivers for chronically disabled individuals are neither the spouse nor the 
child of the person receiving care.41 Non-immediate family care is likely to become more prevalent as 
workers become increasingly mobile and, as a result, cease to live near immediate family members.
Furthermore, because our proposal is a social insurance program financed by contributions from 
all workers, there is merit to allowing workers to provide care to those individuals who most need 
it, whether or not the care recipient is part of the individual’s immediate family.   Allowing a worker 
to use benefits earned through his or her contributions to care for any person who falls within the 
proposed definition of family member will make the program useful to a broader cross-section of 
workers. We also believe that, as a matter of social policy, government should encourage caregiving, 
and allowing benefits to be used to provide care for all those who qualify as family members under 
this definition increases the number of potential caregivers in the population. Some people who 
need temporary care from others for a serious health condition may not have an immediate family 
member available to provide it for them.  Allowing care from another individual is more economical 
for the government than paying for professional nursing care.
Because of these concerns, we concluded that the FMLA’s definition of “family member”  — children, 
a spouse, and parents — is too narrow and does not recognize the current constellations of families 
and caregiving relationships.  As a result, we recommend that the term “family member” track the 
federal regulations allowing federal employees to use their sick leave to care for a seriously ill family 
member.  That regulatory definition of a “family member” is broader than the FMLA, and includes an 
individual with any of the following relationships to the employee:
(1) Spouse, and parents of a spouse, i.e., fathers and mothers in-law;
(2) Sons and daughters, and spouses of a son or daughter, i.e., daughters or sons in-law;
(3) Parents, and spouses of a parent, i.e., stepparents;
(4) Brothers and sisters, and spouses of a brother or sister, i.e., brothers or sisters in-law;
(5) Grandparents and grandchildren, and spouses thereof;
(6) Domestic partner and a domestic partner’s parents; and
(7) Any individual related by blood or affinity whose close association with the employee is the 
equivalent of a family relationship.42
An eligible recipient must attest that he or she is acting as a caregiver for a family member during 
any time period in which benefits are received.
Like the eligibility rules for parental care, we recommend adopting language modeled after state 
paid family leave programs. Those programs require eligible recipients to attest that they are acting 
as a caregiver while benefits are received to ensure that the program is being used for its intended 
purpose.43   
Benefits.
An eligible recipient’s wages should be replaced at 80 percent of the worker’s average weekly 
wage, up to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage.  
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We chose to set wage replacement levels for caregiving at the same level as temporary disability.  
Caring for one’s own disability and caring for another’s disability both rest on the same “qualifying 
event”: a serious health condition. As with temporary disability, wage-replacement levels for 
individuals who take time off from work to care for others must be high enough to provide meaningful 
income support during such individuals’ time away from work.  Otherwise, the societal rationale of 
supporting those who provide important caregiving services for those in need will not be achieved. At 
the same time, wage replacement levels for supportive caregiving cannot be so high as to encourage 
over-use of the program. Setting wage replacement levels at the same level for caregiving and 
disability also avoids the inequitable situation where a care recipient could receive higher wage 
replacement than the person for whom he or she is caring, assuming that person happens to be 
accessing the temporary disability portion of the program.
There should be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum amount an 
individual can receive over the course of his/her working lifetime, and that 12 weeks of caregiving 
benefits be the maximum an individual can receive in any one year. Within those limits, actual 
benefit durations should depend on how long a worker must be out of work to provide care.  
As explained above, we believe caregiving benefits should be available when an employee takes time 
off to care for a family member, broadly defined, in order to recognize and support the wide range of 
familial caregiving relationships that exist today.
That said, there are four reasons why we believe it is appropriate to set a maximum number of weeks 
an individual could receive benefits for caregiving over the course of his or her working life.
First, we are concerned about overuse.  A program that allows unlimited wage replacement benefits 
to care for family members, broadly defined, could result in overuse and unsustainable costs.  One 
way to limit use is to more narrowly define the class of persons to whom one can provide care. But 
we believe setting a maximum number of weeks an employee can take off for caregiving during his/
her working lifetime is a more equitable solution. Specifically, we believe it would be unfair to exclude 
a worker who has been contributing to the program and is otherwise eligible simply because the 
worker’s relationship to the person in need of care does not meet a narrow definition of “family.”  
We are also concerned that unlimited benefits for caregiving might lead to fraud and abuse.  As will 
be discussed in Chapter 5, administering caregiving benefit claims is inherently complex, especially 
when claims are allowed for a broader array of caregiving relationships.  Limiting an individual’s total 
benefit allotment will discourage abuse of the system and encourage individuals only to use the 
program when the caregiving need is serious.
Third, we are motivated by concerns that imposing no limit on Caregiving benefits will perpetuate 
disparities in caregiving obligations between men and women. If caregiving benefits are limited, 
there will be stronger incentives for males to take caregiving leaves; once a female caregiver has 
exhausted her benefits, the only way for a family to receive additional insured leave may be for a 
male family member to take the leave. 
Finally, we believe that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits for temporary time off from work is just 
one part of a larger public policy response to a growing caregiving crisis.  Longer-term caregiving 
is addressed by long-term care insurance and government programs such as the recently enacted 
CLASS Act and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for home health care providers.44  
As a result, we recommend there be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the 
maximum amount an individual can receive over the course of his/her working lifetime, and that 12 
weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum an individual can receive in any one year. Within those 
limits, actual benefit durations should depend on how long a worker must be out of work to provide 
care.  
The 26-week total benefit maximum would allow an individual to receive up to half a year’s worth of 
wage replacement over the course of the individual’s working life when taking time off from work to 
provide care to various family members.  
The 12-week annual benefit maximum would ensure that caregivers have access to enough benefits 
to provide wage replacement for a variety of caregiving needs.  The 12-week annual benefit duration 
tracks the FMLA, which provides up to 12 weeks per year of unpaid leave for, among other things, 
caregiving purposes.45  It recognizes that some illnesses and disabilities last longer than others, 
and that some caregivers have caregiving responsibilities for more than one person.  In addition, it 
compels caregivers to exercise prudence in order to save some benefits for the future — for example, 
when they might need to take time off from work to provide care in their later years. 
Under our proposal, an individual, over the course of her career, could claim benefits for one month 
to care for her mother recovering from surgery, three weeks to help a sibling recovering from an 
injury, two weeks to assist her father as he moves into a nursing home, six weeks to care for a dying 
spouse, and still have 11 weeks’ worth of benefits if unforeseen caregiving needs arise in the future.  
However, the individual could receive only up to 12 weeks of caregiving benefits per year.  [Note that 
the Caregiving benefit is available in addition to the maximum of 26 weeks per year of Temporary 
Disability benefits, and 12 weeks per year of PCNC benefits.]
We recognize that the 12-week annual caregiving limit is shorter than the 26-week annual TDI limit.  
However, while the duration of wage replacement benefits must be long enough to allow individuals 
to take the time off that they need to provide care, it need not be as long as benefits provided for 
one’s own temporary illness or injury. First, some individuals who are recovering from a disability 
will not need someone to take time off work to care for them (especially in increments of a week or 
more), either because they can recover on their own or because they have a professional caregiver 
(e.g., in-home health aide, hospital staff, etc.).  Second, when an individual is unable to work because 
of illness or injury, there is no one else who can recover for the individual.  By contrast, when an 
individual’s family member is seriously ill or injured, there will often be more than one person who 
can provide care to that family member, especially when the term “family member” is broadly 
defined.  
There is no way to predict the number of weeks an individual will need to take time off from work in 
his or her lifetime to provide caregiving.  Some individuals will have large, extended families, where 
a number of relatives might need care, but also where a number of relatives might be available to 
share the caregiving burden.  Other individuals will have small families, where fewer relatives might 
require care, but where the caregiving burden might fall on only one or two family members.  While 
26 weeks of wage replacement for caregiving purposes may not be sufficient for all, we believe half a 
year of wage replacement constitutes a reasonable amount of benefits that can be used to address 
a variety of caregiving needs. Further, because we have recommended a broad definition of “family 
member,” we anticipate a broader pool of caregivers will be eligible under the program and able to 
provide care if another person has exhausted their total allowable benefits.
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As explained in Chapter 7, however, while we recommend a 26-week total benefit duration and 12-
week annual benefit duration, we also recommend that there be further research on whether there 
are other ways to mitigate concerns about overuse, program sustainability, and fraud and abuse.
There should be a five-day waiting period per qualifying serious health condition of the care 
recipient before benefits can be collected. 
We believe there should be a five-day waiting period before an individual can seek wage replacement 
for caring for others. As with the waiting period for temporary disability benefits, a waiting period 
for caregiving benefits helps avoid problems of moral hazard and overuse.  It underscores the fact 
that the program is intended to provide wage replacement only when time off is taken to care for 
an individual with a serious illness or injury. In addition, we believe this program should supplement 
shorter-term policies such as paid sick days that can be used to care for sick family members and 
PTO days.
As with TDI, our proposal only requires a Caregiving benefit recipient to serve one five-day waiting 
period per qualifying serious health condition.  If an individual has to take additional time off to care 
for the same individual with the same condition, the individual can claim benefits without another 
five-day waiting period. 
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PartII
How Would It Work?
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Chapter 5
Administration
Previously, we discussed our recommendations on eligibility, benefits, and financing for a national 
social insurance system for time off for temporary disability, parental care for a new child, and 
caregiving. This section discusses how the program can be administered. 
A. Background
While we are proposing the first national social insurance system for temporary disability, parental 
care for a new child, and caregiving benefits, a number of lessons can be learned from experiences 
in the states.  Rhode Island established our first social insurance system for temporary disability 
more than 68 years ago, in 1942.  California, our largest state, has been operating its temporary 
disability insurance program since 1946 and its parental care and caregiving insurance programs 
since 2003. These programs, and similar laws in New Jersey, New York, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, 
have operated, for the most part, without undue cost or complaint.1  Their continued existence 
alone suggests strongly that our proposed FSI program is both workable and affordable from an 
administrative standpoint. 
Our goal was to build from the states’ experiences and put forward recommendations regarding how 
a TDI, PCNC, and Caregiving Insurance system should work and where it can best fit in our national 
social insurance structures. 
To that end, we conducted an in-depth examination of the existing social insurance structures in 
the United States — Social Security, Rail Road Retirement and Sickness Insurance, Unemployment 
Insurance (UI), state Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI), and state Paid Family Leave (PFL) systems 
— to see what is and is not working in the distribution of social benefits and whether there is an ideal 
administrative vehicle for the FSI program. 2  
We also explored the leading national social insurance proposals — a proposal to amend the Social 
Security Act to provide Social Security benefits for FMLA-covered reasons;3 a proposal to provide 
wage replacement to individuals who take FMLA leave with the benefit financed by a payroll tax 
and administered by employers;4 and a proposal for a family-leave insurance program financed by a 
payroll tax and administered by a federal-state partnership5 — to learn about different administrative 
approaches.
Providing wage replacement for temporary disability, caregiving, and parental care, however, is in 
many ways fundamentally different from the missions of each of the major national social insurance 
systems.  For instance, Social Security operates a disability insurance program, but that system is 
designed to cover disabilities that prevent most gainful employment and are expected to last for a 
year or longer, not temporary conditions that keep a person from performing his or her current job.  
As one would expect, the eligibility standards and application screening processes associated with 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) are more intensive and lengthy than those needed for a 
temporary disability system.  Likewise, the retirement and survivor’s insurance programs are capable 
of providing benefits based solely on relation. Yet, benefits are predicated on a concrete event, the 
death of a parent or spouse, as opposed to the more subjective standard of “needed to care” for that 
person.  
Similarly, while Unemployment Insurance provides wage replacement for short-term, involuntary 
absences from the labor force, it is not equipped to handle claims that are medical in nature.  
Indeed, as the Commissioner of the SSA said in the Social Security Amendment Act hearings of 1949, 
“[E]xperience has shown that the two programs of temporary disability and unemployment insurance 
are so different as to require almost separate administration, with separate policies, separate 
procedures, and separate administrative staffs.”6   
As a result, we had to start from the premise that regardless of which agency 
administers the FSI program, a temporary disability, caregiving,  
and parental care system would require its own set of 
administrative processes.  In the sections that follow, we describe our initial thoughts 
about how those processes might work and how we would address some of the unique challenges 
associated with this kind of system.  We then turn to our recommendations on the most appropriate 
administrative delivery vehicle for these benefits.  
B. Basic Process and Claim Evaluation
 1.  Key Elements of the System
While the purposes of our program diverge from those found in our major national social insurance 
programs, the basic processes would look very similar to what is currently done in state UI, TDI, and 
PFL systems: 
Application:  For each FSI component, an applicant will be required to submit a formal application to 
the agency in charge of distributing benefits (see section C for our discussion on the agencies best 
suited to handle these benefits).  For TDI, that application will need to be accompanied by medical 
certification of an illness or injury that renders the individual unable to work.7  For Parental Care, 
the applicant will need to provide some proof of the relationship with the new child and attest that 
they are providing care to the child.8  For Caregiving, there will need to be proof of relationship and 
a medical certification showing that the care recipient has a serious health condition and requires 
care.9 
Review by the Agency:  Once an application is submitted, there will need to be some form of review 
and verification by the agency in charge of the program.  This will include a review of wage and hour 
records provided to the agency by employers to determine an applicant’s eligibility and benefit level.10 
In addition, agency staff will need to review and approve medical certifications.   We discuss some of 
the unique challenges associated with this kind of review below. 
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Appeals: If an applicant is dissatisfied with either the eligibility or benefit determination made by 
the agency, the applicant should be able to appeal that decision — both within the agency and to an 
independent administrative tribunal.11 
Distribution: There will need to be some system in place to distribute program benefits.  Most of the 
programs we studied offer applicants the choice of receiving benefits by check or by direct deposit.  
For example, the Rhode Island TDI program, Wisconsin’s UI program, New Jersey’s UI program, and 
all of the Social Security programs offer direct deposit as a payment option.12  Some states even 
use electronic debit cards that are distributed through partnering banks.13  We believe a range of 
alternatives will be needed to meet both the financial needs of applicants and the administrative 
capabilities of each system.14  
As one would expect, of the four steps summarized above, claim evaluation presents the greatest 
challenge.  Ensuring smooth distribution of applications and benefits is mostly a question of 
sufficient resources and staff.  Claim evaluation, on the other hand, consists of both hiring the 
right personnel and establishing the right processes.  In the sections below, we outline some of our 
findings regarding the challenges presented by each segment of our program. 
 2. Specific Claim Evaluation Challenges
  a.  Temporary Disability 
The largest challenge in the administration of temporary disability benefits is the evaluation 
of medical certifications.  As noted above, our program will rely on certifications from medical 
professionals to determine whether a person is suffering from a qualifying illness or injury.  These 
certifications will, of course, need to be verified by agency staff.  
There are essentially two methods for handling verification.  First, an agency can hire claim 
administrators with medical training or medical backgrounds to review certifications.  Second, the 
agency can adopt a set of medical guidelines, like the Medical Disability Advisor (MDA), to assist 
administrators in making initial determinations — an approach currently employed by TDI programs in 
Rhode Island and California.15   
The most efficient method is to craft medical guidelines and train administrative staff in how to 
implement them.  Medical guidelines, such as the MDA, enable staff without medical training to 
effectively review applications by providing accessible descriptions of common ailments, their typical 
duration, and the factors that can speed or slow recovery from them.  As a result, highly trained 
medical experts, such as Registered Nurses, would be needed only for the review of suspicious cases 
and testimony in support of agency determinations.16  This approach is much less expensive than 
employing experts to review all applications or requiring extensive training for all administrators, and 
it will be much faster than having experts complete an extensive review of all applications. 
  b. Parental Care for a New Child
Of the three types of time off we discuss in this proposal, PCNC presents the fewest challenges in 
terms of claims evaluation. 
The proof and analysis required to prove a parental care claim is generally straightforward.  A birth 
certificate, adoption or foster placement records, parentage judgment, or other official record that 
demonstrates the claimant’s relationship to the child will generally serve as adequate proof for a 
claim.17  In order to approve the claim, the benefits administrator will simply need to verify that the 
proof presented is authentic.  The training required to review the authenticity of these documents is 
not as intensive as the training needed to review medical claims.18  As a result, there will be less need 
to worry about processing speed and appeals procedures.  
Claims involving parental relationships where no official recognition exists (e.g., an individual acting 
in loco parentis) are naturally more complex.  In these situations, a claims administrator will not be 
able to rely on state-sanctioned records to prove a relationship exists.  A signed attestation by the 
claimant confirming the relationship is, probably, the best substitute available.19 
  c.  Caregiving  
Caregiving claims are intrinsically difficult to evaluate.  Applications depend on the relationship 
between the care recipient and claimant, the medical status of the care recipient, and the recipient’s 
need for care from the claimant.  Proof of relationship is generally simple to provide, although proving 
relationships outside of the core family will be more complicated. In addition, establishing that the 
recipient requires care and assistance from the claimant will sometimes be difficult to prove.  
These complications naturally lead to concerns about potential fraud. However, an agency should 
be able to safely rely on practices similar to those used in the New Jersey and California family leave 
insurance systems. In those programs, the primary evidence in support of a caregiving claim consists 
of a statement from a physician or other healthcare provider stating that the care recipient has a 
serious health condition and requires care.20  Because our proposal adopts a broader definition of 
family, the agency charged with reviewing claims might also request a signed statement from the 
care recipient (when possible) that verifies the nature of the care being provided as an extra check 
against fraud. It should be noted that neither California nor New Jersey requires this, however. 
As in the parental care context, if a government-issued document verifying the relationship between 
the care provider and care recipient is not available, we would recommend the agency accept a 
signed attestation from the care provider confirming the relationship.
Finally, since this is a new program, we would also recommend occasional spot audits to ensure that 
the program is working as intended and that only legitimate claims are approved.  
 
C. Federal or Federal-State Approach
As noted above, the unique requirements of a temporary disability, caregiving, and parental care 
system ensure that, regardless of the administrative vehicle, our program will largely stand apart 
from the processes currently in place.  However, we also recognize that there are efficiencies to be 
gained from aligning it with an existing system.  
From our perspective, there are two plausible forms this alignment could take: 
k A national-state program directed by a federal agency, but administered by  
 state agencies; OR
k A national program directed and administered by a federal agency.
Regardless of administrative vehicle, an FSI program will be a part of the broader social safety net 
in the United States.  As such, it is likely that any legislation establishing an FSI program would be 
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an amendment to the Social Security Act — which established, among other things, Old Age and 
Survivors’ Insurance (OASI), Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), and Unemployment Insurance 
(UI). The question here is whether it makes more sense to align the administrative aspects of the FSI 
program more closely with UI (which is administered by the Department of Labor and state agencies) 
or OASI and SSDI (administered by the Social Security Administration).   
In the sections below, we discuss how the FSI program would be administered under each approach, 
and where the challenges lie.
 1.  A Federal-State Partnership
One option would be for the FSI program to be administered by a federal-state partnership.
A similar administrative structure is proposed under the “Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009,” which 
was introduced by Rep. Pete Stark (D-Calif.).  The Stark bill would create a national family leave 
insurance program that is funded by the federal government, but run through state agencies.21  The 
program would be funded through an increase in the employee FICA payroll tax by 0.1 or 0.2 percent 
(depending on whether the person works for a large or small employer).22 The money collected would 
then be used to provide wage replacement, on a sliding scale, for employees who take time off for 
FMLA-qualifying reasons.23
The primary vehicle for administering the benefit in Stark’s bill is a federal-state partnership.  Under 
these partnerships, the Department of Labor would provide the state with funding for a family 
leave and temporary disability insurance program in exchange for having a state agency administer 
the program.24  In order to qualify, states would be required to administer the program through an 
existing system, such as Unemployment Insurance or Workers’ Compensation.25  
We recommend a similar approach, where the federal agency would be responsible for collecting 
funds for wage replacement and program administration through a federal payroll tax, and 
would set national standards for benefit levels, duration, and eligibility.  State agencies would 
be responsible for the processing of claims and distribution of benefits.  Funding for program 
administration and benefits would come entirely from the proceeds of the payroll tax collected 
by the federal government. 
Under this approach, the lead federal agency would, most likely, be the Department of Labor, and 
the lead state agency would, most likely, be the state workforce agency currently responsible for 
administering Unemployment Insurance.  The state Unemployment Insurance agencies would 
be responsible for processing applications, handling appeals, and distributing payments.  The 
Department of Labor would allot funds for program administration and benefits, set national 
standards, and ensure that state agencies are administering the program effectively.  Unlike the 
initiative undertaken during the Clinton Administration, in which states were permitted to use UI 
funds to provide wage replacement during times of parental leave for newborns or newly adopted 
children, 26 this approach would simply build off of the administrative structures of the state UI 
agencies — their payment, processing, and appeals systems — and would not use funds slated for UI 
administration or benefits.27 
This approach would mirror what is currently done in the two states with functioning Paid Family 
Leave Insurance (PFL) programs, California and New Jersey.  Both states chose to build their PFL 
administrative systems off of their existing Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs.28  Those 
TDI programs, in turn, were built on top of the state UI infrastructures. The programs — UI, TDI, and 
PFL29 — have distinct policies, procedures, and funding sources, yet all three work out of the same 
department and share some of the same administrative resources.30  
Indeed, the connection between these systems reflects a long-standing tie between UI and TDI 
programs at the national level.  Since 1946, the federal laws governing the certification of state 
unemployment compensation programs — namely the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and Title 
III of the Social Security Act — have specifically permitted the use of funds derived from state UI taxes 
on employees for TDI benefits.31   
The states will, of course, need to affirmatively grant the relevant state agencies the authority to 
administer the program and work cooperatively with the federal government.  The role of the federal 
government, then, is to incentivize the granting of authority.  States that refuse to partner with the 
federal government will forfeit funds set aside for program operation and benefits, even though state 
residents have contributed to the program.  If that turns out to be an insufficient motivator, however, 
other incentives, such as a tax credits similar to those used to promote UI, could be added.32
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program provides a good illustration of the agreement/
incentive approach.  The TAA provides partial wage replacement and other employment services to 
individuals who are unemployed or underemployed due to a free trade agreement or other structural 
change in the United States economy.  The program is fully funded by the federal government and is 
administered through state UI offices.  To encourage participation, businesses in states that fail to 
enter into agreements with the federal government to administer the TAA program lose part of their 
federal unemployment tax credit.33 
Even though we recognize that TDI, PCNC, and Caregiving will require largely separate programs, 
there are still a number of efficiencies one would expect to flow from building on top of the UI 
infrastructure.  These include use of wage records, payment systems, and appeals networks.  As 
noted above though, certain aspects of our program will require distinct or expanded infrastructure. 
As the current unemployment crisis has underscored, our UI infrastructure, particularly the computer 
systems used for claim processing and data storage, is woefully outdated.34  Without a sufficient 
influx of resources, the wage records, payment, and appeal systems of the state UI programs will be 
unable to absorb these added responsibilities. 
Another issue is that our program, unlike most UI systems, uses hours worked instead of wages 
earned as a measure of eligibility. Only two states, Washington and Oregon, currently require 
employers to track and submit hours worked by employees.35 The Washington experience shows that 
tracking hours is viable from an administrative standpoint, but the addition of hours worked to the 
information tracked by state agencies will constitute a new practice for 48 state systems. 
A third issue is that our program will be governed by national standards on eligibility and benefits.36  
The UI system, on the other hand, gives state agencies greater flexibility in establishing eligibility 
and benefits requirements.  In this way, our proposal more closely matches the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).  SNAP, more commonly know as the Food Stamp program, is 
a national benefit administered by the Department of Agriculture but operated by state and local 
organizations.37 The federal law establishes uniform eligibility, benefit, and distribution standards.38  
The state or local agency in charge of administration simply verifies eligibility and distributes 
benefits.39   
80 81
 2. A New Federal Program 
Another option would be that a federal agency, most likely the Social Security Administration or the 
Department of Labor, administer FSI.
A similar recommendation, based in part on earlier work by Workplace Flexibility 201040 and other 
proposals, has been put forward by Heather Boushey, an economist at the Center for American 
Progress.  Under the Boushey proposal, entitled “Social Security Cares,” the program would operate 
either as a traditional social insurance program, funded through an increase in the Social Security 
payroll tax and/or an increase in the wage cap, or alternatively, it would be financed through a unique 
“time-lending” system that would allow Social Security recipients to trade future benefits for family- 
and medical-leave benefits.41 
As discussed in our universal recommendations in chapter 1, however, our proposal would 
be limited to using a payroll tax to fund the benefit, which would be administered by the 
federal agency.  Employees would submit their applications for benefits to the agency, agency 
employees would handle the processing and approval of these applications, and benefits would 
be distributed by the agency.
Unlike the federal-state partnership, FSI operated by a federal agency could be enacted through 
federal legislation alone.  There would be no need for individual state legislation or federal incentives 
to create state programs.  
As with the federal-state partnership proposal, we expect there would be a number of efficiencies 
associated with operating FSI at the federal level. However, there are also a number of aspects of our 
program that will require distinct or additional infrastructure. 
For instance, if we were to operate FSI alongside Social Security programs such as OASI, we would be 
able to tap into existing employment records, wage data, payment systems, and appeals networks.  
Not all of these mechanisms, however, are well suited for an FSI program. 
To start with, the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) employment and wage data only covers 
employment history and wages earned.  It does not contain any information about hours worked.  
In addition, the SSA only collects this data once a year.   Furthermore, each program in the Social 
Security system uses a complicated benefit formula that differs substantially from our rather 
straightforward method of replacing a certain percentage of wages up to a national cap. 42  Finally, 
the Social Security payment system currently can only process checks on a monthly basis.43  Benefits 
under our proposed program would need to be processed and delivered quickly, so individuals would 
have wage replacement during the periods they were not working — not weeks or months afterward. 
44  
Similarly, if we were to place FSI within the Department of Labor there would be gains in terms of 
area expertise and national reach.  The DOL already operates four national workers’ compensation 
programs45 and employs a cadre of experts on short-term benefit programs and employment law.46  
However, despite its expertise on the subject, the Department has little experience in actually 
operating a program like FSI.  The existing workers’ compensation systems would provide a base to 
build from, but those systems are fairly meager when compared to the social insurance programs 
operated by the SSA and the state unemployment agencies.47  Most of the system would need to be 
newly built.     
1 This is not to say that there has been no controversy.  In recent years, states have (sometimes successfully) attempted to 
raid the Temporary Disability Insurance trust funds to help pay for other state expenses.  See, e.g., California Budget Project, 
Governor Releases May Revision With, As Promised, “Absolutely Terrible Cuts,” No Tax Increases (May 19, 2010), http://www.
cbp.org/documents/100514_May_Revise.pdf (explaining the Governor’s budget proposal to use $500 million from California’s 
State Disability Insurance trust fund to pay for job training); Labor Management News for New Jersey Employers, February 2006 
(stating that since 1993, $473 million have been diverted from NJ’s TDI to pay for the state’s general operating expenses).  
Similarly, states have experienced shortfalls in trust fund levels.  In the early ‘90s for instance, California had to increase 
their SDI premiums in order to avoid the collapse of the fund.  See Mark Schwanhausser, State SDI Rate Rises, San Jose 
Mercury News, Apr. 1, 2000 (explaining past rate hikes in the SDI program).  Much further in the past, RI’s TDI trust fund came 
dangerously close to collapse only a few years after its creation.  The fund has remained stable since that point though.  See 
Comment, Insurance Against Temporary Disability: A Blueprint for State Action, 60 Yale L.J. 647, 663 n. 79 (1951) [hereinafter 
Yale Comment] (describing the early Rhode Island problem). 
Likewise, there are occasional complaints about the speed of claim processing, backlogs, and error rates.  These, however, 
tend to be similar to complaints lodged against UI. See Robert Salladay, Chief of State Disability Program Quits Under Fire, San 
Francisco Chron., Feb. 5, 2003 (describing the results of a newspaper sponsored audit of SDI applications and checks and the 
subsequent dismissal of the head of the SDI program); Michelle Quinn, California Family Leave Program Lagging Behind Stream 
of Claim Applications, San Jose Mercury News, July 29, 2004 (describing an early backlog in the processing of PFL claims); Tom 
Abate, Spike in Jobless Claims Highlights Systems Flaws, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 2, 2010, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/03/02/MN4U1C5TJ9.DTL (describing claim processing problems in the state UI program).       
2 See Appendix A: Current Social Insurance Programs. 
3 Heather Boushey, Center for American Progress, Helping Breadwinners When it Can’t Wait: A Progressive Program for Family Leave 
Insurance (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/fmla.html. 
4 S. 1681, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
5 H.R. 1723, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); H.R. 5873, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); H.R. 3192, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2006). 
6 Hearings on the Social Security Amendments Act of 1949 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 1081, 1093 
(1949) (statement of Dr. Arthur J. Altmeyer, Commissioner for the Social Security Administration); Social Security Amendments 
Act of 1949, H.R. 2893, 81st Cong. (2nd Sess. 1949) (which included national TDI).
7 See R.I. Dep’t of Labor & Training, TDI Application Form, available at http://www.dlt.ri.gov/tdi/pdf/tdiapp09.pdf; N.Y. State Ins. 
Fund, TDI Form DB-450, available at http://www.fordham.edu/images/admin_offices/HR/Notice%20and%20Proof%20of%20
Claim%20for%20Disability%20Benefits.pdf; Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, Claim for Disability Insurance Benefits, available at http://www.
edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/de2501.pdf; N.J. Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev., Claim for Disability Benefits DS-1, available at http://
www.state.nj.us/labor/tdi/WDS1.pdf.; Haw. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., Form TDI-45, available at http://www.alohainsurance.com/
files/tdi-claim.pdf.
8 See Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, Paid Family Leave Sample Form, available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/de2501f-sample.pdf; 
N.J. Div. of Temp. Disability Ins., Form FL-1, available at http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/forms_pdfs/tdi/complete_fl1_R11_09.pdf. 
9 See Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, Paid Family Leave Sample Form; N.J. Div. of Temp. Disability Ins., Form FL-1.  
10 New Jersey, New York, and Hawaii require employers to complete and sign a statement regarding their employee’s wages and 
That being said, we believe that FSI could work in either setting.  The question is whether the 
advantages associated with a federal approach outweigh the advantages inherent in the partnership 
model. 
D. Conclusion 
There are clearly challenges associated with administering a temporary disability, parental care for a 
new child, and caregiving benefit, regardless of the administrative structure that is ultimately chosen.
The broader point, however, as first made in a 1949 report of the Federal Security Agency, is that our 
national experience shows “basic family protection for all workers through compulsory contributory 
social insurance is in harmony with the American way of life and . . . a firm and successful 
administrative foundation exists upon which to build [this] new benefit program.”48  The only question 
is which foundation we want to build upon.
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hours when their employees file for TDI benefits.  The employee must obtain this statement from the employer and file it along 
with the initial application.  Rhode Island and California do not require employers to fill out any portion of the initial application.  
Instead, the relevant state agencies rely on applicants’ descriptions of their hours and wages and verify with the employer as 
necessary. See Appendix A: Current Social Insurance Programs  (TDI).
11 Applicants in almost every system are provided multiple levels of appeals.  The first determination is made at the agency 
level.  In some programs, such as in California’s TDI and PFL program, or in SSDI, the next step is also an internal review.  In 
most programs, however, the second step is an administrative hearing in front of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or a 
designated hearing tribunal.  If the hearing is before a tribunal, it tends to be either the board charged with overseeing the 
entire system, such as the Workers’ Compensation Board in New York, or a specialized appellate review board, such as the 
Board of Review in Rhode Island or the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board in California. See Appendix A: Current Social 
Insurance Programs.
12 See Temporary Disability Insurance: Frequently Asked Questions, R.I. Dep’t of Labor & Training, http://www.dlt.ri.gov/tdi/
tdifaqs.htm; Frequently Asked Questions About Direct Deposit of Unemployment Insurance Payments, Wis. Dep’t of Workforce 
Dev., http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/uiben/faq_direct_deposit.htm; Direct Deposit of UI Benefits, N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., 
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/ui/claim/dirdeposit.html; Social Security Direct Deposit, Soc. Sec. Admin., http://www.ssa.gov/
deposit/. 
13 See Temporary Disability Insurance Electronic Payment Card Welcome, R.I. Dep’t of Labor & Training, http://www.dlt.ri.gov/
tdi/tdiEPCWelcome.htm; What’s New About EDD, Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, http://www.edd.ca.gov/About_EDD/Whats_New.htm 
(describing new electronic debit card system for benefits administered through the Employment Development Department, 
including TDI/PFL).
14 Consumer protection concerns regarding the use of electronic payment systems for benefit programs are well documented. 
See, e.g., Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-645, Electronic Payments 18-26 (2008) (detailing agency concerns about the use of 
EBT in their programs).  If an agency were to implement an electronic payment program, we would recommend the imposition of 
strong consumer protections.  
15 The Medical Disability Advisor (MDA) provides evidence-based disability duration guidelines to clients in all 50 states and 
more than 38 other countries. It is published by the Reed Group and recently released its 6th edition of the manual in April of 
2009. The tables and narratives in the book are reviewed by a Medical Advisory Board of 37 doctors. See The Reed Group, Medical 
Disability Advisor Brochure, available at http://www.reedgroup.com/Guidelines/pdf/MDA_Brochure.pdf. 
16 As noted above, California and Rhode Island follow this model in their TDI Programs. The Rhode Island Department of Labor 
and Training uses an online version of the Medical Disability Advisor (MDA) to assist them with their Temporary Disability 
Insurance program.  Upon receipt of a TDI claim, case managers, who often have no formal medical training, review the 
disability duration to determine if it is within the MDA guidelines. If so, claims are certified and approved for payment. Claims 
outside the maximum disability duration, however, are automatically flagged and referred to the Claims Management Unit 
(CMU), which is staffed by registered nurses. See R.I. Dep’t of Labor & Training, 2007 Progress Report 8, available at http://www.
dlt.state.ri.us/tdi/pdf/2007TDI_ProgressReport.pdf. Similarly, the California Economic Development Department uses the MDA 
as an informal guide to assist case managers in evaluating claims for their TDI program (known as State Disability Insurance). 
Upon receipt of a claim, EDD case managers, taking into account the age and profession of the claimant, review the diagnosis 
and estimated date of recovery and determine whether those are consistent with what is “normally expected” (a standard 
informed by the MDA) for a disability of that kind. If the diagnosis and estimated date of recovery are “significantly greater” than 
what is normally expected, the EDD will engage in further investigation.  See Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, The Medical Provider’s Guide to 
Disability Insurance, available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/de2548.pdf. 
17 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22, §§3302-2, 3303-1 (2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-39.2 (2010); N.J. Admin Code § 12:21-3.2 (2010).
18 Soc. Sec. Admin., Survivor Benefits 7 (2009), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10084.pdf.
19 The Deputy Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division recently issued guidance on how these situations should be treated 
in the FMLA context.  According to the WHD, “Where an employer has questions about whether an employee’s relationship to a 
child is covered under FMLA, the employer may require the employee to provide reasonable documentation or statement of the 
family relationship. A simple statement asserting that the requisite family relationship exists is all that is needed in situations 
such as in loco parentis where there is no legal or biological relationship.” See Dep’t of Labor Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s 
Interpretation No. 2010-3, available at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FMLA/2010/FMLAAI2010_3.htm (citing 
29 C.F.R. § 825.122(j); 73 Fed. Reg. 67,952 (Nov. 17, 2008)). 
20 See Appendix A: Current Social Insurance Programs. (PFL). It should be noted that this is slightly different than what is done 
under the FMLA. An employer may ask an employee requesting FMLA leave to provide medical certification regarding the 
serious health condition of the person being cared for, but the employer is not required to obtain a certification. See 29 U.S.C. § 
2613(a)-(b). 
21 H.R. 1723, 111th Cong. (2009). See Appendix D: Legislative Proposals on Time Off (Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009) for previous 
introductions of the legislation.
22 Id. at § 306. 
23 Id. at § 103(c).
24 Id. at § 102(b)(1)(b). 
25 Id. at § 102(b)(1)(a) (stating that “State agrees to establish, or expand a State program in effect at the date of the enactment 
of this Act”) (emphasis added). 
26 The Department of Labor, under the Clinton Administration, issued regulations permitting states to use Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) funds to pay for wage replacement for employees who had left their jobs because of the birth or adoption of 
a child. Those regulations were subsequently reversed by the Bush Administration.  See Birth and Adoption Unemployment 
Compensation, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,210 (June 13, 2000). 
27 In fact, under current law, grants for UI administration and funds collected via the UI payroll tax are only available for UI use.  
See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(4)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(5).  We do not recommend changing those provisions. However, there have 
been a number of instances where the Congress has specifically required state employment agencies to share wage data with 
other state and federal agencies.  We would recommend similar action to encourage data sharing. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 503(d) 
(Stating that the state agency charged with administering UI must disclose, on a reimbursable basis, UI wage data upon request 
of the Secretary of Agriculture and/or officers and employees of State Nutritional Assistance Programs). 
28 See Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 135-2708 (2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 43:21-25, 43:21-71 (2005).  It is important to note that 
these states chose to build their TDI programs on top of Unemployment Insurance even though others argued that Workers’ 
Compensation was better suited for a medically based program like TDI.  See Yale Comment, supra note 1 (laying out the 
general approaches to providing TDI); M. William Zucker, The New York Disability Benefits Law: The Model Approach, 4 Cornell 
Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 420 (1951) (arguing that the N.Y. Workers’ Compensation approach is best suited for TDI); P.L. 79-719 § 
416(a); 60 Stat. 978, 991 (1946) (law allowing the use of collected UI funds for the payment of TDI benefits); Soc. Sec. Admin., 
Temporary Disability Insurance Program Description and Legislative History, 2009 Annual Statistical Supplement (2009), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2009/tempdisability.html.
29 See Appendix A: Current Social Insurance Programs (TDI and PFL).
30 In New Jersey, the TDI, UI, and FLI programs are run through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development.  California 
operates their SDI, PFL, and UI systems through the Employment Development Department.  All three programs also use the 
same wage information to determine benefit amounts and use the same appeals process.  See Department of Labor, Comparison 
of State UI Laws: Temporary Disability Insurance 8-9 (2010), available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/comparison2010.asp. 
It should be noted, however, that there are limits to the integration of UI and other social insurance systems.  As mentioned in 
note 27, current law prohibits the use of UI administration grant funds for any purpose other than administering UI programs.  
States can still pool UI and non-UI funds for the purpose of buying or operating systems that benefit both, however.  OMB 
Circular A-87 governs the use of federal grant money in state programs.  The basic rule for allocating a cost to a program is 
that costs associated with systems and/or employees that benefit more than one program (such as a general tax program that 
collects UI, TDI, and PFL payroll taxes or a processing center that collects wage information for a database shared by UI, TDI, 
and PFL) must be shared by all systems in proportion to the benefit they receive. In this way, efficiencies are certainly gained, 
but costs are not shifted entirely to UI.  See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OMB Circular A-87 (2004).
31 See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(4)(A) (“all money withdrawn from the unemployment fund of the State shall be used solely in the 
payment of unemployment compensation . . . except that:  (A) an amount equal to the amount of employee payments into 
the unemployment fund of a State may be used in the payment of cash benefits to individuals with respect to their disability, 
exclusive of expenses of administration); 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(5) (“The Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for payment 
to any State unless he finds that the law of such State, approved by the Secretary of Labor under the Federal Unemployment 
Tax Act includes provision for— [. . .] (5) Expenditure of all money withdrawn from an unemployment fund of such State, in the 
payment of unemployment compensation, exclusive of expenses of administration, and for refunds of sums erroneously paid 
into such fund and refunds paid in accordance with the provisions of section 3305(b) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act: 
Provided, That an amount equal to the amount of employee payments into the unemployment fund of a State may be used in 
the payment of cash benefits to individuals with respect to their disability, exclusive of expenses of administration”). 
32 See Appendix A: Current Social Insurance Programs (UI), describing tax incentives to participate in the Unemployment Insurance 
system.  As it is unconstitutional for the federal government to coerce or force state agencies or officers to act on behalf of 
the federal government, these types of arrangements are typically carried out through voluntary administrative agreements 
between federal and state governments.  The natural disadvantage of this approach is that the federal government loses the 
ability to directly control the state agencies.  Instead, it must rely on indirect methods of persuasion. See Printz v. U.S., 528 
U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the Brady Act’s “compelled enlistment” of state executive officers violated the 10th Amendment). 
See also Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (holding that the Federal Unemployment Tax and its accompanying 
incentives did not constitute coercion of the states by the federal government). 
33 See 26 U.S.C. § 3302(C)(3).  There are, in fact, a number of programs run through UI that use this approach.  The 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance program, for instance, is funded entirely by the federal government (both benefits and 
administration) but run by the state UI agencies via agreements made between the state and the Department of Labor. Unlike 
TAA, however, funds for the benefit and administration are the only incentives offered for participation. See 42 U.S.C. § 5177.  
34 See generally NELP 2009 Unemployment Insurance Reform Conference, National Employment Law Project,  http://www.nelp.
org/index.php/site/issues/category/Unemployment_Insurance_Progress_Prospects_and_Priorities (the conference featured 
presentations by Jim Garner of the Kansas State Department of Labor on responding to the “Great Recession” and Joseph 
Vitale of the National Association of State Workforce Agencies on building a 21st century service delivery system). 
35 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, Chapter 3: Monetary Entitlement 3-6, 3-7 (2009), http://www.ows.doleta.
gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2009/monetary.pdf.  Washington State has successfully tracked hours as part of its UI program 
since the mid-1970s. 
36 The issue of federal preemption of current state laws is closely related to this point.  As we note in our chapter on future 
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research, we think preemption is an issue that needs further exploration and do not take a position on it. 
37 See About SNAP, U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/rules/Legislation/about.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 
2010).
38 See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.
39 See About SNAP, supra note 37. 
40 See WF2010, Proposals for Providing and Funding Wage Replacement During Periods of Extended Time Off (“The Four Models”) 7-9 
(suggesting the Social Security system as potential provider of national paid Extended Time Off); Boushey, supra note 3 
(suggesting that a paid family leave program in Social Security could be financed by lifting the earnings cap beyond its current 
level, increasing the Social Security payroll tax slightly, or allowing workers to trade future benefits for family leave).
41 Boushey, supra note 3, at 2.  
42 See Social Security Benefits Amounts, Social Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/Benefits.html (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2010). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 405(i) (2009); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1805, 404.1807 (2008).  
44 Employees would presumably have lead-time prior to the birth and adoption of a child, as well as lead time for caregiving 
needs for planned events, such as surgery.  But they would be unlikely to have similar lead-time in the case of their own 
temporary disability or for many caregiving needs.
45 See Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/.  DOL operates Workers’ 
Compensation programs for Federal Employees, Longshore and Harbor Workers, Coal Miner Workers, and Department of Energy 
Employees.  The Federal Employee program alone covers more than 3 million workers.  These programs, and the Department 
generally, are supported by a national network of district and field offices.  
46 In addition to the Workers’ Compensation programs, the Department of Labor contains the Employment and Training 
Administration, which oversees the operation of the state Unemployment Compensation programs and Workforce Investment 
Grants, the Wage and Hour Division, which is responsible for enforcing the FLSA and the FMLA, and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, which is the primary source for data on employment issues in the United States.  See generally DOL Organizational 
Chart, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/orgchart.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). 
47 As noted in note 46, the Federal Employee program covers more than 3 million employees.  The California Unemployment 
Insurance program, on the other hand, handled almost 3 million claims in 2008.  See Monthly Program and Financial Data, 
Emp’t & Training Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/claimssum.asp (to obtain data for 2008-09, 
select “State,” choose California from the menu, enter 1/2008 as the start date and 1/2009 as the end date, and then click 
“Submit.”)
48 Federal Security Agency, Temporary Disability Insurance Coordinated with Unemployment Insurance 1 (1949). 
Chapter 6
Making it Work for Employers and Employees
Wage replacement, alone, will not guarantee that a national social insurance system will work — for 
employers or employees.  In this section, we discuss those additional supports and guarantees that 
employees and employers will need to make FSI fully functional.
 
A. For Employers: Getting the Work Done 
 
Many employers understand and support employees’ need for paid time off to care for a family 
member or recover from an illness or injury.  At the same time, employers are faced with the reality 
that a job needs to get done.  As we developed our proposal, we were quite aware of this tension and 
spent time trying to understand and recognize the employer perspective on these issues.  Paid time 
off in and of itself may not carry significant costs.  Indeed, as discussed above, there is evidence that 
time off — particularly in combination with flexible work arrangements — can enhance productivity 
and have positive bottom-line results.1  But from the perspective of many employers, the need for 
employees to take time off creates some short-term challenges, particularly around continuity 
of operations and ease of administration.  These challenges, however, are not new, and many 
employers have developed effective policies, tools, and management strategies to assist them with 
executing time off effectively at their worksites.
An exhaustive analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this report.  But we provide here a brief 
introduction to key employer interests identified in our research and some promising management 
tools and strategies.  We also identify a sampling of public policy ideas that build on the programs 
and policies that the private sector has already developed. While we are under no illusion that the 
potential responses identified below will meet every employer concern or ameliorate all potential 
administrative burdens associated with FSI, we strongly recommend that employer interests and 
supports to address employer concerns be considered in any broader policy discussions on FSI.   
 1.  The Current Landscape
Our research shows that employers consistently identify two major challenges in providing periods of 
time off to employees: continuity of operations and administration of time-off policies.  
Continuity of operations — that is, how to get the work done — appears to be the primary challenge 
faced by employers.  Employers place a high premium on predictability and stability. Time off that 
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is taken with little or no notice is often experienced as a disruption to business operations.  On the 
other hand, companies report that time off taken with adequate notice is generally easier to plan 
around and can have positive benefits for their business. 2  
Absences can also lead to reductions in capacity and productivity.3  Some employers find when an 
employee is out they end up spending scarce resources on expensive temporary labor, and valuable 
time developing a plan for managing and reallocating the missed work.4  Customer service and other 
performance indicators may also suffer.5  Additionally, employers report that absences can lead to 
reductions in workforce morale if employees have to increase their hours to cover for lost work or 
feel that the absent worker is receiving special treatment.6
The second major challenge expressed by employers is the potential administrative burden imposed 
by a paid time-off program.7  Employers are naturally concerned about new laws and programs that 
impose administrative burdens such as additional paperwork, reports, or compliance monitoring.  
These indirect costs can be especially difficult for small employers to bear.8
Of course, the reality of today’s workforce is that employers must be prepared for all contingencies:  
planned absences (e.g., for the birth of a new child or to care for a spouse after surgery) as well as 
unplanned ones (e.g., a heart attack, a child injured in a car accident); absences of known duration 
as well as those that continue longer than originally predicted.  
Many employers, large and small, have developed strategies and tools to more effectively and 
efficiently manage periods of employee time off in order to ensure smooth continuation of 
operations.  Below we describe a few of these management strategies in greater detail:
k “Cross training” refers to the practice of training employees for multiple jobs within an 
organization.9  If there is an unplanned absence or unexpected surge in work in a certain 
area, a company with cross-trained employees can simply move existing workers around to 
cover the problem.  This technique is especially useful in industrial settings, both large and 
small, where the unexpected loss of a single employee could severely delay the production of 
a good or service. 
k A “team approach” emphasizes reliance on a group of employees, as opposed to individuals 
given discrete tasks, for the production of a product or service.10  Unlike a traditional top-
down management system, a company or division of a larger organization built around teams 
gives the employees tasked with performing a service control over the process by which the 
work is completed.  This often results in both gains in productivity and flexibility since teams 
tend to apportion work in a manner that allows all workers to gain some knowledge of the 
tasks needed to produce the ultimate service or product.  As in cross training, that shared 
knowledge can allow the team, and therefore the company, to more easily adapt to extended 
absences.  In addition, the team approach can be easily integrated into companies of all 
sizes.  Larger organizations can break operations down into multiple teams while smaller 
companies may find that the entire business can operate as one team.  The same principles, 
and gains, apply in either setting. 
k “Mass Career Customization” (MCC) is an approach pioneered by Deloitte Consulting.11  The 
MCC approach operates on the assumption that a workplace should offer every employee the 
opportunity to customize his or her career to include periods of change along four dimensions 
of work: pace, workload, location and schedule, and role.  By shaping the workplace around 
flexibility, companies that adopt the MCC model work from the assumption that extended 
absences are likely and, as a result, are better able to respond to those situations when they 
occur.  
k “Return to work” programs assist employees re-entering their job after a prolonged absence 
from work.12  They usually take a broad view, considering legal obligations, the individual job 
design, and the design of the overall insurance package to help get an employee back on the 
job.
Of course, none of these policies offers perfect solutions to the challenges associated with time 
off.  The potential impact of each is limited and new ideas and thinking will certainly be needed if 
employers are going to deal effectively with the realities of the modern workplace.  However, they 
serve as evidence that employers are searching for ways to handle these problems.   
Ultimately, we believe any technique that enhances flexibility for business operations and accepts 
the reality that extended time off is a part of modern working life will reduce the burdens experienced 
by companies. And, as we discuss below, we think government can play a role in promoting, 
disseminating, and furthering the development and adaptation of these kinds of policies to ease the 
transition to FSI.  However, we understand that government assistance will never be the only — or 
even the best — answer to the challenges that FSI may create.  Instead, it will require a combination 
of public policy supports and creative management strategies. 
2. Policy Recommendations
Public policy can make implementation of FSI easier on employers.  We have tried to tailor our 
proposal with that goal in mind.  
  a. Supporting Continuity of Operations
FSI is designed to provide some predictability regarding the length of leave and timing of 
return.  Minimum and maximum durations of leave, along with the requirement that health care 
professionals provide estimated dates of return for temporary disability and caregiving claimants, 
ensure that there will be some measure of certainty for employers.  In addition, FSI is specifically 
designed to discourage overutilization and has a number of checks and balances in place to 
minimize the potential for fraud and abuse.  
That being said, challenges associated with continuity of operations will remain for most employers.  
We believe the government can play a role in easing those challenges by serving as a source of 
training and technical assistance in promising management strategies — such as the ones described 
above — both to further the spread of these ideas and cultivate new approaches. 
For instance, using strategies similar to those laid out in Workplace Flexibility 2010’s Public Policy 
Platform on Flexible Work Arrangements, the government could build on existing business models 
and disseminate information on how best to plan for and manage when one or more employees are 
out for an extended period of time.  This could be done through various media including websites, 
printed materials, webinars, conferences, and on-site trainings.  The government could also provide 
direct technical assistance support, available via 1-800 numbers, e-mail, and social media sites.   It 
could also be done through a grant program to incentivize non-governmental entities to develop 
model policies, provide training and technical assistance in those areas to further the spread of 
these ideas, eliminate piecemeal approaches when possible, and cultivate new approaches. 
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In fact, a program focusing on the options mentioned above would easily fit into current efforts to 
start a national dialogue on workplace flexibility and build from programs already in place.13  
A number of countries with existing paid time-off programs already provide similar types of training 
and assistance.  Unlike the technical assistance programs currently in place for the paid family leave 
insurance laws in California and New Jersey, these international programs are designed specifically 
to help employers cope with the impacts of paid time off as opposed to helping them comply with the 
legal requirements imposed by the law.  The Government of New Zealand, for example, maintains 
a comprehensive guide on work-life balance policies for employers.14  The guide includes a brief 
introduction to the concept of workplace flexibility, suggestions for making the individual components 
of flexibility (including maternity and paternity leave) work, and lessons learned from employers who 
have implemented flexibility programs.15  The guide also places a heavy emphasis on knowing what 
to expect when an employee is out for extended periods and the need to plan in advance for these 
kinds of absences.  Similarly, both the Government of the United Kingdom’s “Business Link” website 
and Singapore’s private Employer Alliance provide practical guidance to employers regarding tools 
for managing employee absences.16 
Technical Assistance Websites
Technical assistance websites are an important, cost-effective way to get valuable 
information to employers about the implementation of paid family-leave policies.  
Several countries have helpful websites for employers to understand and better  
effectuate such policies. 
k New Zealand’s Department of Labor has a website detailing ways to  
 “make flexibility work” for employers, including how to manage parental leave. 
 http://www.dol.govt.nz/worklife/resources/making-it-work.asp#3
k Singapore’s Employer Alliance has a website explaining the different types of  
 leave benefits an organization can offer and testimonials on how they can work.
 http://www.employeralliance.sg/toolkit/index.html
k The United Kingdom’s Business Link has a website with sections on managing  
 maternity, paternity, adoption, and parental leave. http://www.businesslink.gov. 
 uk/bdotg/action/layer?topicId=1073858787&r.s=tl&tc=000SYDG00101 
k Australia Fair Work Ombudsman’s websites detail how employers can comply  
 with Australia’s parental, personal, carer’s, and compassionate leave laws.
 http://www.fairwork.gov.au/leave/personal-carers-and-compassionate-leave/ 
 pages/default.aspx 
k http://www.fairwork.gov.au/leave/parental-leave/pages/default.aspx 
 Service Canada has a website on how to manage compassionate care leave.
 http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/ei/types/compassionate_care.shtml
  b. Easing Administrative Burdens
FSI strives to impose minimal administrative burdens on employers.  Claim evaluation, monitoring, 
and payment would all be handled by the agency charged with administration of FSI.  The only direct 
administrative requirements placed on employers would be limited to those related to withholding 
the FSI payroll tax, tracking hours worked by employees, and responding to requests for information.  
While these administrative duties are not insubstantial, we feel they represent the lightest burden we 
could impose under a comprehensive program like FSI. 
Employer experience with the California paid family-leave insurance program reinforces the fact that 
employer administrative burdens associated with family leave insurance schemes can be relatively 
light.  While there may be room for debate regarding the overall impact of the law on businesses,17 
one thing that is clear is the administrative requirements associated with PFL have been minimal.  
The EDD produces applications, reviews claims and certification forms, processes benefits, and even 
provides employees with the appropriate tax forms.18 Employers are only required to post a notice 
in their workplaces and provide a brochure created by the EDD to new employees and those taking 
qualified leave.19   New Jersey’s program has not operated long enough to make similar claims about 
administrative ease, but, with a few exceptions relating to the role employers are expected to play in 
verifying wages and employment, we believe it will also prove to be less onerous than anticipated.20
As noted above, we have tried to follow California’s lead and minimize the administrative burdens 
imposed upon employers by FSI wherever possible.  To assist employers with any administrative 
burdens that may remain, we would recommend a vigorous employer outreach and education 
program.  Lessons could be drawn from the efforts undertaken by New Jersey and California.  Both 
states have developed fairly comprehensive employer guides to the programs, and California even 
offers regular webinars and in-person trainings.21  These programs help employers to understand 
their administrative obligations and can serve as tools for spreading best practices. 
FSI implementation will have impacts on business operations, and it is important they be analyzed 
and taken seriously.  The transition may not always be easy.  We believe the above discussion serves 
as a starting point — both regarding the challenges businesses may face and the role public policy 
can play in helping to address those challenges.  But it is only a starting point.  As policy discussions 
around FSI continue, we believe these issues merit further attention and exploration.
B. For Employees: Job Protection 
The primary purpose of this Policy Platform is to provide a blueprint for a national wage replacement 
program for time off from work for medical or caregiving reasons.  Job protection — the right to one’s 
former job (or an equivalent job) upon return from a period of time off — is, in a theoretical sense, 
separate and apart from the issue of wage replacement.  In reality, however, it is difficult to speak 
about either issue separately.  
Without wage replacement, individuals entitled to job-protected time off may be unable or reluctant 
to take the time off because they cannot afford to do so.  Indeed, two leading studies on the FMLA 
show that of individuals who needed to take leave but did not, the number one reason was that 
they could not afford the loss of wages.22  Conversely, the absence of job protection may prevent 
individuals with access to wage replacement from taking time off from work. Workers understandably 
will be disinclined to leave their job for an extended period if there is a chance that the position will 
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not be there when they are ready to return.  
Of course, this is only true for some workers.  If a worker has a temporary disability, he or she will 
have to take the time off regardless of job protection.  And for many workers, it will make good 
business sense for the employer to keep the job open until the worker can return — in order to keep 
a good employee, avoid turnover costs, and assist in overall recruitment and retention.  However, 
some employers may decline to provide job protection based on their belief that it does not make 
good business sense for them to do so.  And there are other workers who, in better economic times, 
might have taken time off, but who now are scared to do so out of fear of being viewed as “lazy,” or 
“not committed to the job.”23 For these latter categories of workers, job protection is essential. 
 1.  The Current Landscape
The principal federal source of job protection for people who take time off from work for medical or 
caregiving reasons is the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).24  The FMLA provides up to 12 weeks 
of job-protected time off per year for one’s own health condition, to care for a new child, or to care for 
a seriously ill family member.25  However, the statute only applies to persons who work for employers 
with 50 or more employees, and only those who have worked 1,250 hours in the past year.26  About 
40 percent of workers are employed by institutions that do not meet the FMLA employer threshold, 
and, among the approximately 60 percent who do work for covered employers, another 20 percent 
are excluded from FMLA coverage by the hours requirement.27  Some state family and medical leave 
laws are broader in coverage and scope, providing job-protected time off to employees who work 
for smaller employers or who work part time.28  Nevertheless, this still leaves approximately half 
of private sector workers without job protection if they need to take time off for medical or family 
caregiving reasons.29  
Low-wage workers are particularly vulnerable.30 Fifty-six percent of workers with a family income of up 
to twice the poverty line (as compared to 42 percent of higher wage workers) work for employers with 
fewer than 50 employees (i.e., for employers not covered by the FMLA).31 
Preliminary data from the California Paid Family Leave (PFL) program suggests a connection between 
wage replacement and job protection.  As discussed above, California PFL was the first family-leave 
program established in the nation.  PFL became law in September of 2002, and the California 
Employment Development Department (EDD) started dispensing benefits to eligible recipients in July 
of 2004.  
From its inception, PFL has experienced lower than expected take-up rates.  A 2002 study by 
economists at the University of Chicago and the University of California at Berkeley estimated that 
the total number of leaves taken under the program would range between 300,000 and 600,000 
per year.32  A 2000 study by the state EDD, which assumed the program would only be available to 
employees covered by the FMLA or the state equivalent to the FMLA, the California Family Rights Act 
(CFRA),33 — a universe much smaller than that actually covered by PFL — estimated at least 211,000 
people would use the program annually.34  Actual program usage, however, has ranged from a low of 
139,593 in 2004-05 to a high of 187,889 in 2008-2009.35
There are several major studies underway that seek to understand why the take-up rates are low, but 
one strong working hypothesis is that a lack of job protection prevents many workers from using the 
program.36 
A 2007 study by the California Senate Research Office, for instance, found that more than half of 
early PFL claims came from employees working for large employers (with 1,000 or more employees).  
That percentage was surprising since employees working for employers with 1,000-plus employees 
only constituted 14 percent of the overall California workforce.37  The study also found a similar, 
but less pronounced, pattern in employees working for firms with 250 to 499 and 500 to 999 
employees.38  Since most employees working for larger employers are protected by the FMLA and the 
CFRA, whereas employees working for smaller employers are not,39 one explanation for this disparity 
is the fact that individuals working for small employers do not have job protection.
The 2007 study also found that only two-thirds of mothers receiving state short term disability 
benefits (SDI) for pregnancy opted to continue on to the state PFL program.40  One reasonable 
explanation for this disparity is that the employees could no longer afford to live on the reduced 
wages offered by SDI and PFL.  Another explanation, however, is the loss of job protection forced 
these employees to return to the workforce.  Most women receiving SDI payments for pregnancy are 
entitled to job protection under the California Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (PDLL).41  However, 
PDLL protections do not apply to persons taking PFL leave to bond with their newborn children.42  
Unless a worker is covered under the FMLA or CFRA, PFL bonding leave is taken at the risk of losing 
employment. 
 2.  Policy Recommendations  
While the dynamic between the lack of job protection and the utilization rate for California family 
leave is still being studied, we believe there is a strong likelihood that employees who need time off 
may not elect to take it — even if it is paid — if it is not connected to some form of job protection.43  
Empirics aside, our intuition boils down to common sense:  Why take the benefit of a limited-time 
insurance subsidy at the risk of losing your job (i.e., primary income)?  As a result, we believe in order 
to achieve the goals of FSI, all persons eligible for this program should be given some form of job 
protection. 
On the other hand, as discussed above, we are mindful of the very real challenges that employers 
— especially small employers — face when an employee is out of work for a week or more.  The 
question is how we can reconcile these competing interests and provide meaningful protection.  
We believe the simplest and most effective means for creating job protection for people who take 
time off under FSI is to amend the FMLA so it covers more individuals.
42%
56%
all workers
low-wage workers*
Source: Ross Philips, “Working for All Families?” In The Economics of 
Work and Family (2002), pp. 164; 170
*family incomes below 200% of federal poverty level
employed by establishments  
not covered by FMLA
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As a result, we recommend that the FMLA’s job protection requirement be extended to cover 
all employers with at least 15 employees. It should be noted, however, that in recommending 
expansion of the FMLA, we are not recommending that the FMLA conform to FSI standards.  For 
instance, even if the FMLA employer coverage threshold was expanded, an employee would still 
have to work for a single-covered employer for 12 months and have 1,250 hours of service before 
becoming eligible for FMLA job protected leave.
This expansion of the FMLA employer threshold would mean 85 percent of private sector employees 
would work in covered establishments.44  This would track the majority of employment discrimination 
laws, which prohibit discrimination by all employers with 15 or more employees.45  This would also 
track a number of state family- and medical-leave laws that cover employers with fewer than 50 
employees.46  Compliance with these state laws demonstrates that lowering the employer threshold 
is not unprecedented, and that smaller employers can comply with job protection requirements 
similar to the FMLA’s. 
That said, the FMLA, in its entirety, currently covers medium and large employers, and smaller 
employers might have unique difficulties complying with the law as currently drafted.  Thus, if the 
employer threshold is expanded, we recommend further discussion and exploration regarding 
whether the FMLA’s substantive requirements should be modified to address the concerns of small 
businesses.  
Such analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this report.  For purposes of this report, we wanted to 
make the strong recommendation that the FMLA employer threshold be lowered in order to provide 
job protection for more individuals who take time off and receive wage replacement under the FSI 
program.
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hours of service.  The FMLA, by comparison, applies to all employees who work for a covered employer (defined as a company 
with 50 or more employees within a 75 mile radius) and have been employed for 12 months and put in at least 1,250 hours of 
service.  Compare Ca. Gov’t Code §§12945.1-12945.2 with 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
34 Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Paid Family Leave in California: An Analysis of Costs and Benefits 35, tbl.4 (2002), available at http://
www.paidfamilyleave.org/pdf/dube.pdf. (citing the EDD study statistics).  
35 Cal. Emp. Dev. Dep’t, PFL Program Statistics (2010), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/pdf/PFL_Program_Statistics.
pdf.  
36 See Sarah Fass, Nat’l Ctr. for Children in Poverty, Paid Leave in the States 7 (2009), available at http://www.nccp.org/publications/
pdf/text_864.pdf. The California Senate Office of Research agrees that the lack of job protection might be one reason for 
low take-up. Cal. Senate Office of Research, Balancing Work and Family 5 (2007), available at http://www.paidfamilyleave.org/pdf/
paidfamily07.pdf [hereinafter California Senate].  However, the Office theorizes that other potential reasons – including the fact 
that partial wage-replacement is insufficient for many employees and/or that employees are not aware of CA PFL – might also 
explain the low take-up.  Id. 
37 California Senate, supra note 36, at 9.
38 Id. 
39 Approximately 40% percent of California workers are not protected by the CFRA and FMLA because of the statutes’ employer-
size and hours-worked requirements.  Dube, supra note 34, at 9 (citing a 1996 Commission on Family and Medical Leave finding 
that approximately 62 percent of California employees are covered by the FMLA). 
40 California Senate, supra note 36, at 5.
41 The PDLL offers up to 16 weeks of job-protected leave for illness and temporary disability related to pregnancy to women 
working for employers with five  or more employees. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945(a)-(c) (making it an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to refuse a reasonable period of leave, not to exceed four months, to a female employee disabled by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or a related condition unless such refusal is based on a bona fide occupational qualification); Cal. Gov’t 
Code § 12926(d) (defining “employer” for the purposes of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, of which the PDLL is a 
part, as any person regularly employing 5 or more persons).   
42 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945(a). The PDLL, like SDI, only covers leave needed for disabilities related to pregnancy, childbirth, or 
a related condition.  PFL for bonding applies to time off taken explicitly to bond with a new child.  
43 See Hofferth, supra note 22, at 78 (“The most important aspect of the FMLA is that it requires covered employers to at least 
provide job-protected leave. Employees may feel more comfortable about requesting leave knowing that their job is secure.”).
44 See U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, Employer Firms, Establishments, Employment, and Annual Payroll Small Firm 
Size Classes, 2007 (2007), http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/us_07ss.pdf.
45 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 
et seq.; Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq.
46 See Workplace Flexibility 2010, Overview of Job Protected Leave, http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/images/uploads/
EXTOJobProtection.pdf. 
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Chapter 7
Recommendations for Further Research
The recommendations in this report are based on an exhaustive study of decades’ worth of 
research on the problems surrounding paid time off for temporary disabilities, parental care and 
other caregiving needs. After conducting this review, we have identified a number of gaps in the 
research that, if filled, might result in additional recommendations or modifications to our existing 
recommendations.  Below we outline some of these research gaps.
A. Increments of Time Off
We recommend that benefits be available for a minimum of one business week (five days) per 
episode of time off.  As a result, individuals who have a serious health condition (or who care for an 
individual with a serious health condition) that requires short periods of time off would not be able 
to receive wage replacement benefits under this proposal.  Nor would an individual who chooses to 
phase back into work on a reduced-hours schedule after being out for several weeks.  
We believe the need for wage replacement in these situations is quite significant, and we struggled 
with how to incorporate them into FSI.  Ultimately, we believe more research would help address 
concerns regarding: a) whether our one-week increments might cause moral hazard by either 
encouraging leave takers to take an entire week off when they only need one or two days of leave, 
or providing a disincentive to transition back into work on a reduced hours or part-time schedule; 
b) how wage replacement for shorter periods of time off fits with a program whose primary purpose 
is wage replacement for longer periods of time off from work, c) how employers currently manage 
short periods of intermittent leave, both under the FMLA and as a general practice, recognizing that 
intermittent leave as allowed under the FMLA has caused concerns and management challenges for 
some employers,1 and d) whether it is administratively feasible to distribute benefits for short periods 
of time off through a national social insurance program. 
We note that most developed OECD countries account for short-term time-off needs for disability and 
caregiving through mandates requiring employers to provide sick and vacation days.2  By contrast, 
maternity, paternity, and parental leave benefits are generally offered through a government-
administered social insurance program.3  Although some countries provide benefits for very short 
increments of time off or for reduced schedules, many others only provide benefits for recipients 
who are fully out of the workforce and taking time off in one long increment, e.g., three months or six 
months.4   
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We also note that New Jersey and California — the only two states with social insurance programs for 
paid family leave — each have different rules with regard to wage replacement for short increments 
of leave. California Paid Family Leave provides benefits for claimants who take any form of PFL in 
hourly, daily, or weekly increments.5 New Jersey Family Leave Insurance, on the other hand, only 
provides intermittent caregiving benefits in one-day increments.6  Intermittent parental care benefits 
are not available under the New Jersey program unless an employer agrees to the intermittent leave 
schedule.7  Even then, in order to receive intermittent parental care benefits, the claimant must take 
time off in minimum increments of one week.8  
There is very little research or data collection about how California and New Jersey’s rules on 
intermittent leave are working in practice. We believe further research is needed regarding: 
k  the extent to which, and reasons why, individuals are currently seeking benefits under these 
 intermittent caregiving provisions; 
k  how the benefits are being administered, and whether administration of these short-term 
 benefits is creating any difficulties for the administering agency; and 
k   whether these provisions have created any undue burdens on employers.
We believe that similar research should be conducted in OECD countries that provide short-term 
benefits for disability and/or caregiving.  This research would allow policymakers to better evaluate 
arguments regarding the best way to provide benefits for shorter periods of time off, including 
arguments regarding administrative ease and burdens on employers.
B.  Total and Annual Caregiving Benefit Durations
To ensure that the program is sustainable and to protect against overuse and potential fraud and 
abuse, we recommend there be a requirement that 26 weeks of caregiving benefits be the maximum 
amount an individual can receive over the course of his/her working lifetime, and that 12 weeks of 
caregiving benefits be the maximum an individual can receive in any one year. 
We recognize that the California and New Jersey paid family leave laws do not have a total benefit 
duration for any of the benefits offered under the programs. However, these laws only provide up to 6 
weeks of benefits per year, and the six weeks include benefits taken for both caregiving and parental 
care purposes.  Under FSI, in addition to 26 weeks of caregiving benefits, individuals are entitled to 
12 weeks PCNC benefits per child.  Moreover, the wage replacement rates — 55 percent of a worker’s 
average weekly wage, up to a maximum of $959 per week in California, and 66 percent of a worker’s 
average weekly wage, up to a maximum of $543 per week in New Jersey — are significantly lower 
than those proposed for FSI Caregiving benefits (80 percent of a worker’s average weekly wage, up 
to a maximum of 150 percent of the national average weekly wage, which translates to $1,254 per 
week).  Finally, California and New Jersey paid family leave laws have restrictive definitions of family 
that naturally limit the number of individuals who qualify for benefits.  FSI contains a much broader 
definition of family.
We believe additional research is needed regarding how the caregiving components of California and 
New Jersey’s paid family leave programs are working in practice.  Issues that should be addressed 
include:  
k   The purposes for which care is being provided; 
k   The relationship between care providers and care recipients, including how many applicants 
  are rejected for benefits because they do not meet the definition of “family”;
k   The average number of caregiving claims per individual;
k   The mechanisms in place for detecting fraud and abuse; and
k   The amount of fraud and abuse that has been detected.
In addition, we believe more research is needed regarding whether the FSI 26-week maximum 
total benefit duration is the appropriate duration, and whether there are alternate ways to mitigate 
concerns about overuse, program sustainability, and fraud and abuse.
Finally, we believe there should be additional research regarding whether the maximum benefit 
duration for caregivers of servicemembers should be extended, so as to more closely track the FMLA, 
which provides up to 26 weeks of unpaid leave for servicemember care.
C.  Interaction between Job Protection and Program Utilization
We recommend the FMLA be extended to cover all employers with 15 or more employees.  While this 
would provide job protection to a number of employees not currently protected by the FMLA, it still 
leaves a number of individuals without protection, including those who have not met the FMLA’s year 
in service and hours requirement, those who need to care for a family member not covered by the 
FMLA, and those who work for very small businesses.  
We are concerned this may result in a situation where workers will be required to make contributions 
to a social insurance program for time-off benefits that they are unable to effectively access because 
they fear losing their jobs.  
We note, however, that workers without job protection in California and New Jersey are still required 
to make contributions to those paid family leave programs.  We believe further research is needed 
regarding the dynamic between the lack of job protection and the utilization rate for California and 
New Jersey paid family leave in order to determine whether there should be additional extensions 
of the FMLA, opt-out provisions for workers who lack job protection, or other modifications to our 
proposal.9
D.  Data Collection  
As evidenced by the above sections, we believe there needs to be more research done on the 
implementation of California and New Jersey’s paid family leave insurance laws. In particular, there 
needs to be more quantitative research regarding program usage, and more qualitative research 
regarding the impact of the laws’ provisions on employees, employers, and the administering 
agencies.
In addition, we believe there needs to be new research on FMLA implementation.  The last national 
study was conducted in 2000, and there are many concerns regarding the study’s scope and the 
lack of subsequent studies.10  The Secretary of Labor has announced that DOL is planning to conduct 
a new nationwide study in 2011, which we believe will help ensure the design of a national social 
insurance system rests on the most current and accurate data regarding how the FMLA is working in 
practice.11 
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E.  Cost/Benefit Analyses 
  
It is difficult to quantify the costs and benefits of a federal social insurance program for temporary 
disability, parental care, and caregiving.  What might be a benefit for employees might be a cost for 
employers, and vice versa.  On top of that, there are costs and benefits to society as a whole.  While 
some cost-benefit analyses were conducted prior to the enactment of California’s paid family leave 
law, we are not aware of any post-enactment studies of California or New Jersey’s PFL programs.12 
We also are not aware of cost-benefit analyses of the existing five-state TDI programs. We believe 
there needs to be sophisticated cost/benefit analyses of these programs, and similar programs in 
the OECD countries, at both the firm level and the macroeconomic level. There have been many 
important contributions to the field, particularly related to maternity and parental leave,13 but 
research is not as comprehensive as similar work in the health care and retirement security contexts.  
  
We believe there needs to be further analysis of the California and New Jersey PFL programs, and the 
state TDI programs, in an effort to address a number of critical issues around cost.  We believe the 
answers to questions such as the following will help guide a more sophisticated analysis of the costs 
and benefits of FSI, as well as any other similar social insurance program:  
k Has implementation of the California and New Jersey PFL laws placed significant burdens on 
employers, and if so, in what ways?
k How much have employers saved as a result of not having to bear the full cost of maternity 
leave, paternity leave, and short-term disability benefits?
k Is FMLA utilization for time off to care for one’s own serious health condition any greater in 
TDI states than in non-TDI states?
k How can one quantify the benefits to employees, and society as a whole?
k What are the costs of not providing wage replacement for temporary disability, parental care 
for a new child, and caregiving for a family member? 
In addition, we believe there needs to be more research into the relationship between TDI and 
SSDI.  A very basic look at rates of SSDI usage in states with public TDI programs compared to those 
without shows that TDI states tend to have fewer SSDI claimants per capita than non-TDI states.14  
This deviation could, of course, be explained by any number of factors other than TDI—including 
unemployment rates, average income, climate, the “health culture” of the state, etc.  However, given 
the costs to society associated with SSDI claims — the estimated lifetime savings of just 1 percent of 
SSI/SSDI recipients returning to work is $3 billion15 — we think the link is worth exploring in greater 
detail.
F.  Preemption
 
The FSI program builds on existing social insurance programs at the state level — namely, the five 
state (and one territory) TDI programs, and the two state paid family leave programs.  This naturally 
raises questions about how FSI would interact with these state programs, as well as any state social 
insurance program enacted in the next few years.
 
One option would be to frame FSI as a “floor” and have the federal government certify whether state 
programs provide similar, or better, wage replacement benefits than FSI.  If so, then states could 
apply for a waiver from FSI, and state residents would no longer have to contribute to the FSI system. 
Of course, determining whether a state program is as good as or better than FSI would be quite 
challenging.  In addition, employers might argue against having to deal with a system that varies from 
state to state, making their leave programs more difficult to administer.
 Another option would be that FSI preempt—or supplant—the state programs, since FSI would address 
the same needs and, as currently proposed, would provide greater wage replacements benefits.  
However, this would undercut current state systems that are up and running and would limit states’ 
ability to improve on the federal system.   
Given this complexity, we do not make any recommendations in this document regarding 
preemption.  Instead, we recommend that additional research be conducted on these issues.  
G.  Better Understanding of the Costs of Different Design Elements
  
We specifically chose not to cost out the FSI program at this time, since we wanted to focus solely 
on the substantive policy issues and spark debate.  That said, it would be helpful to know the costs 
of different program design elements, and how changing them would raise or lower the costs of the 
program.  For example, how does the cost of the program change if the wage-replacement rate is 
set at 60 percent or 70 percent of a worker’s average weekly wage, or if the benefits are not taxed?  
What if PCNC benefits are only available for 6 weeks, or if TDI benefits are only available for 20 
weeks?  What actuarial data are available to estimate how many individuals will claim caregiving 
benefits?  Such information will be tremendously helpful in ultimately designing a budget-neutral, 
self-funding, sustainable program.
In sum, as the debate continues regarding how best to provide paid time off for temporary disability, 
parental care, and caregiving, we hope there will be additional research to inform the debate.  The 
above discussion lays out some of the primary issues we believe merit further exploration. 
1 See Dep’t of Labor, The Family and Medical Leave Act: A Report on the Request for Information (2007 Update), http://www.dol.gov/whd/
fmla2007report.htm (documenting employer concerns regarding the administration and use of unforeseen, intermittent leave).
2 Jody Heymann, Hye Jin Rho, John Schmitt, & Alison Earle, Contagion Nation: A Comparison of Paid Sick Day Policies in 22 
Countries, Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research (May 2009), http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/contagion-nation/
paid-sick-days-2009-05.pdf.
3 See generally Dep’t for Bus. Innovation & Skills, International Review of Leave Policies and Related Research (Sept. 2009), http://www.
berr.gov.uk/files/file52778.pdf.
4 Id. at 83–86.
5 Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 3302.1–3303 (West 2009); see also Part-Time Worker/Intermittent/Reduced Work Schedule, St. of 
Cal., Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, http://www.edd.ca.gov/disability/PFL_Part-time_Worker.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
6 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-39.2(a) (2010) (employers must also be provided 15 days prior notice if intermittent leave is taken to 
care for a family member with a serious health condition).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Two forthcoming studies are expected to address whether the lack of job protection prevents some workers from accessing 
paid family leave benefits in California.  See Ruth Milkman and Eileen Appelbaum, Paid Family Leave in California:  New 
Research Findings (forthcoming 2011) and Catherine Albiston, Social Obstacles to Exercising Mandated Leave Rights 
(forthcoming 2011).
10 See, e.g., Letter from National Partnership for Women and Families, to Richard M. Brennan, Senior Regulatory Officer, Wage 
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& Hour Div., Dep’t of Labor (Feb. 16, 2007), http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480
239325&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (“[T]he lack of available data on many of the issues raised in the RFI is an 
unfortunate reminder of DOL’s failure to conduct objective studies on the FMLA and its implementation in recent years); Letter 
from Randel K. Johnson, Vice President, Labor, Immigration, & Emp. Benefits, Chamber of Commerce, to Victoria A. Lipnic, 
Assistant Sec’y for Emp’t Standards, Dep’t of Labor, (Feb. 16, 2007), http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer
?objectId=090000648025921a&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (stating that existing studies provide “little insight” 
into the difficulties in FMLA implementation or other issues faced by employers and employees).
11 See Hilda Solis, Secretary, Dep’t of Labor, Introductory Remarks at the Middle Class Task Force Work-Life Balance Event (July 
20, 2010), http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/speeches/20100720_MCTF.htm.
12 Compare Arindrajit “Arin” Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Paid Family Leave in California: An Analysis of Costs and Benefits, Labor 
Project for Working Families (June 19, 2002), http://www.working-families.org/learnmore/pdf/paidleave_costbenefit.pdf, with 
Bruce D. Phillips, Paid Family Leave in California: A Bad Idea at a Bad Time, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Research Found., http://www.
nfib.com/Portals/0/Paid_Family_Leave_Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) Both studies were written prior to the passage 
of the California Paid Family Leave law; key provisions to the proposed law were ultimately modified after these reports were 
written, including the elimination of employer contribution to the program.
13 See, e.g., Deanna S. Gomby & Dow-Jane Pei, Newborn Family Leave: Effects on Children,
Parents, and Business, Packard Found. http://www.packard.org/assets/files/children%20families%20communities/NFLA_
fullreport_final.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2010); Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, Am. Econ. 
Rev., Vol. 84, No. 3 (1994), pp. 622–41, available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/2118071; Christine Jolls, Accommodation 
Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223 (2000); Jacob Alex Klerman & Arleen Leibowitz, Labor Supply Effects of State Maternity Leave 
Legislation, in Gender and Family Issues in the Workplace 65–91(1997); Christopher Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of Parental 
Leave Mandates: Lessons from Europe, 113(1) Q. J. of Econ. 285 (1998), available at libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/C_Ruhm_
Economic_1998.pdf; Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the United States and Britain: Can Maternity Leave 
Make a Difference, 16 J. Lab. Econ. 505 (1998).
14 A quick comparison of SSDI usage rates per state with estimated state population reveals that TDI States (California, Hawaii, 
New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island) average approximately 2,400 SSDI beneficiaries per 100,000 in population, while non-
TDI States (the rest of the U.S.) average 3,200 SSDI beneficiaries per 100,000 in population.
15 Such costs may arise because these individuals are not working, as well as the costs of providing SSI/SSDI benefits. Joann 
Sim, Improving Return-to-Work Strategies in the United States Disability Programs, with Analysis of Program Practices in 
Germany and Sweden, 62(3) Soc. Security Bull. 41 (1999), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v62n3/v62n3p41.
pdf.
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When Workplace Flexibility 2010 and the Berkeley Center on Health, Economic & Family Security 
began our collaboration in 2009, we set out to answer some critical questions:
k How do we create national policy solutions that explicitly account for the facts on the ground?  
Given the realities of what families look like today — dual-earner families, single heads of 
households, and an aging population — people of all ages and across incomes will need 
financial security when they take time off from their jobs to care for themselves, their aging 
parents and their kids.  What can the government do to support these families’ needs?
k How do we create policy solutions that reflect the modern reality where having a health 
condition or disability is no longer a barrier to working?  And how do we confront the fact that 
society generally expects people to work regardless of health status?  Right now our federal 
policy forces a choice between being considered permanently disabled or not at all.  How do 
we shift the system so it reflects the continuum of ability created by modern medicine and 
equal opportunity?
k As we develop these policies, how do we account for the needs of employers in a competitive 
global economy, taking into account that employers need to get their work done, regardless 
of what is happening in their employees’ lives?  And how do we build a system that works well 
and does not add to the national debt?
A year and a half later, after a great deal of research, writing, discussion, and debate, we arrived at 
Family Security Insurance (FSI).  As we articulate clearly in this report, FSI would fill a critical gap in 
our national social insurance system.  
We recognize that this proposal requires some tough choices about priorities and demands a 
commitment from many stakeholders inside and outside government to make it a reality.  But we 
are convinced that a comprehensive national social insurance program is the best way to meet the 
growing health and caregiving needs of American workers. 
Seventy-seven percent of Americans believe that businesses should be required to provide paid 
family and medical leave to every worker who needs it.1  An even stronger majority — 85 percent 
— believes that businesses are at risk of losing good workers if they fail to adapt to modern family 
needs.2   These statistics are not in spite of the current economy — they are because of it.  American 
workers are struggling, the private sector hasn’t adequately responded, and there has been a lack of 
comprehensive national policy on these issues since the FMLA was passed in 1993.    
This report provides a blueprint for a program that would fundamentally reform our social policy to 
address workers’ critical needs — and at the same time, spread the cost fairly, protect the deficit, and 
keep people working.  
We view this report as the beginning of what we hope is a much longer conversation that engages 
a wide range of stakeholders from both the private and public sectors.   Critical decisions are being 
made about the deficit in the current economic climate, making it especially important to factor this 
type of social insurance policy into overall discussions about how we make our economy globally 
competitive, while increasing financial security for American families.  This report paves a path to 
progress on both counts.  
1 Heather Boushey, It’s Time for Policies to Match Family Needs: New Polling Data Shows Widespread Support for an Agenda to Address Work-
Family Conflict (Center for American Progress 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/pdf/work_survey.pdf.
2 Id.
“Staying home to care for a sick child or taking an 
elderly parent to a doctor’s appointment shouldn’t 
mean risking one’s job . …Things like paid family leave 
and sick days and affordable child care should be the 
norm, not the exception.” 
 
Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady during visit to the Department of 
Labor, January 14, 2010 
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Appendix A
Current Social Insurance Programs in the United States 
The United States has a robust social insurance network at the state and federal level.  This appendix 
provides a brief overview of the major state and federal social insurance programs with a special 
emphasis on eligibility standards, benefits, and administration.  
I. Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment Insurance (UI) is a federal-state program created by the original Social Security Act 
of 1935. The system’s primary mission is to provide wage replacement to workers who become 
unemployed through no fault of their own.1
Each state operates its own UI program.  While the establishment of a state UI program is technically 
voluntary, the tax and incentive structure established by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 
and the Social Security Act (SSA) effectively mandates the creation of one. 2 Currently, all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia operate within the federal system.3  
 A. Eligibility
Individuals qualify for UI benefits if they work for a covered employer and meet state eligibility 
requirements at the time of unemployment.  Covered employers include those that paid out at 
least $1,500 in wages in the current or previous calendar year or employed one or more persons 
at least one day a week for 20 weeks in the current or previous calendar year.4  Agriculture and 
domestic services industries have special coverage thresholds,5 though each state may set its own 
rules.6  About half of the states use a definition of “employer” that is even broader than the federal 
minimum.7 
Working for a covered employer that pays UI tax does not guarantee that an individual is covered 
under the state UI program.  An applicant can perform services for a covered employer but still be 
deemed ineligible for UI coverage if she is found to be a non-covered “independent contractor”8 or if 
she fails to meet additional monetary and non-monetary requirements.  
Applicants must have earned wages beyond a threshold amount in a specified period to demonstrate 
sufficient workforce attachment. Federal guidelines ensure the threshold wage in each state is 
similar, though states use different formulae to implement these guidelines.9
In addition to meeting the monetary requirement, an applicant must 1) have been involuntarily 
separated from the job without fault, 2) be available and willing to accept suitable work, and 3) be 
currently looking for work.10  Some states have “good cause” exceptions that relax the involuntary 
separation requirement in certain situations. These can include sexual harassment and “compelling 
family reasons” such as domestic violence, a relocating spouse, or the illness or disability of an 
immediate family member.11 New federal funding incentives created under the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 have prompted many states to enact good cause exceptions: 31 
states now have domestic violence exceptions (up from 20), 22 states have spousal relocation 
exceptions (up from 10), and 20 states have worker illness and disability exceptions (up from nine).12
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 B. Benefits
Under the UI system, states set the benefit levels. Each state has a system for determining a 
recipient’s “weekly benefit amount” (WBA), though these calculations are subject to a state statutory 
minimums and maximums.  As of July 2009, the lowest and highest WBA maximums were enforced 
by Mississippi ($235) and Massachusetts ($628).13 The maximum duration of benefits in most states 
is 26 weeks.14
Thirty-seven states have a non-payable waiting period before benefits can be collected.15 While nearly 
all states stop paying regular UI benefits after 26 weeks, the federal-state Extended Benefits (EB) 
program provides for emergency extensions of benefits in states that have high unemployment.16   
Typically EB costs are shared by federal and state governments, however, the ARRA extended the 
length of benefits and provided 100 percent federal funding for the program.17 Under the most recent 
extension, federally-funded EB benefits are available through November 30, 2010.18
 C. Administration
  1. Funding and State Agencies
The state UI programs are funded by a combination of state and federal employer payroll taxes.  The 
proceeds from the federal tax are allocated to each state to cover their administrative costs.19  State 
payroll taxes, paid almost exclusively by employers, are used to fund program benefits.20  Unlike 
the uniform federal tax, the rates and terms of the state taxes vary significantly.21 All states use an 
“experience rating,” which creates a variable employer tax based on employment stability factors.22  
For example, an employer that has historically laid off few employees will have a more favorable rate 
than an employer with frequent layoffs.  
While federal law sets numerous guidelines, the states have some latitude in how they administer 
the programs.23  Each state maintains its own unique UI organization, usually within an executive 
agency devoted to labor and employment issues.  Due to the large inflow and outflow of money, these 
organizations are often among the state’s largest agencies.  
  2. Benefit Application and Determination
UI applicants apply for unemployment in the state where they were employed, even if it is not 
their state of residence.24  The application collects basic contact, citizenship, and employment 
information.25 States may also ask for wage information, though this can be more reliably obtained 
from the employer or from another state agency.  The state agency reviews applications, contacts the 
applicant’s last employer to request or verify wage and employment information, and makes an initial 
eligibility determination.26  
Each state has appeals procedures as required under the Social Security Act.27  Almost all states 
have two levels of administrative appeals.28  The first level is usually the appellant’s only hearing 
of right and is often conducted in person.29  In the second level of administrative appeals, review is 
generally limited to the record and additional hearings are seldom held.  Further appeals may be 
made to the courts, though the level of initial jurisdiction varies.30  Both employee and employer may 
appeal a benefits decision.  The courts require that UI benefits continue during an appeal by the 
employer.31
All states require that UI recipients answer weekly or bi-weekly questionnaires to certify ongoing 
eligibility and need for benefits.32  The recipient may also be required to provide information on the 
progress of her search for new work.33
  3. Benefit Payment and Termination
The Department of Labor tracks several measures of speed and efficiency of the state UI programs.  
The DOL sets a goal that each state should pay 87 percent of first-time benefit recipients within 21 
days.34  
Recipients’ benefits are terminated automatically if they exhaust the statutory duration limits for UI 
benefits. If a UI recipient regains full-time employment, some states simply ask that the recipient 
cease to fill out the weekly certifications.35 In all states, the recipient’s weekly certification responses 
may trigger termination.  In many states, regaining partial employment does not disqualify someone 
from receiving some benefits, assuming he or she continues to seek full-time or additional part-time 
work.36
II. Temporary Disability Insurance
Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) is a state program or mandate providing for wage replacement 
when an employee is unable to work due to a non-work-related temporary illness or injury.  Currently, 
five states and Puerto Rico provide TDI coverage.37  This section discusses the TDI systems currently 
in place in California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.
All five state programs have been in place for decades. The oldest program, Rhode Island’s, was 
enacted in 1942, and the youngest program, Hawaii’s, began in 1969.  The lack of uniform federal 
guidelines on benefits and administration has led to a wide range of approaches to providing TDI 
coverage among the different states.  Rhode Island relies solely on a state-run social insurance 
system.38  New Jersey and California operate a hybrid system in which a public TDI plan operates 
alongside approved voluntary plans purchased by employers that either meet or exceed the state’s 
TDI requirements.39  Hawaii and New York use modified versions of a private mandate.  These states 
require that employers self-insure or purchase temporary disability insurance from private companies 
or, in New York, from the state itself.40 
 A. Eligibility
Employees qualify for benefits if they work for a covered employer and meet defined employee 
coverage requirements.  While standards vary from state to state, most employers are covered.41 
Applicants must demonstrate that they meet certain earnings and employment thresholds in addition 
to being unable to work. These thresholds vary greatly.  New York requires only that applicants 
have worked four consecutive weeks (or 25 days for regular but non-daily employees).42 California 
and Rhode Island use only earnings thresholds, though the threshold is calculated differently in 
each state.43  New Jersey and Hawaii use both earnings and employment thresholds.  As of 2010, 
New Jersey requires applicants to have earned at least $145 a week for 20 weeks (translating into 
20 hours a week for a minimum-wage worker) or $7,300 total in the base year.44 Hawaii requires 
applicants to have worked for 20 hours a week for 14 weeks and earned at least $400 in the 
previous year.45
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 B. Benefits
Eligible applicants are entitled to a weekly benefit based on their past income, usually up to a 
specified cap.  The benefit duration in Hawaii, New Jersey, and New York is 26 weeks;46 Rhode Island 
and California are more generous, offering 30 and 52 weeks respectively.47  As of 2010, the weekly 
wage replacement rate, maximum benefit amount, and duration of these benefits range as follows:
k California:  55 percent wage replacement from $50/week minimum up to $987/week (150 
percent of the state average weekly wage), for up to 52 weeks.48 
k Hawaii:  58 percent wage replacement up to $510/week (80.7 percent of the state average 
weekly wage), for up to 26 weeks.49 
k New Jersey: 2/3 wage replacement up to $561/week (53 percent of the state average weekly 
wage), for up to 26 weeks or until 1/3 total base period wages has been paid.50  
k New York:  50 percent wage replacement up to a $170/week statutory maximum, for up to 26 
weeks.51
k Rhode Island: 4.62 percent of total highest base period quarter wages, from $69/week 
minimum up to $700/week (85 percent of the state average weekly wage), for up to 30 
weeks or until 36 percent of total base period wages has been paid.52 
All five states require a seven-day waiting period before an applicant can claim benefits.53 New Jersey 
and Rhode Island plans will pay wage replacement for the waiting period retroactively if the disability 
lasts long enough (21 days in New Jersey and 28 days in Rhode Island);54 Hawaii, New York, and 
California plans do not reimburse applicants for lost wages during the waiting week.55
 C. Administration
  1. Funding and State Agencies
Most state TDI systems are financed by employee and employer contributions.  New Jersey and 
Hawaii require employers and employees to contribute a percentage of program costs.56 New York’s 
low employee contribution cap (60 cents per week) forces employers to share program costs as 
well.57  California and Rhode Island fund their TDI programs solely through employee payroll taxes.58
Rhode Island, California, and New Jersey have built their TDI system on their Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) systems.  In each state, the two programs share many of the same benefit appeal 
resources.59 
New York’s program is overseen by its Workers’ Compensation Board, but the Board does not 
administer any plans.  A self-sufficient quasi-public entity, the New York State Insurance Fund (NYSIF), 
is the state’s largest competitive carrier.60 NYSIF was created to provide employers with workers’ 
compensation protection at the lowest possible cost.  After New York passed its TDI law, the Fund 
began offering temporary disability insurance as well.61  
Hawaii’s TDI plans are purely private; an employer can provide coverage through a collective 
bargaining agreement, an insurance provider, or its own insurance plan.62  All plans must meet a 
baseline of coverage and be approved by either the Commissioner of Insurance or the Director of the 
Department of Labor and Industry.63
  2. Benefit Application and Determination
All state plans and the private plans in Hawaii and New York use a state application form. The form 
includes personal information completed by the applicant and a medical certification completed by 
a licensed medical provider.64  New York, New Jersey, and Hawaii (the states where employers may 
have private coverage) also require an employer statement.65 Some states reduce or refuse benefits 
for claims filed too long after the date of disability.66
The estimated date of return to work on the medical certification forms the basis of the disability 
claim.67  The TDI agencies in Rhode Island and California may challenge claims where the benefit 
duration exceeds the state’s published medical guidelines on disability durations.68  In all states, 
the state agency and (in states using private plans) the employer or insurance carrier may require 
independent medical evaluations of the claim as often as weekly.69  
Each state provides for an appeals process for denied claims.  Rhode Island provides for an appeal 
to an Appeal Tribunal appointed by the Board of Review and a second appeal by right to the Board 
of Review itself.70 California provides for a re-review of any appealed claim, followed by appeal to an 
ALJ in the Office of Appeals and then to the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.71 
Although New York does not have a state TDI plan, the state Worker’s Compensation Board provides 
for appeals before an ALJ, followed by a discretionary appeal to a panel of three Board members.72 
New Jersey maintains parallel appeals processes for its state and private plans. Appeals under 
the state plan are heard by an Appeals Examiner;73 claimants may thereafter request review by the 
Board of Review.74  Appeals of denials under private plans are heard by a Private Plan Officer, with 
no further administrative appeal.75 Hawaii provides for agency review of private plan denials.  The 
state may of its own accord review any claim denial and request reconsideration where it believes 
the denial is erroneous.76  The employee may also request the state agency to conduct a review when 
her claim is denied as well as when her claim is accepted but the benefits are unsatisfactory.77  In 
all states, denials may be appealed to the state courts when administrative remedies have been 
exhausted.78
  3. Benefit Payment and Termination
The time from filing a claim to receiving the first benefit check varies across the states; California and 
New Jersey send out most initial checks within two to three weeks,79 while Rhode Island claimants 
receive their first payment within three to four weeks.80  New York requires the insurer to pay the 
claimant within the first 18 days of disability or within four days of the claim filing date, whichever is 
later.81
Under all state plans, benefits automatically terminate once the claimant’s disability certification 
expires, unless the claimant files new paperwork to show ongoing medical need.82  Claimants must 
inform the state insurer if they return to work before estimated.83  The states maintain various 
mechanisms designed to deter and detect fraud and duplication of benefits.84
III. Paid Family Leave
Paid family leave (PFL) provides wage replacement for workers who take time off work to care for a 
loved one (including parental care for a new child and caregiving for ill or injured family members). 
Only two states offer PFL programs: California’s Paid Family Leave (PFL) program enacted in 2002,85 
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and New Jersey’s Family Leave Insurance (FLI) program enacted in 2008.86 (Washington State 
passed a PFL law in 2007, but it has never been funded and will remain nonoperational until at 
least 2012.)87  Both states’ programs function alongside the states’ TDI system, sharing many of 
the statutory requirements.88  To date, the majority of claims filed in both programs have been for 
parental care for a new child.89  For example, from July 2009 to June 2010, parental care constituted 
88 percent of claims filed California and 78 percent in New Jersey.90 
 A. Eligibility
The eligibility requirements for FLI/PFL are basically identical to those used in the state TDI programs 
— except that instead of requiring the claimant to be suffering a temporary disability, the FLI/PFL 
programs require that the claimant be caring for a new child or ill family member.91 In addition, in 
California, an individual may be ineligible for PFL benefits if another family member is “ready, willing, 
able and available” to perform the caregiving functions during the same period and time of day.92
 B. Benefits
Under PFL, recipients can collect approximately 55 percent of their highest base-period earnings up 
to 150 percent of the state average weekly wage for six weeks in a 12-month period. 93 In 2010, the 
weekly benefit cap is $987.94 Eligible individuals under FLI can obtain two-thirds wage replacement 
up to 53 percent of the state average weekly wage for six weeks in a 12-month period.95 In 2010, the 
weekly benefit cap was $561.96 A seven-day waiting period applies in both programs.97 As with their 
state’s TDI programs, neither PFL nor FLI provide job protection.
New Jersey requires that newborn bonding leave be taken in consecutive weeks, unless the employer 
agrees to intermittent leave;98 the state permits intermittent leave for family caregiving where 
medically necessary.99 California permits recipients of both family caregiving and newborn bonding 
benefits to take intermittent leave.100  
California permits recipients to take intermittent leave in hourly, daily, or weekly intervals.101  New 
Jersey, on the other hand, only allows intermittent leave to be taken in 24-hour blocks for caregiving 
and seven-day periods for bonding.102   
 C. Administration
  1. Funding and Agencies
Both PFL and FLI are administered through their states’ disability systems (State Disability Insurance 
(SDI) in California and Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) in New Jersey) and are funded through 
employee payroll taxes.103
  2. Benefit Application and Determination
Applications for FLI/PFL benefits are obtained from the state agency; where an individual is already 
receiving TDI benefits for pregnancy, a FLI/PFL application will automatically be mailed to her after 
the child is born.104 Both states’ applications require personal information about the caregiver and 
care recipient, a medical certification (completed by a doctor) or bonding certification (completed 
by the applicant), and a HIPAA authorization.105 New Jersey includes a section completed by the 
employer.106  
New Jersey requires that applicants provide employers with 30 days “prior notice” for bonding leave 
and “reasonable” notice for other caregiving leave.107 In both states, employers may force employees 
to exhaust up to two weeks of sick leave benefits before applying for FLI; New Jersey counts these 
two weeks against the benefit limit, while California does not.108 As with TDI, the medical certification 
for family caregiving leave must be completed by a Licensed Medical Provider and must include a 
diagnosis and an estimated date of recovery for the ill or injured relative.  The states may require the 
relative to submit to one or more independent evaluations.109
Both states’ appeals processes for denied claims are identical to those used in their TDI programs.110
  3. Benefit Payment and Termination
FLI/PFL claims in both states are paid in the same way as TDI claims,111 except that in both states 
FLI/PFL benefits are taxable.112 As with the states’ TDI programs, benefits for family caregiving 
terminate when the claim certification expires, benefits are exhausted, or the care recipient returns 
to work or otherwise becomes ineligible for benefits. California, unlike New Jersey, will provide 
benefits to persons who return to work on a reduced schedule. For newborn care, benefits terminate 
12 months after the child’s birth, even if the six weeks have not been exhausted.113
IV. Social Security: Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
Federal old-age insurance benefits date to the Social Security Act of 1935. Four years later, 
lawmakers added benefits for spouses and children of retirees and deceased workers.114  Old Age 
Insurance provides benefits to retiring workers and their relatives; Survivors Insurance provides 
benefits to the relatives of deceased workers, similar to a life insurance plan.   
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which provides benefits to impaired workers before they 
reach retirement, was added to the Social Security program in 1954. The SSA also administers 
a parallel program known as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) that pays benefits to disabled 
workers who have not worked enough to qualify for SSDI.  Unlike the relatively straightforward criteria 
for old age insurance, SSDI employs a lengthy and complex process to decide the merits of disability 
claims. In 2007, just over two million people applied for disability benefits.115  
 A. Eligibility
  1. Old Age Insurance
People qualify for old-age insurance when they reach age 62 and have worked a sufficient amount 
of time during their careers.116  Many wait until they reach “full retirement age” — which will increase 
from 65 to 67 over the next two decades — to apply in order to maximize benefits.117 Relatives of 
retirees (including spouses,118 dependent children under 18,119 and certain divorced spouses,120 
stepchildren, and grandchildren)121 are eligible for benefits at one-half the value of the retiree’s 
benefits.
Forty quarters of coverage (QCs) or “credits” are required for “full insurance.”122 The SSA will generally 
count a minimum amount of money earned in each year as worthy of a QC.123  For example, in 2009, 
$1,090 earns 1 QC.124  No one can earn more than four quarterly credits in a given year.125 SSA tracks 
this information for every worker who pays the Social Security payroll tax.
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  2. Survivors Insurance
Social Security provides survivors insurance only to the family members of deceased workers who 
have worked a sufficient amount during their lives.  The minimum requirement depends on the age 
of death, though no one needs to work longer than 10 years.126 Several different types of relatives 
qualify to receive survivors insurance. Any widow or widower at full retirement age can garner full 
benefits while those older than 60 but below full retirement can only obtain reduced checks right 
away.127 A disabled widow or widower may qualify for full benefits as early as age 50.128  Similarly, 
spouses who currently care for a deceased’s child (under age 16 or disabled), the unmarried 
dependent children of the deceased under 18, and children who became disabled before they 
turned 22 are also eligible for benefits immediately. 129  SSA will even pay out benefits to certain 
stepchildren, grandchildren, or adopted children.130  
  3. Disability Insurance 
To qualify for SSDI benefits a worker must be blind or have a disability that will result in death or 
prevent them from performing most work for at least a year.131  The claimant must “prove” that she 
meets these criteria to the DDS,132 but the agency has a duty to obtain, on its own, any relevant 
medical reports and information from the preceding 12 months.133 The worker must also have earned 
a certain number of work credits under the Old Age Insurance system.134
 B. Benefits
  1. Old Age Insurance
If the SSA confirms at some point that a person meets eligibility criteria, it will calculate her monthly 
benefit using a complicated formula set forward in the Social Security Act.135   The average retired 
beneficiary received $1,153 a month in 2009.136
Old Age benefits continue until a beneficiary dies or an individual’s yearly income exceeds the 
set earning ceilings.  The law applies an earnings test to the time between when a person begins 
receiving old-age benefits and the time she reaches full retirement age,137 but no such limits exist 
after that date.  For the years leading up to the time an individual reaches full retirement age, the law 
removes one dollar of benefits for every two dollars earned above $14,160 (the 2010 cap).138  
  2.  Survivors Insurance
Survivors receive a proportion of the benefits the deceased would have received. Widows above 
retirement age receive full benefits, widows over the age of 60 but below retirement age receive 71-
99 percent, widows of any age with children younger than 16 receive 75 percent, and children receive 
75 percent.139  Dependent parents may also receive benefits.140 A family cannot collect more than 
150-180 percent of the deceased’s benefit amount.141 Widows or widowers also qualify for a lump 
sum death payment of $255.142
  3.  Disability Insurance
SSDI beneficiaries receive an amount of money equal to what they would receive in old age benefits 
if they had turned age 62 on the day they became disabled.143 They therefore receive slightly less 
than those who wait until full retirement age to collect.144 A five-month waiting period applies before 
benefits may be collected.145
 C. Administration – Old Age and Survivors Insurance
  1. Funding and Agencies
OASI benefits are administered by the Social Security Administration.  Today Social Security is the 
single largest program in the federal budget.146 In 2007 the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
handled roughly $624 billion in transfer payments for over 50 million people while spending a mere 
1% on administrative costs.147 About half of that sum goes toward managing Old Age, Survivors, 
and Disability Insurance (OASDI).148 Funding for SSA programs including OASI comes entirely from 
payroll taxes levied on both employers and employees under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act 
(FICA).149
  2. Benefit Application and Determination
Eligible citizens can apply for old-age benefits online, by phone, or in person once they have reached 
61 years and 9 months in age.150  Eligible citizens must apply at least four months before they wish to 
begin receiving payments.151  At the initial stage, claimants must provide their Social Security number 
along with personal, citizenship, and tax information.152  Claimants also provide bank information for 
direct deposit.  Once a representative confirms eligibility, SSA will notify the claimant in writing.
A survivor can claim benefits by providing the deceased’s proof of death; Social Security numbers of 
the applicant, the deceased, and any dependent children; birth certificates of the applicant and any 
dependent children; marriage certificate (for a widow or widower); divorce papers if applicable; W-2 or 
tax return for the deceased; and direct deposit information.153
A dissatisfied applicant has 60 days to request reconsideration in writing.154 If the original decision is 
upheld, applicants may request a hearing before an ALJ.155 Applicants can appeal an unfavorable ALJ 
ruling to Social Security’s Appeals Council, which may dismiss a claim outright, issue a decision, or 
remand the claim for further proceedings in front of the ALJ.156 Upon receiving a dismissal or denial, a 
claimant has 60 days to file suit in federal district court.157
  3. Benefit Payment and Termination
Each month’s benefits are deposited on the following month.  Though the law does not allow 
individuals to collect retirement benefits for the month of their death, survivors can receive a 
payment for this month.158  As benefits are subject to earnings ceilings, beneficiaries must report their 
earnings so that benefits may be adjusted accordingly.159
 D. Administration – Disability Insurance 
  1. Funding and Agencies
Under the Social Security Act, responsibility for making disability determinations falls to the states’ 
Disability Determination Services (DDS) agencies.160 The use of state agencies dates back to the 
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beginnings of SSDI.161  The SSA pays the state agencies’ costs, which totaled over $1.8 billion in FY 
2008.162 Funding for SSDI, as with OASI, comes entirely from payroll taxes levied under the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA).163
  2. Benefit Application and Payment
SSDI applicants must first complete an application asking for basic information such as name, 
gender, and social security number.164  If the applicant meets the non-medical eligibility requirements 
she can file a Disability Report, which requires information about the applicant’s ailment, medical 
records, and work and education history.165  The SSA field office then forwards the case to the state 
DDS for evaluation. The DDS considers an applicant’s work status, severity of the medical condition, 
and ability to work.166 The DDS may require an independent medical examination.167 Owing to complex 
national standards, increased applications, and ongoing funding and personnel issues, there is a 
substantial backlog; it took an average of 88 days to process a claim in 2007.168 In 2008 the SSA 
implemented the Quick Disability Determination (QDD) process to speed the process for those who 
easily qualify for benefits.169
As with OASI, a dissatisfied SSDI applicant may request reconsideration, then appeal in turn to 
an ALJ, the Social Security Appeals Council, and federal district court. Roughly 62 percent of 
submissions are denied by the state DDS at the initial stage.170 However, three-quarters of appellants 
will eventually receive benefits, 171 most after appeals to the federal ALJ.172 
  3. Benefit Payment and Termination
The lengthy appeals process means that many applicants wait more than two years for a final 
decision.173 Even with a favorable initial determination, a claimant may wait three to five months 
after applying to receive their first payment.  Beneficiaries receive monthly payments until they die, 
reach retirement age,174 or no longer have a disability.175 Recipients must notify SSA if their condition 
improves, if they successfully complete vocational therapy or training, if they return to work, or if their 
earnings increase.176  Beneficiaries must report any earnings to SSA before April 15th of the following 
year.177 The SSA regularly reviews cases to evaluate whether a participant still meets disability 
criteria.178
The law incentivizes labor-market reentry. The SSA’s Ticket to Work program permits beneficiaries to 
engage in trial work periods while maintaining, for a time, supplemental benefits.179  The program also 
provides vouchers for public or private employment or vocational rehabilitation services.180  However, 
take-up for the Ticket to Work program has been limited.181
V. Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ Compensation (WC) provides wage replacement and medical benefits to workers who have 
suffered workplace injuries.182 All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government 
have WC laws in place.183  These laws codify a fundamental exchange between employers and 
employees: employees agree to forgo negligence claims in return for employer-provided insurance for 
workplace injuries.184 
Workers’ compensation is financed almost exclusively by employers through self-insurance, private 
carriers, or payments into state funds.  In 2008, workers’ compensation covered 130,643,000 
workers.185  The total wages of the covered workers amounted to $5.9 trillion.186  Workers’ 
compensation plans paid out $29.1 billion in medical benefits and $28.6 billion in cash benefits 
in 2008.187  Employers paid an additional $21.3 billion in administrative costs (if self-insured) or 
premiums (if purchasers of insurance), bringing the total cost to employers to $78.9 billion in 2008.188 
Benefits and costs have declined in recent years since peaking in the early 1990s.189  
 A. Eligibility
Forty-nine states mandate that almost all private employers have workers’ compensation coverage 
(under a state or a private insurance scheme as required by the state’s laws).190  Many states exempt 
small employers or certain other categories of employers from coverage.191  Federal employees and 
their dependents are covered under the federal workers’ compensation law.192
Texas is the only state where workers’ compensation coverage is voluntary; however, the employer 
must provide notice to the state if electing no coverage.193 As of 2008, 33 percent of Texas private 
employers representing 25 percent of the state’s workforce did not have workers’ compensation 
coverage.194 Non-subscribing employers reported higher satisfaction overall and higher satisfaction 
as to the adequacy/equity of occupational benefits paid to workers than subscribing employers.195 In 
Texas, employers electing not to subscribe to coverage are not protected from tort suits.196
Unlike the other programs discussed here, workers’ compensation has no monetary or nonmonetary 
eligibility requirements beyond sustaining an injury in the course of one’s employment; there are no 
earnings or hours thresholds for benefit eligibility, so coverage starts on an employee’s first day of 
work.197
 B. Benefits
Generally, workers’ compensation pays for immediate medical care and provides cash benefits after 
a three to seven day waiting period.198  In 2008, medical-only cases accounted for 77 percent of all 
cases, but only  8 percent of benefits paid out. 199  Wage replacement benefits for lost work are only 
paid in 23 percent of cases, but account for 92 percent of all benefits paid out.200  
Wage replacement benefits vary based on the duration and severity of the injury.  Temporary 
disability benefit cases are the most common type, representing 63 percent of cash-benefit cases 
and 16 percent of benefit payments.201 Temporary partial disability benefits cover situations where 
the worker returns to work before her full medical recovery with reduced responsibilities and pay.202 
Temporary total disability benefits are paid where the worker is unable to work while recovering.203
Permanent disability benefit cases are less common but more costly. Permanent partial disability 
benefits, which represent 36 percent of cases but 67 percent of benefit payments, are paid for 
permanent impairments that do not completely limit the worker’s ability to work.204  Permanent total 
disability benefits, which represent only 1 percent of all cases but 17 percent of benefit payments, 
cover very significant impairments judged to be permanent.205
Benefit amounts and durations may vary widely depending on the state and the type of disability. 
For temporary total disability, most states allow the worker to recover two-thirds of her weekly 
wage subject to a maximum benefit correlated with the state’s average weekly wage.206 Forty-four 
jurisdictions use a schedule — a list of body parts that are covered — to determine the duration 
and amount of permanent partial disability benefits for certain injuries.207 For unscheduled injuries, 
states may use several different approaches to evaluate the disability and assign compensation.208 
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Some states, such as California, provide for upward or downward modification of benefits where an 
injured worker is not offered, or refuses to accept, modified or alternative work.209 Cash benefits for 
permanent injuries often have a limited duration.210
 C. Administration
  1. Funding and Agencies
States require employers to obtain insurance or prove their financial ability to carry the risk (self-
insure).  Private insurers are the largest source of workers’ compensation benefits — in 2007, private 
carriers paid 52.3 percent of benefits.211  North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming rely on a 
state-run monopoly.212  Twenty-two states, including California and New York, maintain state-run funds 
that compete with private carriers.213 The rest, including Iowa, Massachusetts, and Texas, rely entirely 
on private insurance carriers. 
  2. Benefit Application and Determination
States commonly place a limit on how long after an injury a worker may apply for benefits.214  
Applications usually include an employer’s certification of workplace accidents and a medical 
certification of the injuries and disability.  
Private insurers are often mandated to process a claim within a set amount of time, with penalties 
for delay.215 In California, the claims administrator must authorize medical treatment up to $10,000 
within one working day after the injured worker files a claim form with their employer, even while 
the claim is being investigated.216 New York, on the other hand, grants insurers a longer time period 
to determine whether to accept or deny a claim and to pay benefits.217  Also, New York insurers may 
delay payments for a lack of medical evidence, which they are not required to obtain on their own.218  
In contrast, other states require insurers to obtain the medical information and do not accept “lack of 
medical evidence” as a reason to delay payment of benefits.219
Each state maintains an appeals process, including states that have no public plan. In North Dakota, 
the first level is a request for reconsideration by the state agency.220 In Massachusetts and Texas, 
which have no state plans, the first level is an informal meeting with the worker and insurer aimed 
at reaching a voluntary agreement.221 All states provide at some point for a formal hearing before 
an administrative law judge (ALJ) or similar official, followed in most states by appeal to a governing 
board.222 After administrative remedies are exhausted, parties in all states may file suit in state court.
  3. Benefit Payment and Termination
As with other wage replacement programs, workers’ compensation benefits come in a regular 
disbursement, often with a significant lag time between application and payment.223  Benefits may be 
terminated when the state’s maximum benefit duration is reached or when the worker is no longer 
medically eligible.  A worker is no longer medically eligible when she recovers or reaches a state of 
maximum medical improvement, a point at which her condition is not expected to further improve.224 
1 SSA, 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.
2 The FUTA currently imposes a 6.2% payroll tax on all employers.  Companies in states with UI programs that meet minimum 
federal requirements can credit state UI payroll taxes against the federal rate (a process that creates an effective federal tax of 
0.8%).  Companies in states without approved UI plans are forced to pay the full amount.  States without approved UI programs 
are also ineligible for federal grants that cover administrative costs associated with operating a UI program. FUTA, 26 U.S.C. §§ 
3301, 3306(b); SSA, 42 USC § 501-504; see also Office of Workforce Security, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment 
Laws 2-1 (2009), available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2009/comparison2009.asp [hereinafter 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws]; Kathleen Romig & Julie Whittaker, U.S. Cong. Research Service, The Unemployment Trust Fund 
(UTF): State Insolvency and Federal Loans to States 1 (2009), available at http://wikileaks.org/leak/crs/RS22954.pdf; 26 U.S.C. § 
3302; 42 U.S.C §§ 501-02. 
3 This section aims, wherever possible, to describe generally applicable features of the UI system.  However, in order to avoid 
citing to all 50 state laws, the programs in Arkansas, California, New Jersey, and Wisconsin are used to illustrate a handful of 
points.   
4 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(1). Because FUTA has unique tax exemptions for certain organizations (including nonprofits, state 
governments, and Indian tribes), subsequent amendments to FUTA have created affirmative requirements for states to cover 
these groups. Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 1-2.
5 26 U.S.C. §§ 3306(A)(2)-(3).
6 California, for instance, eschews the higher coverage threshold for the agricultural industry, effectively including small farms 
and other agricultural units in the standard employer definition. Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, supra note 2, at 1-2 to 1-3.
7 For example, California only requires an entity to pay over $100 in a quarter to be an “employer” for UI purposes. Cal. Unemp. 
Ins. Code § 675.
8 The ABC test defines employee as any worker other than those who: (A) are free from control or direction in the performance 
of the work; (B) conduct work outside the usual course of the company’s business and off the premises of the business; and (C) 
are customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business. Id. at 1-5. See also Nat’l Employment Law 
Project, Use the Broad “ABC” Test to Define Employer-Employee Relationships, available at
http://nelp.bluestatedigital.com/page/-/UI/cwce_book/Employer-EmployeeRelationships.pdf
9 For example, in California an applicant must have earned $1,300 in at least one of the past four quarters or earned at least 
$900 in her highest quarter and at least $1,125 total in the past four quarters. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1281(a). The New Jersey 
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Appendix B
Key Characteristics of Social Insurance Programs
Unemployment 
Insurance (UI)
Social Security 
Disability Insurance 
(SSDI)
Social Security 
Survivors Insurance
Social Security 
Survivors Insurance
California Paid 
Family Leave
New Jersey Family 
Leave Insurance
California State 
Disability Insurance
New Jersey State 
Disability Benefits
New York State 
Disability Insurance
Rhode Island 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Hawaii Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Puerto Rico 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Workers’ 
Compensation14
Individuals must have lost their job through no fault of their own and be 
unemployed as a result.1
Individuals must be blind or meet Social Security’s definition of disability.2 
Individuals become eligible for partial benefits upon reaching age 62 
and having earned the requisite number of work credits (generally 40).3   
Individuals are not eligible for full benefits until they reach “full retirement 
age” — a number that varies from 65 to 67 based upon birth year.4
Certain surviving family members become eligible upon the death of a worker 
who has earned Social Security credits.5
An individual must be bonding with a new child during the first year after the 
birth or adoption of the child or caring for a seriously ill child, parent, spouse, 
or domestic partner.6
An individual must be bonding with a new child during the first year after the 
birth or adoption of the child or caring for a child, spouse, domestic partner, 
civil union partner, or parent who has a serious health condition.7
A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual 
to be unable to work.8 
A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual 
to be unable to work.9
A non work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual 
to be unable to work.10
A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual 
to be unable to work.11
A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual 
to be unable to work.12
A non-work-related disability, including pregnancy, which causes an individual 
to be unable to work.13
Worker-related injury or illness suffered on the job or arising in the course of 
employment.15
Eligibility: Qualifying Events
Unemployment 
Insurance
Social Security 
Disability Insurance
Social Security 
Retirement 
Benefits
Social Security 
Survivors Benefits
California Paid 
Family Leave
New Jersey Family 
Leave Insurance
California State 
Disability Insurance
New Jersey State 
Disability Benefits
New York State 
Disability Insurance
Individuals must earn a certain amount of wages and/or work a certain 
period of time during the “base period,” (BP) defined as the first four of 
the last five completed calendar quarters in most states. 16  Workers must 
generally have earnings in more than one quarter within the BP. 17  The 
minimum amount of wages an eligible individual must earn during the base 
period ranges from $130 in Hawaii to $4,455 in North Carolina.18
Individuals must earn a specified number of work credits.19  In 2009, $1,090 
in income equals one credit; $4,360 equals the maximum four credits an 
individual can earn per year.20 The maximum number of required credits is 
40. Younger workers may qualify with fewer credits:
1) Before age 24, six credits are required.
2) Between ages 24 and 31, individuals must have credit for working 
half the time between age 21 and the year they became disabled.
3) For workers aged 31 or older, the number of credits required 
increases with age. Of the credits required, 20 must have been 
earned in the previous 10 years (ending in the year in which the 
individual became disabled).21
Individuals born after 1929 need 40 work credits, calculated in the 
same manner as SSDI, to qualify for Social Security retirement benefits 
(equivalent to 10 full years of work).22
Eligibility depends on the decedent’s work credits.23  The maximum number 
of credits required is 40.24 Younger workers may qualify with fewer credits.25  
If a decedent earned at least six credits in the three years before his or her 
death, surviving children and any spouse taking care of the children can 
receive benefits.26
Individuals must have $300 in wages during the 12-month period 
approximately five to 17 months prior to the date of application for paid 
family leave (the base period) and must be currently employed or actively 
seeking work.27
Individuals must be currently employed (or have been unemployed for 
less than two weeks)28 and must have earned at least $145 in at least 20 
calendar weeks or have earned at least 1,000 times the minimum wage 
(currently $7,300) during the 52 weeks immediately prior to the week in 
which the family leave claim begins.29
Same as California Paid Family Leave
Same as New Jersey Family Leave Insurance
Individuals must be employed for four or more consecutive weeks.30 
Individuals continue to be eligible for four weeks after the termination of 
covered employment.31
Eligibility: Workforce Attachment Requirements
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Rhode Island 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Hawaii Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Puerto Rico 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Workers’ 
Compensation
An individual may be eligible if he or she has earned at least 1,200 
times the minimum wage during the base period (currently $8,880).32  
Alternatively, individuals must have been paid at least 200 times the 
minimum hourly wage (currently $1,480) in any quarter during the first four 
of the five most recent completed calendar quarters (the base period) and 
must have total base period earnings that are at least 1.5 times the amount 
paid in the quarter of highest earnings, provided that the minimum amount 
of total base period wages is at least 400 times the minimum hourly wage 
(currently $2,960).33
An employee must have been employed for at least 20 hours per week for 
at least 14 weeks and have earned at least $400 in the 52 weeks prior to 
the disability.34 The 14 weeks need not be consecutive nor with only one 
employer. The employee must be currently employed or have incurred 
the injury or illness not more than two weeks from the last day of covered 
employment.35
ndividuals must have received wages of at least $150 in a covered 
employment during the first four of the last five consecutive calendar 
quarters which immediately precede the date of filing the application for 
benefits (the “base year”).36
Coverage generally starts on the employee’s first day of employment in all 
states.37 
Eligibility: Workforce Attachment Requirements (CONTINUED)
Unemployment 
Insurance
Social Security 
Disability Insurance
Social Security 
Retirement 
Insurance
Social Security 
Survivors Insurance
California Paid 
Family Leave
New Jersey Family 
Leave Insurance
California State 
Disability Insurance
New Jersey State 
Disability Benefits
New York State 
Disability Insurance
Rhode Island 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Hawaii Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Puerto Rico 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Workers’ 
Compensation
All, with limited exceptions.38  Self-employed individuals are excluded.
All, with limited exceptions.39
Same as SSDI.
Same as SSDI.
All, with limited exceptions.40   
Self-employed individuals may elect coverage.41
All, with limited exceptions.42    
Self-employed individuals are excluded.
Same as California Paid Family Leave.
Same as New Jersey Family Leave Insurance.
All, with limited exceptions.43 Self-employed individuals are excluded.
All, with limited exceptions.44 Self-employed individuals are excluded.
All, with limited exceptions.45 Self-employed individuals are excluded.
All, with limited exceptions.46 Self-employed individuals are excluded.
Every state except Texas requires almost all private employers to provide 
workers’ compensation coverage.47 In Texas, coverage is voluntary, but 
employers not providing coverage are not shielded from tort liability as 
employers in other states are.48  Some states also exempt very small 
businesses – for example, employers employing fewer than five people are 
not required to cover their employees in 13 states.49
Eligibility: Workforce Attachment Requirements (CONTINUED)
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Unemployment 
Insurance
Social Security 
Disability Insurance
Social Security 
Retirement 
Insurance
Social Security 
Survivors Insurance
California Paid 
Family Leave
New Jersey Family 
Leave Insurance
California State 
Disability Insurance
New Jersey State 
Disability Benefits
New York State 
Disability Insurance
Rhode Island 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Hawaii Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Puerto Rico 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Workers’ 
Compensation
Most states offer benefits for a maximum of 26 weeks.50
SSDI recipients will continue to receive benefits for as long as they continue 
to be disabled and unable to participate in substantial gainful activities.51
Retirement benefits last as long as the recipient is alive.52
Benefits last until one of many terminating events occurs, including death 
of the recipient, remarriage, or, in the case of a child receiving benefits, 
reaching the age of majority.53
Up to 6 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits.54
Up to 6 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits.55
Up to 52 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as 
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter.56
Up to 26 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as 
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter.57
Up to 26 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as 
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter.58
Up to 30 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as 
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter. 59
Up to 26 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as 
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter. 60
Up to 26 weeks per year in which an individual is eligible for benefits, or as 
long as an individual’s temporary disability lasts, whichever is shorter. 61
For temporary total disability benefits, more than half of states allow 
benefits to be paid as long as the disability lasts.62  The remaining states 
have a total maximum duration ranging from 104 weeks to 700 weeks.63  
Permanent total disability benefits generally last until a set retirement 
age or for life, although some states impose a total maximum benefit 
cap (e.g. $318,000 in Indiana).64 Permanent partial disability benefits are 
subject to a total maximum duration in the majority of states, ranging from 
approximately 200 weeks to 520 weeks.65
Benefits: Duration
Unemployment 
Insurance
Social Security 
Disability Insurance
Social Security 
Retirement 
Benefits
Social Security 
Survivors Benefits
California Paid 
Family Leave
New Jersey Family 
Leave Insurance
California State 
Disability Insurance
New Jersey State 
Disability Benefits
New York State 
Disability Insurance
Rhode Island 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Hawaii Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Puerto Rico 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Workers’ 
Compensation
Most states require a one-week waiting period before benefits are paid.66
Individuals must have been disabled for five consecutive months before 
becoming eligible for benefits.67
N/A
N/A
Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven days before benefits are 
paid; the waiting period may be served non-consecutively.68
If the period of family leave immediately follows an eligible period of 
temporary disability for the individual’s own illness, such as pregnancy 
disability, there is no waiting period for the Paid Family Leave claim. 69
Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven days before benefits are 
paid; if the period of family leave lasts three weeks or more, retroactive 
benefits may be paid for the waiting period.70
If the period of family leave immediately follows an eligible period of 
temporary disability for the individual’s own illness, such as pregnancy 
disability, there is no waiting period for the Family Leave Insurance claim.71
Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before 
benefits are paid.72
Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before 
benefits are paid; if the period of family leave lasts three weeks or more, 
retroactive benefits may be paid for the waiting period.73
Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before 
benefits are paid.74
Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before 
benefits are paid.75
Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before 
benefits are paid.76
Individuals must serve a waiting period of seven consecutive days before 
benefits are paid.77
Workers’ compensation pays for medical care immediately and pays cash 
benefits for lost work time after a waiting period, which ranges by state from 
three to seven days. 78
Benefits: Waiting Time
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Unemployment 
Insurance
Social Security 
Disability Insurance
Social Security 
Retirement 
Benefits
Social Security 
Survivors Benefits
California Paid 
Family Leave
New Jersey Family 
Leave Insurance
California State 
Disability Insurance
New Jersey State 
Disability Benefits
New York State 
Disability Insurance
On average, states replace approximately 50 percent of an eligible 
individual’s lost wages, up to a maximum benefit amount, which is usually 
a percentage of the state average weekly wage.79 Benefit amounts are 
calculated as a percentage of an individual’s earnings in a specified base 
period, generally covering the most recent 12- to 18-month period.80
Two “bend points” (calculated based on the national average wage index) 
are used to create three earnings brackets.81  Earnings up to the first bend 
point are replaced at 90 percent, earnings between the first and second 
bend points are replaced at 32 percent, and earnings beyond the second 
bend point are replaced at 15 percent (up to the federal maximum, which 
is updated annually).82  In 2009, the bend points result in the following 
calculation:
· 90 percent of the first $744 of average-indexed monthly 
earnings (AIME), plus
· 32 percent of the next $3,739 of AIME, plus
· 15 percent of AIME over $4,483.83
Same as SSDI.  Benefit amount is reduced if benefits are received before 
full retirement age.84
Benefit payments are equal to a proportion of the primary insurance 
amount (PIA) of the deceased.85  The proportion of the PIA depends on the 
individual’s relationship to the deceased.86  Widows or widowers may also 
be entitled to a lump sum payment of $255 upon the death of a deceased 
spouse.87
The wage replacement rate is 55 percent of an individual’s weekly wages 
during a specified base period.88  The maximum benefit amount, which is 
updated annually, is indexed to the state average weekly wage and cannot 
exceed the maximum benefit amount for workers’ compensation temporary 
disability benefits, which is set at 150 percent the state average weekly 
wage).89  In 2010, the maximum weekly benefit amount was $987.90
The wage replacement rate is 66 percent of an individual’s weekly wages 
during a specified base period. 91  The maximum benefit amount, which is 
updated annually, is 53 percent of the state’s average weekly wage.92  In 
2010, the maximum weekly benefit amount was $561.93
Same as California Paid Family Leave.
Same as New Jersey Family Leave Insurance.
The wage replacement rate is 50 percent of an individual’s average weekly 
wage during the last eight weeks of employment; the maximum benefit is 
statutorily set at $170 per week.94
Benefits: Wage Replacement Rate & Maximum Benefit Amount
Rhode Island 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Hawaii Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Puerto Rico 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Workers’ 
Compensation
The wage replacement rate is 4.62 percent of the wages paid to an 
individual in the calendar quarter of highest earnings within the base period 
(translating into a weekly wage replacement rate of ~51 percent); the 
maximum benefit is 85 percent of the state average weekly wage.95   As of 
July 1, 2010, the maximum benefit was $700.96
Except for individuals with very low earnings, the wage replacement rate 
is 58 percent of an individual’s average weekly wage in the week before 
filing a claim for disability; the maximum benefit cannot exceed 121 percent 
the state average weekly wage.97 As of 2009, the maximum weekly benefit 
amount was $510.98
The benefit amount is approximately 65 percent of the average weekly 
wage (computed using the quarter of highest earnings during the base 
year). 99  For nonagricultural workers, the weekly benefit amount ranges 
from $12 - $113.100  For workers who earn at least 50 percent of their 
income as agricultural workers, the weekly benefit amount is calculated 
using a schedule based on total wages during the base year. 101  The weekly 
benefit amount for agricultural workers ranges from $12 to $55.102
Most states pay weekly benefits for temporary total disability that replace 
two-thirds (66 percent) of a worker’s pre-injury wages, although wage 
replacement rates vary from a national low of 60 percent in New Hampshire 
to a high of 80 percent in Alaska, Iowa, Maine and Michigan.103 Maximum 
benefits, which are usually indexed to a state’s average weekly wage, vary 
between states.104   As of 2010, maximum weekly benefits ranged from a 
low of $351 in Mississippi to a high of $1,173 in Illinois and Iowa.105
Benefits: Wage Replacement Rate & Maximum Benefit Amount (CONTINUED)
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Unemployment 
Insurance
Social Security 
Disability Insurance
Social Security 
Retirement 
Benefits
Social Security 
Survivors Benefits
California Paid 
Family Leave
New Jersey Family 
Leave Insurance
California State 
Disability Insurance
New Jersey State 
Disability Benefits
New York State 
Disability Insurance
Rhode Island 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Hawaii Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Puerto Rico 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Workers’ 
Compensation
Unemployment benefits are subject to income tax.106  Federal law requires 
states to offer workers the opportunity to voluntarily have Federal income 
tax withheld from unemployment benefits at the rate of 10 percent.107  
Federal law also permits states to withhold state and local income tax from 
unemployment benefits.108
Some recipients are required to pay federal income taxes on their Social 
Security benefits if they have another source of substantial income in 
addition to Social Security benefits, such as wages, self-employment, 
interest, dividends and other taxable income.110 No Social Security recipient 
pays federal income tax on more than 85 percent of his or her Social 
Security benefits.111
Same as SSDI.
Same as SSDI.
Benefits in excess of contributions to the program are subject to federal 
income taxes, but not state income taxes.112
Benefits in excess of contributions to the program are subject to federal 
income taxes, but not state income taxes.113
With limited exceptions, benefits are not considered federal taxable income 
because the program is employee-funded.114  Benefits are exempt from 
state income tax.115
Benefits that represent the employer contribution to the program are 
federal taxable income; the remaining portion is free of federal income 
tax.116 Benefits are exempt from state income tax.117
Benefits that represent the employer contribution to the program are 
federal taxable income; the remaining portion is free of federal income 
tax.118  Benefits are likely exempt from state income tax.119
With limited exceptions, benefits are not considered federal taxable income 
because the program is employee funded.120 Benefits are exempt from state 
income tax.121
Benefits that represent the employer contribution to the program are 
federal taxable income; the remaining portion is free of federal income 
tax.122  The statute does not specify whether benefits are exempt from state 
income tax.123
Benefits that represent the employer contribution to the program are 
federal taxable income; the remaining portion is free of federal income 
tax.124  Benefits are likely exempt from state income tax. 125
Workers’ compensation benefits are not subject to federal or state income 
taxes.126
Benefits: Taxation
Unemployment 
Insurance (UI)
Social Security 
Disability Insurance 
(SSDI)
Social Security 
Retirement 
Insurance
Social Security 
Survivors Insurance
California Paid 
Family Leave
New Jersey Family 
Leave Insurance
California State 
Disability Insurance
New Jersey State 
Disability Benefits
Generally 100 percent employer financing. UI is funded by federal and 
state taxes.  The federal tax rate, set by the Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act (FUTA), is 6.2 percent of taxable wages and pays for administration of 
the program.127   Federal law only imposes FUTA tax on the first $7,000 of 
earnings, but most states have increased their taxable wage bases above 
the minimum.128  Employers who pay state unemployment tax on a timely 
basis receive an offset credit of up to 5.4 percent regardless of the rate of 
tax they pay the state.129 Therefore, the net FUTA tax rate is generally 0.8 
percent (6.2% - 5.4%), for a maximum FUTA tax of $56.00 per employee, per 
year (.008 X $7,000. = $56.00).130
Shared employer and employee financing; equal contributions  
of 6.2% from each.132  Self-employed individuals pay both the employer and 
employee contribution (12.4%).133  The earnings cap for the OASDI payroll 
tax is based on a formula set by law; the taxable wage base only adjusts if  
a cost of living increase becomes effective.134  In 2010, the taxable earnings 
cap was $106,800.135
Same as SSDI.
Same as SSDI.
100% employee financing. The 2010 tax rate is 1.1% percent of taxable 
wages per employee, per year; with a taxable wage base capped at 
$93,916.136 The taxable wage base adjusts with changes in the state 
average weekly wage.137
Self-employed individuals who elect coverage pay both the employer and 
employee contribution up to the same taxable wage base cap as non-self 
employed individuals.138
100% employee financing.  The 2010 tax rate is .12% of taxable wages per 
employee; the taxable earnings cap is equal to the earnings cap for state 
unemployment insurance benefits:  in 2010, the cap was $29,700.139
Same as California PFL.
Shared employer and employee financing.140  As of 2010, the employee 
tax rate was .5% with a taxable earnings cap of $29,700.141  Employers 
covered by the state fund pay a basic rate of .5% on the same taxable wage 
base as employees, but employers are subject to experience rating.142  An 
employer’s rate may decrease to .1% or increase to 1.1% on the basis of the 
employer’s reserve ratio, length of employment, and the status of the fund 
as a whole.143
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New York State 
Disability Insurance
Rhode Island 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Hawaii Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Puerto Rico 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Workers’ 
Compensation
Primarily employer financed.  Employers can require employee contributions 
up to a cap of .5% on the first $120 of weekly wages (not more than 60 
cents per week).144
100% employee financing. The 2010 tax rate is 1.2% of taxable wage per 
employee, per year with an taxable earnings cap of $57,000.145
Primarily employer financed, employee contributions are limited to half 
the cost of providing benefits but not more than 0.5% of weekly earnings 
up to the annually adjusted maximum weekly taxable wage base ($877 in 
2009).146
Shared employer and employee financing; equal contributions of .5% from 
each; earnings cap was $9,000 in 2010.147
100% employer financing. Contributions are experience-rated.148
Financing (CONTINUED)
Unemployment 
Insurance
Social Security 
Disability Insurance
Social Security 
Retirement 
Insurance
Social Security 
Survivors Insurance
California Paid 
Family Leave
New Jersey Family 
Leave Insurance
California State 
Disability Insurance
New Jersey State 
Disability Benefits
New York State 
Disability Insurance
Rhode Island 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Hawaii Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Puerto Rico 
Temporary 
Disability Insurance
Workers’ 
Compensation
Federal-State Partnership.  Federal government provides funding and 
sets national standard on some processes; state employment agencies 
physically handle claims and dispense benefits.149
Federal-State Partnership.  The Social Security Administration accepts 
applications, handles appeals, and determines benefits; state disability 
determination services, which are funded by the federal government, make 
initial eligibility decisions.150
Federal Administration. Operated by the Social Security Administration.151
Federal Administration. Operated by the Social Security Administration.152
State Administration.  Operated by the California Employment Development 
Department as a part of the state disability insurance program. The EDD 
also administers unemployment insurance for California.153
State Administration.  Operated by the New Jersey Department of Labor 
and Workforce Development as a part of the state temporary disability 
insurance program. The department also administers unemployment 
insurance for New Jersey.154
Same as PFL.155
Same as FLI.156
State Administration.  State law mandates that employers purchase 
temporary disability insurance or self-insure. The New York State Worker’s 
Compensation Board oversees the operation of these plans.157
State Administration.  Operated by the Rhode Island Department of Labor 
and Training.  The DLT also oversees Rhode Island’s workers’ compensation 
law and administers unemployment insurance.158
State Administration.  State law mandates that employers purchase 
temporary disability insurance or self-insure.  The Hawaii Department of 
Labor and Industrial Relations, which also oversees the operation of the 
state workers’ compensation law and unemployment insurance, monitors 
the operation of these plans.159
State Administration.  Operated by the Commonwealth Department of Labor 
and Human Resources.  The department also administers unemployment 
insurance for Puerto Rico.160
State Administration.  Most state laws mandate that employers carry 
workers’ compensation insurance.  A Workers’ Compensation Commission/
Board within a state Department of Labor and Industries or Employment 
Security will generally oversee the operation of the law.161
Administration
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Appendix C
Historical Background on Maternity Leave Insurance and 
Temporary Disability Insurance in the United States  
A.  The Early Years
In this appendix, we outline some of the critical historical and legislative developments surrounding 
maternity leave insurance and temporary disability insurance in the United States.1 
The idea that the government should offer wage replacement for time taken off work to care for a 
new child or a person’s own illness through social insurance is not entirely new.  
As early as the 1916, labor and progressive party advocates pressed for maternity leave insurance 
programs for female workers.2 In 1919, New York State even came close to passing a comprehensive 
health insurance proposal that included maternity leave insurance and temporary disability benefits.3 
Staunch opposition from the medical and insurance communities prevented these proposals from 
advancing.4  
These issues reappeared during the deliberations of the US Committee on Economic Security in 
the 1930’s.  President Roosevelt created the Committee in 1934 and tasked it with developing 
recommendations on old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and a “unified social insurance 
system affording protection against all major personal hazards which lead to poverty and 
dependency.”5 Though their reports on old-age assistance and unemployment garnered the most 
attention—and ultimately led to the creation of our Social Security system—the Committee studied, 
and issued proposals, on a range of economic issues, including health security.  The health report 
contained four key recommendations:
 
 1) Aid to local medical facilities and services. 
 2) Temporary disability insurance in the form of cash benefits. 
 3) Further study for a system of permanent disability insurance. 
 4) A cooperative federal-state system for medical insurance in which a  State would receive a 
     specified federal subsidy if it met certain basic federal safeguards. 6 
The Committee saw temporary disability insurance (TDI) as a natural corollary to medical insurance.  
When a person fell ill, medical insurance would provide assistance with hospital costs while TDI 
covered lost wages.7 Temporary disability, in turn, would supply a person with cash-benefits and 
thereby help them avoid the double blow of increased medical costs and decreased income.  
American Medical Association (AMA) opposition to any form of national medical insurance effectively 
prevented the Committee’s health security report from receiving consideration in Congress.8  In 
fact, the Committee and the President did all they could to ensure that the health report went 
largely unnoticed.  The Administration and leading Committee members were concerned that AMA 
opposition could ultimately undermine passage of the more limited Social Security Act, which 
covered the Committee’s recommendations on old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and 
federal assistance grants for the elderly and families with dependent children, then moving through 
Congress.9 
Maternity leave insurance benefits were notably absent from the Committee’s health insurance 
144 145
report.  The Committee did recommend grants to states for maternal and child health benefits 
and aid for dependent children as part of an enhanced public assistance program, but it did not 
specifically propose a maternity leave insurance program for working mothers.10   
The failure to address maternity leave insurance for working women was likely the result of the 
Committee’s focus on alleviating unemployment among male breadwinners.11  At the time, maternity 
leave insurance benefits were seen by many as an incentive for men to send their wives into the 
workforce. 12  Given the already tight labor market of the 1930’s and the general stigma against 
working mothers, it is not surprising that the Committee decided not to include maternity leave 
insurance.13 This mode of thinking slowly dissipated as middle-class women began to re-enter the 
workforce in the 1960’s and 1970’s, but, in the 1930’s and 40’s, it remained a major barrier to the 
consideration of the issues facing women in the workplace.
The failure to incorporate TDI into the original Social Security Act did not dissuade the Roosevelt, 
and later, the Truman Administration, from pursuing its inclusion in subsequent expansions of 
Social Security.  In the run-up to the 1939 Social Security Amendments, for instance, both the Social 
Security Board and Roosevelt’s Interdepartmental Committee on the Coordination of Health and 
Welfare Activities recommended the establishment of a national TDI program.14  
The Interdepartmental Committee (IC) report, which the Social Security Board largely echoed, was 
essentially a continuation of the Committee on Economic Security’s original health security study. The 
IC’s recommendations on TDI were, like the Committee on Economic Security’s, made in the context 
of a National Health Program that included incentives for the creation of public medical insurance 
systems.15  As in 1935, this association with health care ensured that TDI received little serious 
consideration during the deliberations about modifying Social Security.16 
In 1946, the Truman Administration won a small victory for national TDI when it successfully 
advocated for a modification to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) that allowed UI funds 
gathered through taxes on employees to be used for the operation of state TDI systems.17  Two of the 
nine states eligible for this provision18—California and New Jersey —19responded by creating state TDI 
programs.20 New York also created a TDI program shortly after the FUTA Amendments, but the state 
chose to model its system on the state Workers’ Compensation Law.21  As a result, the new allowance 
provided no benefit to New York.  
An aggressive campaign to transform Social Security into a true “cradle to grave” social insurance 
program followed the passage of the FUTA Amendments.  Anticipating a debate on retirement 
and survivor’s benefit levels, Truman’s Social Security Administration issued a remarkable report 
on the need to move beyond the current system and adopt a “Single National Program” of social 
insurance.22  The proposed national program included enhanced coverage and benefits for Old-Age 
and Survivor’s Insurance, centralized UI, national health insurance, maternity leave insurance, and 
permanent and temporary disability insurance benefits.23  With the full backing of the Administration, 
the proposal was submitted to Congress in the form of H.R. 2893.24 
The House and Ways and Means Committee spent over a month taking testimony from witnesses—
including a five-day appearance by Dr. Arthur J. Altmeyer, the director of the SSA.25  The Committee’s 
questions covered a range of TDI and maternity leave insurance related topics and issues, but 
primarily focused on fraud prevention and concerns about the ability of employees to “work the 
system.” 26 Outside of the Committee, concerns were also voiced about the costs of the new 
programs and the possibility that they would crowd out state programs and charitable efforts. 27   
Recognizing a lack of support, Rep. Doughton pulled H.R. 2893 in the summer of 1949 and replaced 
it with H.R. 6000—a new package of Amendments that retained the benefit and coverage expansions 
of H.R. 2893, but dropped the “weekly benefit programs,”  which included TDI and maternity leave 
insurance.28  H.R. 6000 ultimately formed the basis for the Social Security Amendments of 1950.29
B.  From the 1950’s to the Present
After the defeat of H.R. 2893, there was little movement in the TDI and maternity leave insurance 
fields at the national level. The SSA stopped calling for an expanded social safety net and the push 
to pass TDI at the local level stalled.  In 1956, permanent and total disability insurance was added 
to the Social Security program, sapping much of the urgency surrounding the establishment of a 
national program for temporary disability.30 
The conversation slowly began to shift as more women began to return the workforce in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s.  Maternity leave insurance benefits, and their exclusion from most private and public 
TDI plans, became a major rallying point for women concerned with workplace discrimination and 
societal stigmas against working women.  Like many of the issues associated with the campaign 
for women’s rights, the 1963 release of the final report of President Kennedy’s Commission on the 
Status of Women played an important role in bringing awareness to this issue.31  Among a number of 
findings and policy recommendations, the Commission noted the importance of maternity benefits 
and urged the federal government to take the lead in providing cash benefits to mothers out on 
maternity leave.32   
A second milestone came in 1964 when “discrimination on the basis of sex” was added to title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act.33  That provision was subsequently used by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with enforcing the Civil Rights Act, as the basis for 
guidelines on pregnancy discrimination that, among other things, specifically prohibited the exclusion 
of pregnancy related illnesses and disabilities from public and private TDI plans.34 The Supreme 
Court ultimately overturned the guidelines as inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act, but Congress 
moved quickly to authorize EEOC and private civil law suits in this field by passing the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA). 35  
The PDA explicitly prohibited discrimination on the basis of pregnancy by amending the definition of 
“on the basis of sex” to include “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”36 For public and 
private TDI plans, this legislative change made it illegal for pregnancy to be excluded from the list of 
illnesses that prevented work.  Overnight, maternity leave insurance became a required component 
of public and private TDI plans.37  
The movement for greater protections continued in 1985 with the introduction of the first versions of 
the FMLA.38  These initial drafts provided unpaid, job protected leave for temporary disabilities and 
maternity/paternity leave.39  By 1987, the bills had expanded to include coverage for family caregiving 
leave and, as the bill neared passage, funding for a study on the costs of creating a federal paid 
leave program.40  
The FMLA first passed Congress in 1991 but was not signed into law until President Clinton 
took office in 1993.41  As enacted, the FMLA provides employees working in mid-size and large 
organizations with 12 weeks of job-protected but unpaid time off, with continuing employer-based 
health coverage, to bond with a new child, care for a family member, or treat personal illness.42 The 
funding to commission a study on a federal paid leave program was ultimately removed. 
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Despite these major gains in job protection for workers at medium and large businesses, there 
remained a persisting lack of momentum in advancing a national system of wage replacement for 
family and medical leave.  
The late 1990’s saw the Clinton Administration’s Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation 
initiative (BAA-UC).43  The program allowed states to use their Unemployment Insurance funds to 
provide wage replacement for leave taken to care for a newly born or adopted child by adding birth 
and adoption to the list of exceptions for the “able and available to work” requirement.44 The Bush 
Administration ultimately repealed BAA-UC in 2003 on the grounds that it would overwhelm the 
Unemployment Compensation Trust Funds.45 
In 2002 and 2008, California and New Jersey, respectively, became the first states to create Paid 
Family Leave Insurance systems.  Both states added these benefits by expanding their existing 
Temporary Disability Insurance programs.46  Washington State became the first state to pass a stand-
alone paid paternity and maternity leave insurance program in 2007, but, as of the writing of this 
document, the program remains unfunded.47   
This appendix has reviewed the history of maternity leave insurance and temporary disability 
insurance programs in the United States.  It highlights the lengthy discussion that we, as a society, 
have had over the establishment of these kinds of programs and underscores the need to move 
away from a public and private patchwork of time off benefits and create a truly comprehensive 
system of parental care, caregiving, and temporary disability insurance.    
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43 See Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,210 (June 13, 2000).
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Appendix D
Legislative Proposals on Paid Time Off 
The need for some form of temporary wage-replacement for employees unable to work due to their 
own disability or their need to care or bond with a family member has been the subject of much 
debate on Capitol Hill and in state legislatures.  In this appendix, we offer brief summaries of the 
major federal proposals on time off for health and family reasons and recent activity at the state 
level.  
A. The FIRST Act – H.R. 2339
The grant approach—embodied by Rep. Woolsey’s Family Income to Respond to Significant 
Transitions Act 1 (otherwise known as the FIRST Act)—seeks to encourage the establishment of TDI 
and PFL programs at the state level by providing federal grants for their design and implementation.2  
Under the FIRST Act, grants would last a maximum of three years and would be available to fund 
administration, implementation, development, and educational outreach.3  States with and without 
TDI and PFL would be eligible for funding, but the states without those programs would be given 
priority.4  The bill only permits one or two three-year grants per state.5  This one-off approach differs 
significantly from existing federal-state partnerships such as UI, for which the federal government 
subsidizes states’ administrative costs on an ongoing basis. Moreover, unlike the UI system, the 
grant approach in the FIRST Act does not provide payroll tax breaks or similar incentives to employers 
in participating states.
Rep. Woolsey’s (D-CA) and other members of Congress have introduced this legislation in various 
forms over the past six years, but it has gained little traction.6  The sole hearing on the bill came in 
front of Rep. Woolsey’s own Education and Labor Workforce Protections Subcommittee in June of 
2009.7 
B. Social Security Cares  
In March of 2009, the Center for American Progress released a report by economist Heather Boushey 
titled “Helping Breadwinners When It Can’t Wait: A Progressive Program for Family Leave Insurance.”8 
In that report, Boushey advocates for the inclusion of a Family Leave Insurance program within the 
Social Security system.9  
She argues that Social Security’s nationwide scope presents an opportunity to enact consistent, 
effective, and broadly popular legislation on the issue.  Moreover, she argues that using the eligibility 
requirements developed as part of the Social Security program would ensure that the new program 
covers nearly all American workers.10 
The Social Security Cares program would operate as either a traditional social insurance program, 
funded through an increase in the Social Security payroll tax and/or an increase in the wage cap, or, 
alternatively, it would be financed through a unique “time-lending” system that would allow Social 
Security recipients to trade future benefits for family and medical leave benefits.11    
To date, the Social Security Cares program has not been introduced as an actual piece of legislation. 
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C. The Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009 – H.R. 1723
A hybrid approach, Rep. Pete Stark’s (D-CA) Family Leave Insurance Act,12 would establish a national 
family leave insurance program operated through federal-state partnerships and/or the Social 
Security Administration. 
Under the federal-state partnerships, the Secretary of Labor would be given the authority to enter 
into administrative agreements with individual states.13  Those agreements would allow the Secretary 
to provide funding for the operation of a PFL/TDI system if the state promised to administer the 
benefits.14  Interestingly, this approach would not allow the state to create a new agency for the 
purpose of administering family leave insurance.  States could only qualify for funds if the new PFL/
TDI benefit was run through an existing program such as UI or WC.15  
If a state were not willing to administer the benefit through an existing agency, the bill would 
authorize the Commissioner of Social Security, at the request of the state’s Governor, to establish 
a family and medical insurance program within the state.16  Program funding would come entirely 
from the federal government, and benefits, presumably, would be distributed through existing Social 
Security offices and resources in the state.17   
All options would be funded by the federal government through a 0.1 or 0.2 percent increase 
(depending on whether the person works for a large or small employer) in the Social Security payroll 
tax.  The tax would be called the “Family and Medical Leave Premium.”18   
In order to be eligible for benefits under the Stark proposal, an employee must have worked for 
his or her employer for at least the previous six months, and must have worked 625 hours for 
that employer in those six months (thus excluding many part-time workers from eligibility).19 Small 
employers, defined as those employing fewer than 20 persons,20 would be exempt from mandatory 
participation.21
Rep. Stark has introduced this bill in various forms over the past 5 years.22  It is currently awaiting 
action in the Workforce Protections Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor. 
D. The Family Leave Insurance Act of 2007 – S. 1681
The bipartisan Family Leave Insurance Act, introduced in the 110th Congress by Senators Christopher 
Dodd (D-CT) and Ted Stevens (R-AK), took the rather unique approach of using employers as the 
benefit delivery vehicle for a national insurance program.  
The bill, like the Stark proposal, would pay for a family leave insurance program by levying a “Family 
and Medical Leave Premium” on eligible employers and employees.23  The proceeds from these 
premiums would then be placed in a special “Family and Medical Leave Insurance Fund” controlled 
by a Board of Trustees.24   Employers would make the initial payments to their employees and then 
seek reimbursement from the insurance fund.25  In this way, the government plays absolutely no role 
in the distribution of benefits.  The employers bear the entire administrative load, including handling 
applications and making initial eligibility determinations.26 
Sec. 103(f)(4) describes limitations on payments, specifically that no amount may be paid greater 
than that which is remaining in the Insurance Fund. In the same section, there is also a provision for 
a “notice of insufficient funds,” which relieves employers of the requirement to pay benefits as long 
as the notice is in effect.
As with the proposals mentioned above, the Dodd-Stevens bill did not receive much legislative 
attention.  The bill was introduced in June of 2007 and referred to the Senate Finance Committee.  
No major action was taken on the bill during the 110th Congress and Sen. Dodd has yet to reintroduce 
it in the 111th Congress. 
E. The Obama Administration’s State Paid Leave Fund 
The President’s FY2011 budget proposal for the Department of Labor included a 50 million dollar 
“State Paid Leave Fund.”27 The fund is designed to offer grants to states to assist them with the initial 
start up costs associated with paid leave programs.  
The Senate Appropriations Committee included a scaled down version of the fund—10 million instead 
of 50 million dollars—in its Labor, Health, and Human Services appropriations for FY2011.28  The 
House Appropriations subcommittee on Labor, Health, and Human Services, however, did not include 
similar language in its version of the FY2011 appropriations bill.29  As of this writing, the fate of the 
fund is uncertain.  
F. State Activity
State legislative activity on paid family leave tends to fall into two broad categories.30 First, a handful 
of states are considering legislation that would either establish a comprehensive wage-replacement 
program for temporary disability, caregiving, and parental care for a new child or would add 
caregiving and parental care benefits to existing TDI programs.  Legislative proposals currently active 
in New York, Hawaii, Illinois, and Massachusetts fit this description.  
Second, a slightly larger group of state legislatures are debating programs that would only provide 
wage-replacement for time off to care for a new child or a family member with a serious health 
condition.  Arizona, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Vermont fall into this 
category.31 
The specifics of the proposed programs in both categories vary widely.  Benefits range from 
$250 a week in Arizona,32 Hawaii 33 and New Hampshire 34 to $750 a week in one proposed bill 
in Massachusetts.35  Several of the bills would also impose caps based on the state average 
weekly wage.36  Benefit durations range from four weeks in Hawaii37 and Missouri,38 to 12 weeks in 
Massachusetts39 and Pennsylvania.40  
The proposed methods for funding these programs are similarly varied. Arizona would require 
employers to pay a small premium into a statewide insurance fund. 41 Vermont’s proposal,42 as well 
as the one pending in the Massachusetts House,43 would establish a payroll tax.  Missouri would 
require employers to pay the wage replacement.44  A bill in New Hampshire45 would even make the 
plan contingent on the receipt of federal funds. 
These proposals have met with mixed responses.  The New York bill has been approved by the 
Legislative Assembly several times but has failed to garner equal support in the State Senate. In 
New Hampshire, an official legislative study was commissioned in 2010 and the House Committee 
on Commerce and Consumer Affairs recommended the bill for consideration in the 2011 session.  In 
most states, no official action has been taken. 46
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2 Id. § 3. 
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4 Id. §3(a)(3)
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6 See H.R. 2363, 108th Cong. (Introduced by Rep. Rosa DeLauro on June 5, 2003), H.R. 5625, 109th Cong. (Introduced by Rep. 
Carolyn Maloney on June 15, 2006), H.R. 1369, 110th Cong. (Introduced by Rep. Carolyn Maloney on March 7, 2007). 
7 Hearing on H.R. 2339, the Family Income to Respond to Significant Transitions Act and H.R. 2460, the Healthy Families 
Act before the H. Sub. Comm. on Workforce Protections, 110th Cong. (June 11, 2009) available at http://edlabor.house.gov/
hearings/2009/06/hr-2339-the-family-income-to-r.shtml. 
8 Heather Boushey, Center for American Progress, Helping Breadwinners When it Can’t Wait: A Progressive Program for Family Leave 
Insurance (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/fmla.pdf.
9 Id. at 1. 
10 Id. at 13.
11 Id. at 2. 
12 H.R. 1723, 111th Cong. (Introduced by Rep. Pete Stark on March 25, 2009). 
13 Id. §102(b)(1)(a). 
14 Id. §102(b)(1)(b). 
15 Id. §102(b)(1)(a) (stating that “State agrees to establish, or expand a State program in effect at the date of the enactment of 
this Act”)(emphasis added). 
16 Id. §102(b)(2)(a). 
17 Id. §102(b)(2)(b).
18 Id. §306. 
19 Id. § 101(1)(A).
20 Id. § 101(2)(C).
21 Id. § 101(2)(A)(II) (noting that small employers are voluntary participants).
22 See H.R. 3192, 109th Cong (Introduced by Rep. Pete Stark on May 1, 2006), H.R. 5873, 110th Cong. (Introduced by Rep. Pete 
Stark on April 22, 2008). 
23 S. 1681 §306, 110th Cong. (Introduced by Sen. Chris Dodd on June 21, 2007).
24 Id. §§ 301-02
25 Id. § 102. 
26 Id. § 103(d)
27 President’s Proposed Budget for the Department of Labor, FY 2011, pg. 797 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
Overview/.
28 See S. 3686; S. Rep. 111-243.  The report describes the purpose of the fund in the following terms: “Grants will support 
State start-up activities relating to the implementation of paid leave programs, such as program infrastructure in States that 
have passed but not implemented paid leave programs. The Committee is interested in the capacity of this new initiative to 
encourage passage of paid leave programs in additional States. Accordingly, these funds will have a 2-year period of availability 
to allow sufficient time for States to consider and pass legislation authorizing paid leave programs.” 
29 See Committee on Appropriations, FY2011 Labor, Health, and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill Summary 
Table available at http://appropriations.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=692:fy11-lh-appropriations-
&catid=33:labor-hhs-education&Itemid=134&Itemid=4. 
30 See Generally National Partnership for Women and Families, 2010 State Action on Paid Family and Medical Leave available at http://
www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Paid_Leave_Tracking.pdf?docID=1921. 
31 Washington might also be included in this category.  As noted earlier, Washington has passed a paid family leave program 
that would provide maternity and paternity benefits to new parents.  However, as of this writing, the State has yet to fund the 
program or empower an administrative agency to distribute benefits.  See Appendix A: Current Social Insurance Programs (PFL). 
32 See Arizona HB 2319, introduced by Rep. Daniel Patterson in Jan. 2010.
33 See Hawaii HB 2258, introduced by Rep. Karl Rhoads in Jan. 2010.
34 See New Hampshire HB 661, introduced by Rep. Mary Gile in Feb. 2009.
35 See Massachusetts S.71, introduced by Sen. Karen Spilka in Jan. 2009.
36 See New York A8742 introduced by Assemblyman Sheldon Silver in June 2009; Massachusetts S. 474 introduced by Sen. Pat 
Jehlen in January 2009. 
37 Hawaii supra note 33.
38 See Missouri HB 1940, introduced by Rep. Beth Low in Feb. 2010.
39 Massachusetts supra note 35; See also Massachusetts S.474, introduced by Sen. Pat Jehlen in Jan. 2009.
40 See Pennsylvania HB 1558, introduced by Rep. Jaret Gibbons in May 2009.
41 Arizona supra note 32. 
42 See Vermont H.672, § 472d(a), as introduced by Rep. Rachel Weston in Jan. 2010.
43 See Massachusetts H.124, §77, as introduced by Rep. Antonio Cabral in Jan. 2009.
44 Missouri supra note 38.
45 New Hampshire supra note 34. 
46 See Center for Working Families, New York State Paid Family Leave, pg. 4 available at http://www.workingfamiliesparty.org/
wordpress/uploads/2009/04/cwf-new-york-state-paid-family-leave.pdf (noting that the New York Assembly passed a Paid Family 
Leave Bill in 2008); Time to Care New York, Paid Leave for New York Families: We Need Time to Care available at http://www.
timetocareny.org/About.htm (noting that a Paid Family Leave Bill passed the New York Assembly in 2005); New Hampshire 
General Court, Docket of HB 661 available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/Bill_docket.aspx?lsr=744&sy=2010&
sortoption=&txtsessionyear=2010&txtbillnumber=HB661
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Family Security 
Insurance
Qualifying 
Event 
Workforce 
Attachment 
Requirements
Family Leave 
Insurance Act of 
2009, H.R. 1723 
(111th Congress), 
introduced by 
Rep. Stark1 
Family Leave and 
Insurance Act of 
2007, S. 1681, 
(110th Congress), 
introduced by 
Senators Dodd 
and Stevens2 
Social Security 
Cares3 
k Temporary 
Disability Insurance 
(TDI): applicant’s 
serious health 
condition (includes 
pregnancy). 
k Parental Care for 
a New Child (PCNC): 
birth or placement of 
a new child.
k Caregiving 
Insurance (CI): 
serious health 
condition of a family 
member, broadly 
defined.
Minimum of 950 
hours worked over 
a base period, 
which is defined 
as the last 4 or 5 
quarters preceding 
an application for 
benefits. Hours 
can be served at 
multiple employers. 
Self-employed 
individuals’ eligibility 
is determined based 
on earnings.
k TDI: same as FSI.
k PCNC:  same as 
FSI.
k Caregiving: 
FMLA-covered 
family members and 
domestic partners.
625 hours of service 
with one employer 
during the previous 6 
months.
k TDI: same as FSI.
k PCNC:  same as 
FSI.
k Caregiving: limited 
to FMLA-covered 
family members.
Employee must be 
eligible under FMLA 
(1,250 hours of 
work at a particular 
employer and a year-
in-service at that 
employer). Employee 
must have also 
earned wages with 
a covered employer 
for 12 of the last 18 
months prior to filing 
an application for 
benefits.
k TDI: same as FSI.
k PCNC:  same as 
FSI.
k Caregiving:
limited to FMLA-
covered family 
members; 
recommends an 
amendment to FMLA 
to cover more family 
members, such as 
domestic partners.
Based on Social 
Security credit 
model.  All 
employees, including 
those who are self-
employed, earn 
one credit for each 
$1,090 in earnings, 
up to a maximum of 
four credits per year.
k Before age 24, 
workers will need 
1½ years of work (six 
credits) in the three 
years prior to the 
leave date;
k Between ages 24 
through 30, workers 
will need credits for 
half of the time
Appendix E
Comparison of FSI Proposal to Similar Paid Time Off Proposals
ELIGIBILITY Workforce 
Attachment 
Requirements
Covered 
Employers
All. Employers with 
20+ employees. 
Employers may opt-
out if they adopt 
a voluntary plan 
approved by the 
agency administering 
the program. 
Self-employed 
individuals and 
employers with 
between 2 and 19 
employees may elect 
to participate.
All employers 
covered under 
the FMLA (50+ 
employees). 
Employers may opt-
out if they adopt 
a voluntary plan 
approved by the 
agency administering 
the program.  
Self-employed 
individuals and 
employers with 
between 2 and 49 
employees may elect 
to participate.
between age 21 
and the leave date 
(i.e. 2 years of work 
required if leave 
is taken at 25 and 
4 ½ years of work 
required if taken at 
age 30);
k At age 31 or older, 
workers need at least 
20 credits (i.e. 5 
years of work) in the 
10 years immediately 
before
the leave date.
Hours can be 
served at multiple 
employers. 
All.
ELIGIBILITY
Family Security 
Insurance
Family Leave 
Insurance Act of 
2009, H.R. 1723 
(111th Congress), 
introduced by 
Rep. Stark1 
Family Leave and 
Insurance Act of 
2007, S. 1681, 
(110th Congress), 
introduced by 
Senators Dodd 
and Stevens2 
Social Security 
Cares3 
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Duration
Wage 
Replacement 
Rate & 
Maximum 
Benefit Amount
k TDI and CI: 80% 
of weekly wages up 
to maximum of 150% 
the national average 
weekly wage.  
k PCNC: 90% of 
weekly wages up to 
maximum of 150% 
the national average 
weekly wage.
Less than $20,000*: 
100% 
$20,000-$30,000: 
75% 
$30,000-$60,000: 
55% 
$60,000-$97,000: 
40%
Above $97,000: 40% 
of $97,000.
*Income categories 
indexed to the 
national average 
weekly wage index.
Same as H.R. 1723. Follows current 
benefit schedule 
in Social Security 
Disability Insurance. 
Two “bend points” 
(calculated based on 
the national average 
wage index) are 
used to create three 
earnings brackets.  
Earnings up to the 
first bend point 
are replaced at 90 
percent, earnings 
between the first 
and second bend 
points are replaced 
at 32 percent, and 
earnings beyond the 
second bend point 
are replaced at 15 
percent up to the 
annually-updated 
federal maximum.
BENEFITS
Family Security 
Insurance
Family Leave 
Insurance Act of 
2009, H.R. 1723 
(111th Congress), 
introduced by 
Rep. Stark1 
Family Leave and 
Insurance Act of 
2007, S. 1681, 
(110th Congress), 
introduced by 
Senators Dodd 
and Stevens2 
Social Security 
Cares3 
k TDI: depends 
on length of an 
individual’s serious 
health condition; 
maximum annual 
duration of 26 
weeks; no total 
maximum duration.
k PCNC:  12 weeks 
per parent, must 
be taken within 12 
months of child’s 
birth or placement; 
no total maximum 
duration.
k CI: depends on 
length of caregiving 
need; maximum 
annual duration 
of 12 weeks, total 
maximum duration of 
26 weeks.
Same as FMLA: 12 
weeks per year for all 
qualifying events.
8 weeks per year for 
all qualifying events.
Same as FMLA: 12 
weeks per year for all 
qualifying events.
Taxation
Waiting period
Allowable 
increments of 
benefits
k TDI: 5 workdays 
per year, per serious 
health condition.
k PCNC: None.
k CI: 5 workdays 
per year, per serious 
health condition of 
the person being 
cared for.
5 days or more.
5 workdays per year.
Minimum increment 
of one day.
5 workdays per year.
Minimum increment 
of one day.
Does not specify.
Does not specify.
BENEFITS
Family Security 
Insurance
Family Leave 
Insurance Act of 
2009, H.R. 1723 
(111th Congress), 
introduced by 
Rep. Stark1 
Family Leave and 
Insurance Act of 
2007, S. 1681, 
(110th Congress), 
introduced by 
Senators Dodd 
and Stevens2 
Social Security 
Cares3 
Benefits are treated 
as taxable wages for 
income and payroll 
tax purposes.
Does not specify. Does not specify. Does not specify; 
presumably benefits 
would be subject 
to tax in the same 
manner as other 
Social Security 
benefits: if a 
recipient has another 
substantial source of 
income, benefits may 
be partially taxed. 
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Method of 
financing
Payroll tax 
earnings cap
k Large employers 
(20+ employees): 
Equal contributions 
from employer and 
employee at a tax 
rate of .2% each.
k Opt-in small 
employers (less 
than 20): Equal 
contributions from 
employer and 
employee at a tax 
rate of .1% each.
k Self-employed: 
Self-employed 
individuals who elect 
to participate are 
required to contribute 
at a tax rate of .2%
Same as Social 
Security earnings cap 
(currently $106,800).
k Large employers 
(20+ employees): 
Equal contributions 
from employer and 
employee at a tax 
rate of .2% each.
k Opt-in small 
employers (less 
than 20): Equal 
contributions from 
employer and 
employee at a tax 
rate of .1% each.
k Self-employed: 
Self-employed 
individuals who elect 
to participate are 
required to contribute 
at a tax rate of .4%.
None.
FINANCING
Family Security 
Insurance
Family Leave 
Insurance Act of 
2009, H.R. 1723 
(111th Congress), 
introduced by 
Rep. Stark1 
Family Leave and 
Insurance Act of 
2007, S. 1681, 
(110th Congress), 
introduced by 
Senators Dodd 
and Stevens2 
Social Security 
Cares3 
Payroll tax, 
contributions made 
on a pre-tax basis.
Payroll tax. Payroll tax. 3 financing options:
1) Increase in the 
Social Security payroll 
tax, which imposes 
equal contributions 
from employers and 
employees;
2) Lifting the earnings 
cap on which payroll 
taxes are assessed 
beyond its current 
level;
3) Allowing workers 
to trade future Social 
Security benefits 
for paid family 
and medical leave 
benefits.
Based on Social 
Security. Equal 
contributions from 
employees and 
employers.  Self-
employed individuals 
cover employer 
and employee 
contribution.
1  Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009, H.R. 1723,111th Cong. (2009).  
2 Family Leave and Insurance Act of 2007, S.1681,110th Cong. (2007). 
3 Heather Boushey, Helping Breadwinners When It Can’t Wait, A Progressive Program for Family Leave Insurance (Center for American 
Progress 2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/fmla.pdf.
4 Some recipients are required to pay federal income taxes on their Social Security benefits if they have another source of 
substantial income in addition to Social Security benefits, such as wages, self-employment, interest, dividends and other 
taxable income.  No Social Security recipient pays federal income tax on more than 85 percent of his or her Social Security 
benefits. IRS Publication 915, Social Security and Equivalent Railroad Retirement Benefits (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p915.
pdf.
Administration 
vehicle
Job protection
No. No.  Recommends 
an expansion of the 
FMLA to cover more 
employers, but does 
not recommend a 
specific threshold.
No.No.  Recommends 
an expansion of 
the FMLA to cover 
employers with 15+ 
employees.
ADMINISTRATION
JOB PROTECTION or ANTI -RETALIATION PROVISIONS
Family Security 
Insurance
Family Leave 
Insurance Act of 
2009, H.R. 1723 
(111th Congress), 
introduced by 
Rep. Stark1 
Family Leave and 
Insurance Act of 
2007, S. 1681, 
(110th Congress), 
introduced by 
Senators Dodd 
and Stevens2 
Social Security 
Cares3 
Either a single 
federal agency 
or a federal-state 
partnership.
Either a federal-
state partnership 
or, at the request 
of a state governor, 
administration by 
Social Security 
offices.  
Employers distribute 
and administer 
benefits and receive 
reimbursement 
from Family Leave 
Insurance Fund.
Social Security.
Anti-retaliation 
provision
Yes. Yes. Yes. Does not specify.
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Appendix F
Other Policy Models for Achieving Wage Replacement for  
Temporary Disability, Parental Care, and Caregiving
We explored a number of possible policy models to increase access to paid time off for health and 
caregiving needs.  In this section, we discuss the wage replacement models we explored in detail and 
the advantages and disadvantages of each.  
1. Employer-Based Models
One way to increase the number of employers that offer paid time off to employees is through 
favorable tax incentives.  For example, some members of Congress and federal policy experts have 
proposed establishing a new tax credit for employers who provide paid family and medical leave to 
their employees.1,2 The goal of employer tax incentives is to tip the financial bottom line in favor of a 
particular behavior.  An employer tax credit for offering paid time off might increase the number of 
businesses providing such benefits by making it affordable to do so.  Offering such benefits might 
then increase employee retention and productivity, which would provide another financial boost to 
businesses.3  
There is ample precedent for using federal tax policy to incentivize employers to adopt policies that 
help families manage caregiving obligations.  For instance, employers receive a federal tax credit of 
up to $150,000 when they provide child care facilities and resources to their employees.4  Employers 
also benefit from reduced payroll taxes when they offer Health Care or Dependent Care Flexible 
Savings Accounts (HSAs and DCFSAs), which allow reimbursement for health care, childcare, and 
some elder care expenses with pre-tax dollars.5   
Tax incentives to employers that provide paid family and medical leave would be a relatively 
efficient way for government to facilitate paid time off because employers would be responsible 
for administering the program.  The federal government could condition incentives on whether an 
employer meets broad, minimum standards (such as requiring that an employer provide extended 
time off for an FMLA-qualifying reason).  Beyond basic standards, employers could be allowed to 
innovate with various ways to provide additional paid time off.  This room for innovation might help 
an employer adapt a paid time off policy to meet the specific needs of its business, such as offering 
higher wage replacement or expanding the reasons employees can take extended time off work (for 
example, a sabbatical or time off for additional job training).  Ideally, this innovation would spur “best 
practices” models that could be replicated in other workplaces.  
The primary disadvantage with relying solely on employer tax incentives to increase workers’ access 
to wage replacement is that coverage is likely to be far from universal.  Evidence suggests that many 
employer tax credits tend to reward employers who are already inclined towards the behavior the tax 
credit is designed to incentivize rather than encouraging new behavior.6  Further, large employers are 
far more likely than small employers to offer work-family benefits like child care facilities and DCAPs.7  
While it is difficult to predict how many employers would decide to offer new paid time off programs 
as a result of a new tax credit, similar tax incentives have not shifted employer behavior to the point 
of achieving anywhere near universal coverage.8 In order to incentivize the vast majority of employers 
to take advantage of a paid time off tax credit, the credit itself would need to be fairly large, which 
would have a negative impact on federal revenue streams.  Also, the current economic recession has 
meant that other employer tax credits targeted directly at economic recovery, such as those provided 
under the HIRE Act and the first-time home buyer’s tax credit, have received higher priority.9 
Another option that locates responsibility for paid extended time off on employers is to directly 
mandate that employers provide paid time off for health and caregiving reasons.  For instance, the 
FMLA could be expanded to require that leave taken under the FMLA be paid by employers (but this 
would still mean that only about half of workers would receive benefits, unless FMLA were expanded 
to all businesses).  There are a number of examples of direct employer mandates, including the 
Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage requirements, civil rights laws prohibiting employment 
discrimination, the FMLA’s job protection mandate, and an employer participation requirement under 
the new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).10  Also, legislation currently pending in 
Congress—the Healthy Families Act—would require employers to provide a certain number of annual 
paid sick days to workers.11  Similarly, eight states have laws, known as “kin care” laws requiring 
employers who provide sick days to allow employees to use those days to care for family members.12  
Assuming a mandate applied across the board to small and large employers, it could be an effective 
way of securing private provision of paid time off for health and caregiving reasons.  Yet, the political 
reality of direct mandates has often meant that these laws are not evenly applied to small and large 
employers.13  
Some scholars have also expressed concern that employer mandates for paid time off could lead 
to job discrimination against individuals who might be perceived as being more likely to use the 
benefits.  For example, while take-up rates of unpaid FMLA tend to be relatively equal between 
men and women, there still might be a perception that women are more likely to use paid time off, 
particularly maternity and parental leave benefits.14 This perception could lead to disparities in labor 
market outcomes for women, including pay and hiring discrimination.15  
The risks of cost-shifting to likely users of paid time off inherent in a mandate nominally financed 
by employers argues in favor of a scheme that severs the direct link between leave-taking by 
individual employees and the tax imposed on employers to finance the leaves.  A social insurance 
scheme financed by a tax spread across employers and/or workers—and not “experience-rated” so 
that employers who have more leave-takers would not pay higher taxes—would help ameliorate this 
problem.16
Finally, a direct mandate tying responsibility for the expense and administration of benefits to 
particular employers may not meet the reality of today’s highly mobile workforce.17  With a direct 
mandate, employers might reasonably demand a policy requiring significant pre- and post- leave 
work history with that employer as a condition of eligibility. While we believe workers need to 
have a significant level of workforce attachment to qualify for wage replacement benefits and we 
support policies that encourage loyalty to the workforce after taking leave, onerous single-employer 
attachment requirements could prove too restrictive, and are not reflective of workforce realities.18  
We believe a social insurance approach, as described in our proposal, provides better protection to 
persons who must hold multiple jobs (such as low-wage workers with one or more part-time positions) 
or those who regularly change employers.
A similar, but less aggressive approach to a broad employer mandate for paid time off is using the 
government’s regulatory powers to incentivize businesses to provide paid time off for health and 
caregiving reasons.
For example, the Society for Human Resource Management has proposed giving businesses a “safe 
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harbor” compliance exemption from federal, state, and local leave laws if they provide paid time 
off benefits.19  However, exemptions from leave laws—like the FMLA’s job protection mandate—in 
exchange for wage replacement benefits are problematic because workers are less likely to take paid 
time off if they do not have a job to return to after their leave is over.20  
Another approach involves using the federal government’s regulation of federal contracts and 
grants to incentivize employers to offer paid family and medical leave benefits.  For example, some 
policy experts have proposed using the government’s significant purchasing power to take into 
consideration employer work-family policies when awarding federal contracts or grants, including 
whether contractors or grantees provide paid family leave to their workers.21  However, even though 
the federal contracting workforce is large (it represents nearly 25% of the American workforce),22 
government purchasing power alone will not secure universal access to wage replacement benefits 
for all workers.
2. Employee-based models
Rather than focusing on employer provision of paid time off, government could encourage workers to 
finance their own time off by incentivizing and supporting dedicated personal savings.  
For example, the government could allow tax-preferred savings accounts similar to Health Care or 
Dependent Care Flexible Savings Accounts (HSAs and DCFSAs).23 The money set aside would be pre-
tax, so workers could reduce their adjusted gross income and pay for paid family and medical leave 
with untaxed dollars.24
Another approach is for the government to subsidize private savings.  Several countries have 
adopted a savings account model to assist families when they have children, although it is important 
to note that these models are a supplement—not an alternative—to other work-family policies, such 
as social insurance programs for maternity and parental leave.25 
An individual account model could be an administratively inexpensive way for government to 
facilitate wage replacement for time off for health and caregiving reasons because a private entity 
would likely administer the accounts.  Individual accounts also have the advantage of being portable 
and flexible. Workers could access funds even if they have changed jobs, and workers would have 
the flexibility to decide what proportion of their earnings to set aside based on their own individual 
situation.  Some workers might be able to save enough to fully account for lost wages instead of 
relying on a social insurance program that caps benefits above a certain income level and does not 
replace wages at 100 percent.
While the individual account model has many attractive features, it is not feasible to rely solely on 
this model to ensure coverage for most workers, particularly workers facing the most economic 
insecurity.  Evidence from similar individual savings account models—such as DCFSAs and HSAs—
shows that a large number of employers do not offer such accounts26 and of those who do, take-
up rates among employees tend to be low. 27   Assuming no change in the voluntary nature of the 
individual savings account model, we believe it is unlikely to generate adequate savings to support 
current needs, especially the needs of low-wage workers, but also early-career workers of all income 
levels.
Individual accounts are also often subject to annual contribution caps, which limits the tax-preferred 
advantage of this type of savings vehicle. For example, the capped savings rate for DCFSAs, which 
can be used to offset the cost of childcare, is $5,000 per year.28  This amount does not come close to 
covering the actual costs of high-quality childcare for most families.29  It is unlikely that the tax code 
could financially bear a high enough savings cap needed to help most families achieve sufficient 
wage replacement for time off for health and caregiving reasons.
Even if an individual account model was adopted, it would likely need to be designed to allow 
workers to roll over their savings from year to year, as with 401(k) accounts, rather than the annual 
“use it or lose it” approach that has been adopted for health savings accounts. Note that Health 
Reimbursement Accounts (HRAs), which are set up and funded by employers, roll-over unused funds 
from one year to the next.30  
Yet, even with roll-overs, higher contribution caps and individual foresight, we anticipate 
disadvantages with the individual account model. Many workers with new children are relatively new 
entrants to the workforce and will not have had enough time in the labor market or surplus earnings 
to save for parental care or other unexpected events or situations.  Others won’t be able to afford to. 
Another employee-centered policy model is to require that workers carry insurance that would 
provide wage replacement during time off for temporary disability, parental care, or caregiving.  This 
model is similar to the individual mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 
and the many state laws that require vehicle owners to carry liability insurance.  As with the PPACA, 
an individual mandate could be coupled with government subsidies and tax credits to ensure that 
mandated coverage is affordable for low and moderate income families.  The PPACA’s individual 
mandate is also supported by an employer participation requirement; a similar requirement could 
reduce the risk that employers who currently provide paid time off would stop doing so.
By mandating universal participation in an insurance pool, the government forces a broader 
spreading of risks than a private insurance market.31  Spreading risks broadly could reduce the cost 
of insurance and facilitate inclusion of workers who would be excluded from private insurance and 
for whom saving privately for individual coverage would be prohibitively difficult, particularly women 
and low to middle-income workers.32
Without some degree of government subsidy, an individual mandate to insure for health and 
caregiving needs will be unaffordable for most workers.  Even families with the resources to set aside 
funds for a rainy day may have competing out of pocket expenses.  Moreover, there are separate 
public policy reasons to encourage individuals to save for competing life events, such as college and 
retirement, rather than make mandatory payments for paid time off insurance.  Finally, unlike health 
or auto insurance, there is virtually no functioning private market for “family and medical leave 
insurance” because caregiving needs do not easily fit into the actuarial parameters necessary to 
sustain a private insurance market.33  Given that caregiving obligations are a universal concern, and 
healthy childrearing is a social good, a social insurance program that allows for some shared costs is 
a preferable alternative to precluding access to extended time off for those who need it most, such 
as chronically disabled individuals or childbearing women. 
3. State-Based Models
An alternative to focusing on a national policy solution is working towards incremental progress in the 
states.  The federal government could still play a role by providing grants to states who wish to start 
their own TDI and PFL programs, such as those that currently exist in California and New Jersey.  
The grants approach has been proposed in Rep. Lynn Woolsey’s Family Income to Respond to 
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Significant Transitions Act34 and the Administration’s FY 2011 Budget for the Department of Labor.35  
Both proposals seek to encourage the establishment of TDI and PFL programs at the state level by 
providing federal grants for the design and implementation of such programs.36    
While grants to states to implement TDI and PFL programs certainly have the potential to increase 
access to these benefits, we believe the need is of such magnitude that we cannot wait for all 50 
states to act.  In addition, we believe it would be unfair and confusing to have a disparity in benefits 
simply based on where one lives.  A state-by-state approach could also result in a race to the bottom 
effect where states provide minimal benefits to keep the employer contribution low.37   As discussed 
in our proposal, we believe a federal-state partnership would be a viable way to administer a paid 
time off program for health and caregiving reasons.  Federal standards would be put in place 
to ensure that benefits are equal across jurisdictions, but states would be allowed flexibility in 
administering the program.
We believe that some of the models discussed above, such as pre-tax savings accounts and 
employer tax credits, could supplement a national social insurance scheme by encouraging employer 
innovation and by incentivizing personal savings by workers to finance their own health and 
caregiving needs. 
Until a national scheme is adopted, these incentive plans might be a valuable first step.  However, 
incentives alone are unlikely to achieve the full coverage we favor.  For this reason, we favor a 
national social insurance program, which has the practical advantage of risk-pooling, and recognizes 
the collective nature of social risks and responsibilities.38  As outlined in our proposal, we believe 
there are compelling economic, public health, and equity reasons to treat the support of workers with 
temporary disabilities or caregiving obligations as a collective obligationwhose costs are shared.  
m
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